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FACTORS INFLUENCING SPECIES PERFORMANCE IN A CROSS-TAXON
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

by

LAURENT PRETOT

Under the Direction of Sarah F. Brosnan, PhD

ABSTRACT
Species vary in the ease with which they can solve apparently similar problems. For
instance, problems will be interpreted differently by different species due to differences such as
how they process the world or their ecology. The latter is the focus of the ecological approach to
cognition, which posits that ecology influences decision-making such that each species performs
better on tasks that are naturally relevant to them. In a previous work, my colleagues and I
compared the performance of cleaner fish and nonhuman primates, which differ substantially in
brain size and ecology, on a dichotomous choice task derived from the cleaner fish ecology. In
the task, subjects chose between two different plates, each containing a same food; if they chose
the food from plate A, they could then choose the food from plate B as well, whereas if they

chose B first, A was no longer available. Fish were better than primates at solving this task,
emphasizing the role of ecology in shaping one species’ decision-making. For my dissertation
project, I explored possible explanations for the primates’ poor performance in the task. In a first
series of studies, I investigated the possibility that species differed in the task because of
differences in the capacity to recognize the relevant cues (i.e. the plate design), to solve it. I thus
repeated the task with fish and nonhuman primates, using variations designed to be more salient
to primates. In a first experiment, the foods were different colors, whereas in a second
experiment, they were hidden to avoid the prepotent response. In a second series of studies, I
tested monkeys in a computerized paradigm that differed from the plate task by removing
interaction with the human experimenter, which may be distracting, and providing a more
standardized testing environment. Finally, in a last study, I investigated one possible cognitive
limitation to the primates in the plate task, the failure to use backwards induction to solve it.
These studies allowed me to investigate the role of ecology in species’ decision-making, a
perspective that is often neglected in studies of cognition.

INDEX WORDS: Ecology, Cognition, Decision-making, Dichotomous choice task, Fish,
Primates
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1

INTRODUCTION

Species differ in numerous factors, but perhaps the most surprising for the traditional
view of comparative cognition is that different species reactions to the same experimental task
can differ substantially. Why this is the case is a major question that must be addressed in
cognitive psychology. Generally, the focus has been on two obvious factors that influence
decisions, differences in species’ ecologies and cognitive abilities. To investigate which factors
influence an individual’s decisions and how much, in what circumstances and how they interact,
psychologists have used two nonmutually exclusive approaches that focus on different aspects of
a species’ behavior. On one hand, the cognitive approach attempts to explain decision-making
based on brain size and relative intelligence, and predicts that species that evolved larger brains
(including primates) should demonstrate advanced cognitive skills as compared to species that
did not. On the other hand, the ecological approach explains decision-making based on one
species’ ecology. According to this view, each species is predicted to have developed its own
particular abilities and outperform others in tasks for which they possess specific adaptations
(e.g., Balda & Kamil, 1989; Kamil, 1988, 1998; Kamil & Mauldin, 1987; Shettleworth, 2009).
In a prior study, Salwiczek, Prétôt, Demarta, et al. (2012) compared the performance of
three primate species (Cebus [Sapajus] apella, Pongo spp. and Pan troglodytes) with the
bluestreak cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) on a dichotomous choice task derived from the
natural cooperative interaction between the cleaner fish and its client fish species, who visit the
cleaner’s territory to have their ectoparasites and dead or infected tissue removed. In the task,
subjects chose between two different plates, each containing the same food and amount; if they
chose the food from plate A, they could then choose the food from plate B as well, whereas if
they chose the food from plate B first, plate A was no longer available. Therefore, the optimal
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foraging strategy was to take the food from plate A first before the food from plate B. The fish
were better than the primates at solving this task, emphasizing the role of ecology in shaping a
species’ decision-making. However, to draw the general conclusion that it is the ecological
relevance of a task that primarily influences species’ abilities to solve it, it was necessary to
show that primates would improve, and match or outperform fish, in a similar task more relevant
to primates, and also rule out possible alternative explanations for the primates’ poor
performance.
To address the first issue, for this project, I investigated the possibility that species
differed in the plate task because of differences in the capacity to recognize the relevant cues
(i.e., the plate design), to solve it. To do this, I compared the performance of several nonhuman
primate species with cleaner fish in versions of the plate task with cues more relevant to primates
than fish. In a first experiment, the cues were changed from the design/color of the plate, which I
hypothesized was more ecologically relevant to fish, to the color of the foods (the plates
remained identical), which is presumably more ecologically relevant to primates. In a second
experiment, the foods were hidden (by cups in primates and behind plates in fish), because
primates are known to have difficulty making the correct choices when food is visible. Second, I
tested monkeys in two computerized versions of the plate task. The first paradigm differed from
the plate task by removing interaction with the human experimenter, which may be distracting,
and providing a more standardized testing environment, whereas the second was an adaptation of
the first paradigm designed to be more relevant to primate ecology. Finally, I investigated one
possible cognitive limitation to the primates in the plate task, the failure to use backwards
induction to solve it. In this study, I tested monkeys using the manual “paddle-box” task,
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originally designed for testing planning skills in apes, which consisted of a box containing three
levels of paddles that subjects rotated to drop a food into a tube that delivered it.
In this dissertation, I first provide a literature review, which goes over some major studies
that have inspired and motivated my choices of dissertation projects. Then, I present each of
these projects (two of which have been already published, one is currently in review, and one is
still in preparation). Finally, I conclude with the overall implications and future directions of my
research to date.

1.1

Literature Review
1.1.1

Cognitive and Ecological Approaches to Cognition

It is often assumed that measures of brain complexity, typically estimated based on brain
size, reflect a species’ cognitive abilities, in particular the presence of more general cognitive
abilities (e.g., Bitterman, 1965; Deaner, van Schaik, & Johnson, 2006; Deaner, Isler, Burkart, &
van Schaik, 2007; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011). The cognitive approach proposes that
species’ differences in cognitive capacities are due to relative distances in phylogeny.
Consequently, taxa that evolved a large brain (including primates) should be more likely to
demonstrate advanced cognitive skills as compared to species that did not. This approach
supports the general-purpose intelligence hypothesis, which predicts that brain-sized differences
in intelligence are unrelated to obvious features of ecology (Hare & Wrangham, 2002). Instead,
abilities can be applied across contexts and have not been selected to solve any specific
evolutionary problem. From a comparative perspective, a similar approach is the general process
view, which holds that cognitive capacities involve processes that are widely distributed in
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animal taxa and used for a wide range of problems (Bitterman, 2000; Macphail & Bolhuis,
2001).
Although brain complexity is clearly important, so too is the environment in which each
species evolved. The ecological approach to cognition (also called the adaptive specialization
approach, adapted cognition hypothesis or ecological intelligence hypothesis) recognizes this
latter aspect and predicts that because cognitive abilities have been selected to solve evolutionary
salient problems, a species’ most flexible cognitive abilities can be demonstrated in settings for
which these abilities evolved (see Hare & Wrangham, 2002). Consequently, each species is
considered to have developed its own particular abilities and outperform others in tasks for
which they have specific adaptations (e.g., Balda & Kamil, 1989; Bshary, Salwiczek, & Wickler,
2007; Emery, 2006; Kamil, 1988; Kamil & Mauldin, 1987; Shettleworth, 2009). If “intelligence
is seen as solving problems of ecological relevance in the environment in which the species
evolved, then all species still extant are equally intelligent in their own ways and the question
becomes what different species’ intelligence consist of.” (Shettleworth, 1998, p. 570).
A classic instance of the ecological approach is the comparative study of food-caching in
birds. In early work, Kamil and Balda (1989) found that Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga
Columbiana) and pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus), two species most dependent upon
stored food for surviving winters, outperformed less cache-dependent scrub jays (Aphelocoma
coerulescens) in a food-recovery experiment. Although these results could not be taken as proof
of species differences in other aspects of cognition (e.g., spatial memory), they emphasized at
least the importance of ecology in shaping specific aspects of species’ decision-making.
In a follow-up study, however, nutcrackers performed better than scrub jays in a spatial
memory task, but not in a nonspatial, color memory task (Olson, Kamil, Balda, & Nims, 1995).
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This finding strengthened Kamil and Balda (1989)’s suggestion that differences in performance
on spatial tasks might reflect species’ dependence on food caching. Similar results were obtained
for two populations of black-capped chickadees (Pravosudov & Clayton, 2002): Alaskan
chickadees, which live in harsh environments and are highly dependent on food caching,
performed better in spatial memory tests than Colorado chickadees, although the populations did
not differ in a nonspatial version of the task.
Importantly, cognitive and ecological approaches are not contradictory. On the contrary,
although they focus on different underlying causes of a species’ behavior, they presumably both
influence behavior. As a result of the conflict between both views, Kamil (1988, 1998) proposed
a synthetic multilevel approach to the study of animal cognition, one that integrates both
cognitive and ecological questions and eliminates false dichotomies.

1.1.2

Cross-Species Comparison Techniques

Cross-species comparisons are helpful to explore questions about the adaptive function of
cognitive abilities, the focus of the ecological approach (Kamil, 1988, 1998). Somewhat
surprisingly, however, empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is rare (Shettleworth,
2009); in particular, most of these studies have strictly limited the comparison to closely related
species. One reason for this is that such studies often suffer from the so-called “learningperformance” problem (Bitterman, 1960, 1965): species’ differences in performance in a task
cannot be explained exclusively by differences in cognitive ability per se, because of the
influence of external factors associated with the procedure (see Balda & Kamil, 1989). For
example, in their bird study on food-caching, Balda and Kamil (1989) pointed out that species’
differences in performance in the food-recovery task may not have been the exclusive result of
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differences in cognitive abilities between species (i.e., spatial memory), because other variables,
like site preferences, systematic movement patterns, differential use of space and other speciesspecific behavioral differences, might also have played a role in their behavior.
Different alternative strategies have been proposed to control for this problem. For
example, Bitterman (1965) suggested a technique he called “control by systematic variation.”
The idea was to develop a series of experiments that test each potential variable (called
“contextual variables”; Macphail, 1985) in order to determine which one(s) may affect one
species’ performance. This strategy presents, however, a major downside in that it is functionally
impossible to test for all variables. An alternative technique to solve this problem is called
“converging operations” (Kamil, 1988, 1998), in which species that are compared are tested with
a battery of different experiments based on the same cognitive ability but across different
settings. If the pattern of species differences holds across those tasks, this provides fairly
convincing evidence that the difference is cognitive. For example, after finding differences in
performance in the food-recovery task (Balda and Kamil, 1989), researchers tested the same
species in a variety of spatial memory tasks (Kamil, Balda, & Olson, 1994; Olson et al., 1995).
Species differences in performance remained similar across all tasks (but not in a nonspatial
memory task; see Olson et al., 1995), indicating that these differences were likely due to
difference in spatial memory.
Despite its potential, the technique of converging operations does not test for the
hypothesis that the species differences observed are due to some general factor; that is, a species
may outperform another not because both differ in specific cognitive abilities, but because one is
simply more adapted to laboratory settings than the other. Consequently, an additional step,
called “differentiation,” is required (see Kamil, 1998). This strategy involves designing an
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experiment to be as similar as possible to those demonstrating species differences through
converging operations, but testing a different cognitive ability. If there are differences in species’
performance in the new task, and these differences depend on the context of the task, then we
have evidence that the differences in performance are due to specific cognitive abilities and not
just some general factor. Additionally, this means that the differences observed in other tasks are
unlikely to be due to contextual variables, because if these external factors were responsible for
the differences in a specific task, those same factors should have resulted in species differences
in other tasks, too (see Lefebvre & Giraldeau, 1996; Olson et al., 1995). Of course, it is
important to keep in mind that although this technique (as with any other for that matter) strongly
weakens the argument from contextual variables, it does not eliminate it. In addition, the major
drawback of this approach is that it requires researchers to conduct a whole research program,
which may be long and costly.
Despite these issues, taken together, following these techniques will provide strong
support for the hypothesis that species’ differences in performance in a task is due to speciesspecific abilities rather than some aspect(s) of the procedure. For my dissertation, I took an
approach similar to the one suggested by Kamil and colleagues (see Kamil, 1998), using
converging operations, to investigate further species’ difference in performance on a
dichotomous choice task derived from the cleaner-client fish cleaning interaction in the wild
(Salwiczek et al., 2012). Unfortunately, due to time and resource constraints, I was not able to
test species using the technique of differentiation. However, I address this issue in my
conclusions and provide some future directions on how this could be implemented. Thus, despite
this missing step, I believe that my research represents a nice example of the template promoted
by Kamil (1998).
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1.1.3

Comparative Studies: The Fish Model

Fish General Cognition
The ecological approach provides a general functional theoretical framework which
allows for the integration of studies on any animal species, and has led to a great diversification
of animals studied, and in particular to the appreciation that animal clades that lack particularly
large and complexly structured brains may provide examples of impressive cognitive abilities
(Salwiczek et al., 2012). This is in particular true for fishes, for which much evidence has
emerged supporting greater cognitive ability than was previously recognized (e.g., Agrillo,
Miletto Petrazzini, Tagliapietra, & Bisazza, 2012; Brown, Laland, & Krause, 2011; Ferrari,
Trowell, Brown, & Chivers, 2005; Grosenick, Clement, & Fernald, 2007; Kendall, Rendell, Pike,
& Laland, 2009; Piffer, Miletto Petrazzini, & Agrillo, 2013; Vail, Manica, & Bshary, 2013,
2014; for reviews, see Brown, 2015; Bshary, Gingins, & Vail, 2014; Bshary, Wickler, & Fricke,
2002). For example, the male cichlids (Astatotilapia burtoni) use transitive inference to predict
fighting abilities of competitors (Grosenick et al., 2007), and sticklebacks (Pungitius pungitius)
employ so-called hill climbing social learning strategies (Kendal et al., 2009), in which they
compare their own foraging success with the success of observed individuals to update foraging
decisions.
Importantly, many studies have shown that fish, at least as a taxon, demonstrate diverse
skills previously attributed uniquely to primates (for a review, see Bshary et al., 2002; for an
analog approach comparing birds and primates, see Emery, 2006; Marler, 1996). For example,
the grouper (Plectropomus pessuliferus) and the coral trout (Plectropomus leopardus) hunt
collaboratively with other species, including giant moray eels (Gymnothorax javanicus),
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Napoleon wrasses (Chelinus undulatus) and even octopuses (Octopus cyanea; see Bshary,
Hohner, Ait-el-Djoudi, & Fricke, 2006; Vail et al., 2013). Interestingly, the partner-choice
abilities involved in these interactions are comparable to those of chimpanzees (see Vail et al.,
2014; for the primate data, see Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006a). Another behavior of interest
for comparative psychologists and primatologists is the foraging decisions of cleaner wrasse
(Labroides dimidiatus) with their so-called “client” fish species. This interaction involves many
social complex behaviors, which have been the focus of attention in the Machiavellian
intelligence hypothesis (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; also see Bshary, 2006; Bshary et al., 2002).

The Cleaner-Client Fish Mutualism
In the wild, cleaner fish occupy small territories (so-called “cleaning stations”) in which
they interact with a variety of predatory and nonpredatory reef fish species (so-called “clients”)
from which they remove ectoparasites, but also other material such as mucus and scales
(Randall, 1958). Conflict occurs because cleaners prefer to eat mucus over ectoparasites (Grutter
& Bshary, 2003), where eating the former constitutes cheating (for a review, see Bshary, 2010).
Cleaners adjust levels of cooperation to the strategic options available to clients to react to
cheating by cleaners. Predatory clients typically receive the highest service quality, whereas
nonpredatory resident clients, who lack choice options, punish cleaners for cheating.
Furthermore, cleaners pay attention to the presence of potential clients and are more cooperative
to current clients if that allows them to access bystanders (Pinto, Oates, Grutter, & Bshary,
2011). Thus, cleaner wrasse show high adaptation to the specifics of an interaction in their
foraging decisions, which are at the same time linked to interspecific social behavior.
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Client fish have been categorized as either “resident” clients, which live in small
territories and interact most frequently with the same cleaner fish (and are therefore a
“permanent” food source for the cleaner), or as “choosy” clients, which have larger home ranges
that cover several cleaning stations and can choose the cleaners with whom to interact (and are
therefore an “ephemeral” food source for the cleaner). Cleaners typically compete among each
other over access to choosy clients, while they each have exclusive access to their resident
clients; consequently, choosy clients are expected to use their choice options by visiting stations
where the service is better. Field observations found that choosy clients have priority for
cleaning access over the residents (Bshary, 2001). This priority of access is likely because
visitors will leave if they are not cleaned rapidly, and they are less likely to return to the same
cleaner if they have been ignored in the past or have received a bad service (Bshary & Schäffer,
2002).
To further investigate this behavior, Bshary and Grutter (2002) conducted a lab study
with Australian cleaner fish, in which they replaced client fish with plates; one plate mimicked
the choosy client, while the other mimicked the resident client. Importantly, the two plates
contained a same reward and only differed in size. In the task, if the subject picked the food from
the choosy plate first, it could then take the food from the resident plate too (the same way as a
client fish would prioritize cleaning access to a choosy client over a resident client). In contrast,
if the resident plate was selected first, the choosy plate was withdrawn (the same way as a
choosy client would leave and switch of cleaning partner if it is not cleaned first). In this case,
the subject obtained only the food from the resident plate. Therefore, the optimal foraging
strategy was to take the food from the choosy plate first before the food from the guaranteed,
resident plate. Within just a few trials, cleaner fish learned to choose the choosy plate first,
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supporting previous field observations of this behavior. The plate task represents a simple but
great example of how ecological questions can be further tested in a laboratory setting (for a
similar approach, see Bshary & Grutter, 2005, 2006; Bshary et al., 2008; Vail et al., 2014).

1.1.4

Testing the Ecological Hypothesis: The Fish-Primate Model

The ecological hypothesis is rather nonspecific with respect to the cognitive processes
that underlie the cleaners’ performance in the plate task. Therefore, an important remaining
question is whether success in the task involves widespread learning rules or rather specific
abilities (in which case it would support the ecological hypothesis). Could another species easily
solve the task at levels comparable to the fish? To answer these questions, my colleagues and I
subjected adult and juvenile Philippine cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus), capuchin monkeys
(Cebus [Sapajus] apella), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo spp.) to the
plate task (Salwiczek et al., 2012).
We chose primates as a group of comparison for three reasons. Most importantly, both
fish and primates (our three species in particular) possess complex foraging and social behaviors,
which have been used to explain the evolution towards large brain in primates (e.g., see Deaner
et al., 2006; Reader et al., 2011). In addition, at least chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys are
known to eat immobile food sources (like fruits and leaves) and hunt for meat and catch
ephemeral prey in the wild (e.g., Boesch, 1994; Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Fragaszy, Visalberghi,
& Fedigan, 2004; Rose, 1997), which may roughly correlate with the stable resident and mobile
choosy clients. Second, all three species cooperate, at least in laboratory settings, and
chimpanzees and capuchins also do so in the wild (e.g., chimpanzees: Boesch, 1994; Melis et al.,
2006a & 2006b; Suchak et al., 2014; orangutans: Chalmeau, Lardeux, Branditas, & Gallo, 1997;
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Dufour, Pelé, Neumann, et al., 2009; capuchins: Brosnan, 2010; Perry, Manson, Dower, &
Wikbert, 2003). Finally, all three primate species have a large brain-to-body ratio compared to
other species (including most other primates, as capuchins have an atypically large brain-to-body
ratio for New World monkeys; see Deaner et al., 2007), which has been used as a proxy for
cognitive ability.
We hypothesized that if brain size is the key feature in determining whether species can
solve this task, one would expect that primates outperform fish. However, if ecology is more
important, then one would predict that fish outperform primates in this task derived from cleaner
fish ecology. The comparison between adult and juvenile cleaners allowed them to address the
potential role of individual experience. In addition to their longer experience of cooperating with
client fish, adult cleaners usually interact about three times more frequently with visitors than do
juveniles (Barbu, Guinand, Bergmüller, et al., 2011; Bshary, 2001). Thus, juveniles rarely
experience the situation in which a visitor and a resident client seek cleaning simultaneously. If
adult cleaners perform better than juveniles, it would indicate that individual experience with the
task in the field helps to solve the experiment.
Subsequent to the initial learning test, subjects were tested on a reversal test (Rumbaugh,
1971, 1997; also see Gossette & Inman, 1966; Harlow, 1949; Harlow & Warren, 1952;
Schusterman, 1962). The procedure was identical to the initial test, but the role of each stimulus
was reversed (i.e., the former permanent plate now became the ephemeral plate, and vice versa).
This test is frequently used to demonstrate flexibility in cognitive processing. In our task, we
used this procedure as an additional way to test the role of learning in the task. In fact, reversal of
roles never occurs in a fish natural context (e.g., a visitor client never turns into a resident client);
therefore, success in the task could not be associated with fish specific adaptations. For the
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primates, we hypothesized that if subjects were faster at solving the reversal than the learning
test, then it would indicate that learning the task is what is challenging for them. Supporting the
ecological hypothesis, adult cleaner fish performed better than all primates (and a closely related
cleaner wrasse species; see Salwiczek et al., 2012) in learning the task. Interestingly, the majority
of monkeys (but not apes) who eventually learned the task subsequently performed relatively
well on the reversal procedure, like the fish, indicating that learning the rules was part of the
difficulty of the task. In addition, we found that adult fish outperformed juveniles, which
emphasized the important role of learning and experience to make optimal decisions in the wild.

1.1.5

Potential Factors Influencing Species Performance in the Plate Task

In this paper, we proposed four main (not mutually exclusive) reasons that might explain
why the plate task is difficult to learn (Salwiczek et al., 2012). First, we hypothesized that it
could relate to known reinforcement mechanisms: whichever plate was selected first, subjects
always received one same immediate reward, therefore, unlike classic associative learning tasks,
where subjects are rewarded once after selecting one of two stimuli (or a sequence of multiple
stimuli), the plate task required subjects to select the second stimulus for an additional reward
after it already received a reward from the first stimulus. In this case, the intermediate reward
from the permanent plate may have interfered with learning mechanisms, in that it lowered the
incentive value of the reward from the subsequent, ephemeral plate. That is, because the reward
from the suboptimal, permanent option was received prior to the one from the optimal ephemeral
option, blocking or overshadowing mechanisms may have lowered the incentive value of the
ephemeral option.
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Second, we hypothesized that it is possible that although both fish and primates
presumably reacted to the removal of the ephemeral plate as a punishment, only fish may have
perceived the task as a social interaction. In that case, they would have perceived the removal of
the ephemeral plate as the loss of a cooperation partner, and hence as a punishment that reduced
the likelihood that subjects would choose the permanent plate again in the future. The aversion to
losing any client would make the ephemeral plate more attractive to cleaners and thus help in
learning the task faster. Supporting this hypothesis, in previous work, the cleaner fish often
responded in the task with tactile stimulation when the plate returned, a behavior cleaners
typically use to reconcile and to make clients stay longer under natural conditions (Bshary &
Würth, 2001).
Third, we hypothesized that the primates may have failed to use a higher cognitive
mechanism, like backwards induction, to solve this task in lieu to the evolved predispositions
seen in the fish. Backwards induction (first introduced by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) is
a problem-solving strategy that consists of analyzing a problem from back to front in order to
determine what sequence of optimal actions is required to solve it. Evidence of this capacity in
animals was first demonstrated in a chimpanzee, Julia, in a tool-use procedure (Döhl, 1968). In
that study, Julia learned to open 10 boxes in the appropriate sequence, using specific tools that
she could find inside each box, to retrieve a food at the end. In our plate task, although the two
foods were presented simultaneously, they were always offered (or removed) sequentially.
Therefore, after subjects experienced and learned the outcome associated with each option, they
could have used backwards induction to determine what option they would have to choose next
in order to obtain the additional reward from the subsequent (permanent) option. One big
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difference between our study and this work, however, is that Julia received one reward at the end
of the sequence, whereas in our study subjects received their rewards at each step.
Finally, we hypothesized that the primates’ poor performance in the task might have been
due to frustration with the procedure. To illustrate this, some ape subjects would sometimes hit
or grab the plates rather than choosing a reward, or even refused to participate. This frustration
with the task might have caused the low performance in the task, in particular on the reversal
learning procedure.
To begin to address these four possibilities, we still had to demonstrate that primates
would improve their performance in a similar task derived from the primate ecology, and rule out
possible alternative explanations for the primates’ poor performance. Also, wherever possible,
we needed to test both fish and primates in the task, because we needed to make sure not only
that primates improved, but also that if it was a task derived from their own ecology, they would
outperform the fish. For my dissertation, I designed a series of adaptations to the task to test
these hypotheses.

1.2

Overview of this Dissertation
In Study 1, my colleagues and I investigated the possibility that species differed in the

plate task because of differences in the capacity to recognize the relevant cues to solve it (Lotem
& Halpern, 2012; for a review, see Rowe & Healy, 2014). Thus, I tested Moorean fish and
capuchin monkeys on a series of tasks designed to be more relevant to primates (Prétôt, Bshary,
& Brosnan, 2016b). In the original design that was based on cleaners, the plates differed but the
food outcomes were identical, because cleaners always consume the identical foods from
different food patches, in this case acquired from visitor and resident clients during social
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interactions. This may have given the cleaners an advantage in the plate task simply because they
were already predisposed to focus on the way the food was presented (i.e., the plate, which was
indeed the relevant stimulus) rather than the food itself, which was uninformative as the foods
were identical. For the primates, however, what is important is the food itself, not the food patch.
Although foods may be associated with specific surroundings (e.g., a species of tree may provide
hidden fruits), the general details of the source do not change (e.g., the fruits will not suddenly be
found in a different species of tree) and the patch may not be informative about the quality of
food (e.g., the position of the leaves will not tell whether the fruits are ripe; the fruits themselves
must be inspected). Therefore, as food color is potentially a more ecologically relevant cue to
primates than fish, I changed the color of the food item rather than the design/color of the plates.
In a second study, the foods were hidden, under cups for the monkeys and behind plates for the
fish, as primates’ learning performance in choice tasks is generally decreased by the presence of
visible rewards (see Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Boysen, Berntson, & Mukobi, 2001; Boysen,
Mukobi, & Berntson, 1999; Boysen, Berntson, Hannan, & Cacioppa, 1996; Diamond, 1981;
Murray, Kralik, & Wise, 2005). Although monkeys, as expected, improved their performance in
both versions of the task as compared to the original plate task, the Moorean cleaner fish
performed surprisingly well in all tasks, presumably because they generalized from their
experience in the wild. However, they performed substantially worse at the reversal tasks than
did the original Philippine fish, indicating possible differences in cognitive flexibility between
these two populations.
In Study 2, I tested three additional primate species (orangutans, gorillas and drill
monkeys) in the color and cup tasks (Prétôt et al., in prep), to see whether the prior results were
capuchin-specific, or if they generalized across the primate taxon. Interestingly, orangutans
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performed at levels comparable to capuchins in the color task, which supported my hypothesis.
However, they did not solve the cup task, whereas neither gorillas nor drills solved either of the
tasks. Although I can only speculate on why these primates in general did so poorly relative to
the capuchins’ performance (excepting the orangutans in the color task), I see at least three
possible explanations. First, it is possible that the cues were (inadvertently) more salient to
capuchins than other species; therefore, capuchins might have been better than the other primates
at finding the cues associated with success in the tasks. Second, and, I believe, most likely, the
primates might have done poorly in the tasks for reasons that were external to the task. In
particular, none of these species has a lot of experience with cognitive testing, especially relative
to the capuchins. Perhaps more tellingly, the gorillas and drills, who did least well, have even
less experience than the orangutans. Finally, capuchins may have done overall better in these
tasks because of aspects of their ecology.
In Study 3, my colleagues and I investigated the possibility that the primates’ poor
performance in the original plate task was due to unintentional extraneous cues associated with a
manual testing environment, in particular the presence of an experimenter and, again, visible
foods during the subjects’ choice (Prétôt, Bshary, & Brosnan, 2016a). To do this, I tested
capuchin monkeys and a new primate species, the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta), in two
computerized adaptations of the plate task. The first differed from the plate task by removing
interaction with the human experimenter, which may be distracting, and providing a more
standardized testing environment. The second was an adaptation of the first paradigm designed
to be more relevant to primate ecology. To do this, the ephemeral stimulus was moving from the
beginning of the trial, which more closely mimicked primates’ natural ephemeral food sources
(e.g., insects or small vertebrates, who would presumably be moving towards escape from the
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minute they realize that they have been seen). Monkeys’ overall performance in these tasks
matched the performance of the fish in the original study. Again, these results showed that with
the appropriate modifications, the monkeys could succeed in the task.
Relevant to this study, Pepperberg and Hartsfield (2014) proposed another limitation of
the procedure that may have explained species’ difference in performance in the original plate
task. They proposed that both fish and parrots might have excelled in the task because they are
naturally constrained to making a single choice at a time (with the mouth or bill), whereas
primates typically use both hands to reach multiple foods or objects simultaneously, but were
forced by the procedure to make only one choice. As a result, they proposed, the primates may
have found the limitations of the experimental task more difficult than the other species.
Although this third task was not run to test this hypothesis, it did so because the monkeys’
computerized testing is run using a joystick paradigm, which by default limits subjects to a single
choice at a time. The capuchins did indeed perform better on the computerized version in which
they used a joystick to make their choice, which could support this hypothesis (Prétôt et al.,
2016a). On the other hand, in more studies using an analogue of the procedure, two other species
that are naturally constrained to single choices by their anatomy, pigeons (which choose with
their bill) and rats (which choose with their mouth), failed to choose the food maximizing
solution (Zentall, Case, & Berry, 2017; Zentall, Case, & Luong, 2016). Thus, this hypothesis,
while intuitive and at least partially supported, needs additional testing using properly controlled
procedures to determine the degree to which it influences subjects’ responses.
In Study 4, finally, I tested one possible cognitive limitation to the primates in the
original plate task, the failure to use backwards induction (Prétôt & Brosnan, in review).
Backwards induction is a problem-solving strategy that consists of analyzing a problem from
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back to front in order to determine what sequence of optimal actions is required to solve it (von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Although there is evidence that apes (and other animals) show
some degree of backwards induction in various contexts and modalities (at least as per my
definition; e.g., joystick-based computerized maze tasks: Beran, Parrish, Futch, et al., 2015;
Fragaszy, Johnson-Pynn, Hirsh, & Brakke, 2003; Fragaszy, Kennedy, Murnane, et al., 2009;
touchscreen-based computerized maze task: Iversen & Matsuzawa, 2001; manual “paddle-box”
task: Tecwyn, Thorpe, & Chappell, 2013; manual finger-maze task: Völter & Call, 2014a; for a
tool-use version, see Völter & Call, 2014b), few studies have investigated this ability in
monkeys. In addition, most of these exceptions have used computerized procedures (e.g., Beran
& Parrish, 2012; Beran et al., 2015; Fragaszy et al., 2003, 2009; Pan, Kennedy, Pickering, et al.,
2011), whereas it is possible that this ability is best shown in manual tasks, which may provide a
more intuitive interface. Therefore, in this study, I tested monkeys using the manual “paddlebox” task, originally designed for testing planning skills in apes, which consisted of a box
containing different levels of paddles that subjects rotated to drop a food into a tube that
delivered it (Tecwyn et al., 2013). To evaluate subjects’ degree of skill in the task, the locations
of the food and tube were chosen according to the probability of retrieving the reward, starting
with those that gave the highest probability, and moving sequentially to those with the lowest
probability. Most subjects solved all levels of difficulty in the task, and monkeys succeeded as a
group in a generalization test. Although it is still unclear why, if they possess backwards
induction, the monkeys failed to use it in the original plate task, these findings demonstrate that
species may not always use all of their cognitive abilities in every situation.
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2

STUDY 1: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE OF
FISH AND PRIMATES ON A DICHOTOMOUS CHOICE TASK

Previously published as Prétôt, L., Bshary, R., & Brosnan, S. F. (2016b). Factors influencing the
different performance of fish and primates on a dichotomous choice task. Animal Behaviour,
119, 189–199.

2.1

Introduction
Animals’ decisions are constrained by their ecology, their cognitive ability, and the ways

in which they can interact with the world, among other factors. The ecological approach to
cognition posits that ecology influences decision making such that each species performs better
on tasks that are naturally relevant to them (Balda & Kamil, 1989; Kamil, 1988; Kamil &
Mauldin, 1987; Shettleworth, 2009). There are many possible mechanisms by which this could
occur, but one likely possibility is that species have been selected to focus on cues that are
relevant to them (Lotem & Halpern, 2012; for a review, see Rowe & Healy, 2014). Thus, species
may be good at identifying problems that are relevant to their ecology and predisposed to look
for some cues over others. For instance, research on food-caching birds has shown that
nutcrackers, Nucifraga columbiana, which are highly dependent on stored food for surviving
winters, outperform less cache-dependent species specifically in a spatial memory task, but not
in a nonspatial, color memory task (Olson et al., 1995). Similar results were obtained for two
populations of black-capped chickadees, Poecile atricapillus (Pravosudov & Clayton, 2002):
Alaskan chickadees, which live in harsh environments and are highly dependent on food
caching, performed better in spatial memory tests than Colorado chickadees, although the
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populations did not differ in a nonspatial version of the task. Somewhat surprisingly, such
comparisons of performance between ecologically relevant and nonrelevant tasks have remained
rare (Shettleworth, 2009). Here, we extend work comparing two phylogenetically distant species,
cleaner wrasses, Labroides dimidiatus, and brown capuchin monkeys, Cebus [Sapajus] apella,
that converge on their tendency to cooperate with conspecifics but perform differently in a
dichotomous choice task derived from a cleaner-specific cooperative situation (Salwiczek et al.,
2012).
In the wild, cleaner fish remove parasites and other material from client reef fish, which
visit them at their so-called cleaning stations. Clients have been categorized as either residents
with small territories (or small home ranges) that allow them to access only one cleaning station,
or as choosy clients, which have larger home ranges that cover several cleaning stations.
Cleaners typically compete with each other over access to choosy clients, while they each have
exclusive access to their resident clients; consequently, choosy clients are expected to use their
choice options by visiting stations where the service is better. Field observations found that
choosy clients have priority for cleaning access over the residents (Bshary, 2001); they also
typically switch to another cleaner if ignored, but are more likely to return to the same cleaning
station if they are inspected (Bshary & Schäffer, 2002), thus making the clients’ choosiness the
likely cause of this priority of access.
To test this in the laboratory, Bshary and Grutter (2002) replaced client fish with plates;
one plate simulated the choosy client, while the other represented the resident. Fish could feed on
the choosy plate only if they started to feed on it before they went foraging on the resident plate,
otherwise the choosy plate was withdrawn while the fish was eating from the resident plate, just
as choosy clients leave if they are not inspected rapidly; the resident plate, however, always
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stayed in the testing area until the fish had stopped feeding on it, just as resident clients often
queue for service if the cleaner fish inspects another client. Crucially, both plates offered the
same foods, in equal amount, and hence were equally attractive as food patches. Within just a
few trials, cleaner fish inspected the choosy plate first, supporting previous field observations of
this behavior.
In a subsequent study, Salwiczek et al. (2012) tested cleaner fish, capuchin monkeys,
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and orangutans, Pongo spp., on this plate task. The goal of this
study was to compare the performance of fish and primate species that converged on their
tendency to cooperate with one another (e.g., capuchins: Brosnan, 2010; chimpanzees: Boesch &
Boesch, 1989) and their propensity to eat both mobile and immobile food sources, which may
roughly correlate with the stable resident and mobile choosy clients (e.g., plant materials vs.
hunting for insects and smaller vertebrates; Fragaszy et al., 2004; Goodall, 1986), and to contrast
this with orangutans, which primarily eat fruits (Galdikas, 1988) and less frequently insects or
other mobile animal protein sources (Rijksen, 1978), but which do not cooperate to the same
degree in natural situations (but do in captivity: Chalmeau et al., 1997; Dufour et al., 2009). In
the task, fish outperformed all of the primate species. Although most of the monkeys (but not the
apes) eventually learned how to solve the task, they did not do so as quickly as the fish.
Salwiczek et al. (2012)’s results may initially seem counterintuitive given the primates’
large brains and known problem-solving skills, but from the cue perspective they make sense.
The fish were presented with a task that was derived from their own ecology, including the cues
that were needed to solve it, whereas the primates needed to first learn which cues were relevant,
and only then could they learn to solve the task. Of course, ecologically relevant cues are not the
only possible causes for the differences; differences in cognition may generally be due to how
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individuals perceive, process and/or act upon the available information, or to their motivation for
the task itself (Shettleworth, 2009). Therefore, to understand this more fully, we must test the
primates on alternative versions of the task that are designed to account for some of these other
potentially mediating factors. Additionally, to truly test the hypothesis, it is essential to test the
fish on the modified tasks as well, to see whether and how their performance changes across the
tasks. In the current paper, we independently tested two nonexclusive reasons that could explain
the poor performance of primates in the original plate task, namely whether the primates
understood which cue held the relevant information for the decision, and the tendency of
primates to be distracted by seeing food during the choice presentation.
Considering the first potential explanation for the superior performance of the fish, the
task simulated a natural situation for the fish but not for the primates, so we hypothesized that
only the fish would readily identify the relevant cue to solve the task (Lotem & Halpern, 2012).
In the wild, cleaner fish consume small invertebrates on the surface of client reef fish (Côté,
2000; Randall, 1958), which only become visible at short range (i.e. that need to be searched for
and found). Parasite abundance varies between species, partly as a correlate of client body size
(Grutter, 1995); therefore, cleaners should prefer certain clients over others because of their
quality as a food patch (Grutter, Glover, & Bshary, 2005). In other words, cleaners should focus
on the way the food is presented, rather than on the food itself. This was reflected in the original
plate task adaptation, where the plate color and pattern were the relevant stimuli, rather than the
foods, which were identical and uninformative (Salwiczek et al., 2012).
For primates, what is important is the food itself, not the patch. Although foods may be
associated with specific surroundings (e.g., a species of tree may provide hidden fruits), the
general details of the source (e.g., leaf shape) do not change (e.g., the fruits will not suddenly be
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found in a different species of tree) and the patch may not be informative about the quality of
food (e.g., the position of the leaves will not tell whether the fruits are ripe; the fruits themselves
must be inspected). Therefore, for this study, we tested to see whether a cue that was potentially
more ecologically relevant to primates (and presumably less ecologically relevant to fish) would
increase the primates’ performance. For this, we kept the plates identical, but used different
colored food items. We predicted that if the difference found in Salwiczek et al. (2012) was
simply due to a difference between species in where attention was focused, the monkeys would
outperform the fish in this task.
Considering a second potential explanation for the superior performance of the fish,
primates are known to have difficulty making the correct choices when food is present. While
primates certainly can make rational choices when food is visible, and can learn to overcome the
prepotent response with modifications (e.g., using symbols to represent foods; Boysen et al.,
1999; Murray et al., 2005), the original task by Salwiczek et al. (2012) may have been
challenging for the primates because of the presence of this extraneous cue (see Pepperberg &
Hartsfield, 2014). Therefore, for our second study, we adapted the task to minimize any
influence of having visible foods during the subjects’ choices. Note that because studies on the
influence of food visibility on decision making in any context on cleaner wrasse are lacking, we
had no prediction for whether visible vs. nonvisible food would affect their performance; on the
one hand, if the plate design was the important cue, then in principle, this task should not have
been more difficult, but on the other, swimming to the opposite side to claim food was
presumably atypical for them, and therefore, this may have made the task more challenging.
An important aspect of our comparative approach concerned the choice of the
experimental design. Because of the scarcity of nonhuman primate subjects, the capuchin
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monkeys were, by necessity, tested in a within-subjects design; therefore, it was essential to
collect within-subjects data for fish as well, and to give the fish equivalent experience with the
paradigm. To do this, we tested cleaner fish on the original plate task prior to the two other
studies. This also allowed us to compare our results for these cleaner fish (from Moorea) with
those from our earlier study (from the Philippines; Salwiczek et al., 2012). To summarize, we
predicted that (1) offering relevant information of the food (color) rather than some aspect of the
plate (e.g., color, pattern) would be more ecologically relevant for primates, so they should
outperform the fish in the first experiment, and (2) primates should solve the hidden-food task
more quickly than the original plate task (we had no prediction for the effect of this alteration on
the fish). If primates did notably better on one task than the other, it would provide evidence as
to which of these factors were most important in driving primates’ outcomes in the earlier task,
whereas a failure to improve performance in either task for primates would be difficult to
interpret.

2.2

Methods
2.2.1

Subjects and Housing

Capuchin monkeys
We tested nine captive-born brown capuchin monkeys (5 males, average age: 12 years,
range 7–17 years; 4 females, average age: 15 years, range 12–18 years) from two stable social
groups at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.
All subjects participated in both studies. Subjects were always housed with their social groups
except when they separated voluntarily for behavioral and cognitive testing. Subjects were fed a
diet according to their species-specific needs that included primate chow and fresh fruits and
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vegetables. They also received enrichment foods several times per day. Animals were never
deprived of food or water for testing purposes. Running water was available ad libitum,
including during testing. All of the capuchin monkey experiments were approved by the Georgia
State University IACUC (A12015) and met the standards of the United States. Georgia State
University is fully accredited by AAALAC.
The monkeys lived in two large indoor/outdoor enclosures. Each enclosure contained
ample three-dimensional climbing space as well as trapezes, perches and enrichment items. The
enclosure for each social group was divided into an indoor area (approximately one-half of their
total space) and an outdoor area. The subjects had previously been trained to voluntarily enter
test boxes attached to their indoor area, which allowed us to separate individuals from their
group for testing. Monkeys were tested in these testing enclosures. Subjects could choose not to
participate at any time by walking away from the experimenter, and there were no consequences
for the monkeys if they decided not to participate. No subject was ever involved in more than
one testing session for any of the studies on any given day.

Cleaner fish
Fourteen adult wild cleaner wrasses of unknown sex were tested at the University of
California Berkeley Gump Field Station in Moorea, French Polynesia. Subjects were caught with
hand-nets from reefs surrounding the field station, and then housed individually in glass aquaria
(approximately 50 × 40 × 40 cm) with a continuous flow of fresh sea water. All cleaners were
supplied with an opaque Plexiglas shelter tube for hiding during the day and sleeping at night.
Cleaners were first trained to feed off Plexiglas plates prior experiments. Individuals were fed
mashed prawn flesh and kept for 1–5 weeks prior to commencing experiments. Once
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experiments started, subjects were tested every day, and were not given any food except during
testing. All studies were conducted during a 4-week visit to the field station by the first author.
At the end of the study, all subjects were returned to the location they were caught. This research
was approved by the Regional Delegation for Research and Technology (DRRT, Délégation
Régionale à la Recherche et à la Technologie, Papeete, Tahiti).

2.2.2

General Procedure

The experimental set-ups for both species are illustrated in Figure 1.

Capuchin monkeys
The experimental design was based on the studies of Bshary and Grutter (2002) and
Salwiczek et al. (2012). Subjects had to choose between two stimuli, each assigned to one of two
specific roles, permanent or ephemeral. Choosing the permanent stimulus (which simulated a
“resident” client) always resulted in an immediate reward, and this stimulus was available
throughout the trial. The ephemeral stimulus (which simulated a “choosy” client) offered the
same immediate reward, but only if it was the first one the subjects chose. If subjects chose the
permanent stimulus first, the ephemeral stimulus was withdrawn out of reach and sight of the
subject. Thus, the optimal outcome was to pick the ephemeral plate first for a first reward, which
allowed the subject to also obtain the permanent stimulus for an additional reward. The side on
which each stimulus was presented for each trial was randomly determined but counterbalanced
within a session so that they were on each side an equal number of times, but with no more than
three trials in a row on the same side (see Salwiczek et al., 2012). Each subject received 10
sessions of 10 trials each (unless otherwise noted).
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Subsequent to the initial learning test, subjects were tested on a reversal test (Rumbaugh,
1971, 1997; Salwiczek et al., 2012). The procedure was identical to the initial test, but the role of
each stimulus was reversed (i.e. the previous ephemeral stimulus now behaved like the
permanent one, while the previous permanent stimulus now became the ephemeral one). If
subjects initially preferred the ephemeral stimulus and then reversed to prefer the newly
ephemeral (formerly permanent) stimulus, this would indicate that they are consistent in their
preference. The outcomes are more difficult to interpret if subjects initially preferred the
permanent stimulus. Reversing to maintain a preference for the newly permanent (formerly
ephemeral) stimulus would indicate a consistent preference for the permanent stimulus; however,
maintaining a preference for the newly ephemeral (formerly permanent) stimulus would be
uninformative because we would not know whether they preferred that physical stimulus (e.g.,
the plate or food color), or whether they recognized the utility of choosing the ephemeral
stimulus first when “forced” to do so after the stimuli were switched. Although we report data on
reversal tasks in all cases, it is difficult to know what these latter data mean.
Choices were made using a choice apparatus designed for Salwiczek et al. (2012; see
Figure 1). This apparatus was attached to the front of the monkey’s test box and was designed to
limit the monkey to a single choice. It consisted of two Velcro doors attached to each other by a
string that worked in a drawbridge-like fashion; that is, pulling one door closed when the other
was pushed open (for further detail, see Salwiczek et al., 2012). Foods were presented to subjects
on two plates placed on a single larger Plexiglas tray (to standardize the location of the plates)
carried by the experimenter, who wore an opaque face shield at all times in order to minimize
experimenter cueing (one subject was afraid of the face shield and so it was not worn for this
subject). The larger tray had a central opaque barrier that kept the two choice plates clearly
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separated. The trial started once the subjects faced the two food options. If a subject chose the
permanent option first, the ephemeral option was removed from the larger Plexiglas tray and put
on the top of the testing box, out of sight of the animal. Subjects were tested in four to five
sessions per week, but never in more than one session per day. The intertrial interval (ITI) was 5
min, chosen because, in previous testing, it was the ITI at which the monkeys did the best
(Salwiczek et al. (2012) started with a 15 min ITI, as with the fish, and tried a variety of different
options until the monkeys succeeded). Rewards were 750 mg banana-flavor precision pellets
(Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ, U.S.A.), which could be dyed different colors, as needed, in Study 2
(see below). All monkey studies were carried out prior the fish studies.

Cleaner fish
Subjects were tested in their aquarium, in which a separation with an opaque central
sliding door was introduced at approximately four-fifths of the aquarium length to create a large
“experimental” compartment and a small “resting” compartment (see Figure 1; for previous
training studies using a similar apparatus, see Bisazza, Agrillo, & Lucon-Xiccato, 2014;
Gierszewski, Bleckmann, & Schluessel, 2013; Miletto Petrazzini, Agrillo, Izard, & Bisazza,
2015). The foods were placed on two plates that were attached to handles so that they could be
moved towards subjects but also be retracted rapidly. A given trial started by confining the
subject to the resting compartment of the aquarium (subjects quickly learned to swim behind the
door before a trial started). The stimuli were then placed at the opposite end of the experimental
compartment. After a few seconds, the door opened and the cleaner could enter the experimental
compartment at will. Fish received two sessions per day, consisting of 10 trials each. The ITI
was set at 15 min (as in Salwiczek et al., 2012). The two plates were placed far enough apart that
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following a choice of the permanent option, the experimenter could remove the ephemeral option
before the subject could take the food.
Prior to testing, a different set of fish from the same population were pretested for color
preferences on a variety of colors to determine which ones to use during the testing. Pretesting
was done on a different set of fish to avoid the possibility of inadvertently biasing the test
subjects themselves. Colors were based upon those used in Salwiczek et al. (2012). Preferred
colors for all fish were red and yellow, and nonpreferred colors were green and black.

Learning Criterion and Statistics
We based success on the behavior of cleaner fish in previous experiments, which was a
preference for the outcome that maximized their food intake (Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Salwiczek
et al., 2012). Therefore, subjects were considered to have solved the test when they met the
preference criterion for choosing the payoff-maximizing ephemeral option. They failed if they
either developed a preference for the permanent option (using the same criterion as for the
ephemeral preference) or did not develop any preference within 100 trials. Subjects who
developed a preference for either option were then tested on a reversal test so that all subjects
had similar experience prior to subsequent studies. Subjects met the preference criterion when
they showed a statistically significant preference for one of the options, which could be achieved
by choosing the stimulus (1) 10/10 trials on one session, (2) 9/10 or 8/10 trials on two
consecutive sessions or (3) 7/10 trials on three consecutive sessions. These criteria were more
conservative than those used by Salwiczek et al. (2012) in two ways. First, we still used the
10/10 criterion on one unique session, but only if the subject selected each of the two stimuli in
at least one trial of a previous session (to ensure that they had experience with both outcomes).
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This did not apply to the reversal test, because a subject was considered to have already
experienced both options in the initial phase. Second, the 9/10 criterion on one unique session
was dropped because it came to our attention that, while used frequently as a criterion in
cognitive and behavioral testing, Monte Carlo simulation showed that this criterion allowed for
performance that exceeded chance levels (so we required two consecutive sessions of 9/10).
Although we planned to limit subjects to 10 sessions, if a subject chose either option 9/10, 8/10
or 7/10 in the last session (i.e. session 10), it was given another set (or two, in the case of
sessions with 7/10, followed by a second trial with 7 or more out of 10) of 10 trials to maximize
its chances of reaching criterion (Prétôt et al., 2016a). Subjects then received reversal trials.
To compare subjects’ performance across species and conditions, we used two statistical
tests. First, a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test allowed us to compare the number of individuals who
met criterion for preferring the ephemeral option to those who did not; in this way, we could
include data from all subjects, even those who developed a preference for the permanent option.
We used a within-subjects design for the comparisons between tasks, and a between-subjects
design to compare performance between species.
Our primary goal was to compare the capuchin monkeys’ responses to those of the
Moorean fish across all three tasks (the original plate task and the two new studies reported
here). However, to do this, we also needed to test the Moorean fish on the original task
(Salwiczek et al., 2012) in order to give them equivalent experience to the monkeys for our
within-subjects analysis. Repeating this test also allowed us to compare the outcomes of this
Moorean population of cleaner fish to the previous Philippine population. Second, a two-tailed
Mann–Whitney U exact test allowed us to analyze species’ differences in speed of learning. For
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this, we compared the results only from the learning phase for the Moorean fish and the capuchin
monkeys because they were the only populations for which we had results from all three tests.

Study Counterbalancing
We tested two groups of fish and two groups of monkeys. The two groups of fish were
both first tested on the original plate task (Study 1) before being tested in either the color task
(Study 2) or the cup task (Study 3). We were able to test some subjects that completed one task
on the other task (i.e., some subjects participated in all three studies; the length of the field site
visit constrained how many subjects could be tested in both Study 2 and Study 3). All monkeys
had previous experience with the task from Salwiczek et al. (2012) and/or in an analogous
computerized format (Prétôt et al., 2016a); two monkeys had experience only with the
computerized format. Therefore, in monkeys, we did not replicate the first study. The first group
was tested in Study 2 and then Study 3, while the second group was tested in Study 3 before
Study 2.

2.3

Study 1: Plate Task in Fish
Procedure
We replicated the study of Salwiczek et al. (2012; original work: Bshary & Grutter,

2002), to allow for (1) the fish to have the same previous experience as most of the monkeys (all
but two subjects had previously experienced this study) and (2) a within-subjects design in
comparing how subjects did on the adapted tasks (studies 2 and 3), as we did for the monkeys.
This secondarily allowed us to compare results from the two different populations of cleaner
fish.
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The 14 fish tested had a choice between two pieces of mashed prawn (0.001–0.005 g)
placed on two different Plexiglas plates. Each plate was marked with a central black dot to help
both experimenters and fish to locate the food on the plate. Both plates had the same surface, but
differed in shape, color and pattern. Plate 1 was rectangular, with two yellow/green-striped edges
and a black triangle, while plate 2 was square, with two edges in red and one in black (Figure 2).
The colors were the same as the colors used in previous testing on the Philippine fish (see
Salwiczek et al., 2012; we switched black for white because unlike in Salwiczek et al. (2012)’s
task, the plates in the current study were white), and each contained one of the favored and one
of the less favored colors based on our pretesting of the Moorean fishes’ color preferences (see
General Procedure). Each plate was fixed to a wooden stick, which ended with a parafilm hook
that allowed the experimenter to attach it to the inner glass surface of the aquarium. Both plates
and food were presented at equal distance from the central sliding door. Half of the individuals
were tested with plate 1 as the ephemeral choice, while the other half was tested with plate 2 as
the ephemeral choice. As described above, if a subject picked the ephemeral plate first, it was
allowed to take the food from the permanent plate as well. In contrast, if it picked the food from
the permanent plate first, the ephemeral plate was withdrawn from the aquarium and placed out
of sight of the subject. All subjects were then tested on the reversal learning task.

Results
Individual data for all subjects are in Table 1.

Initial learning phase
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Nine out of the 14 subjects tested on the initial learning phase solved the task within 110
trials (range 20–110 trials, mean ±SD = 54.44 ± 34.68 trials). More subjects met the criterion
when plate 2 was the ephemeral plate (seven of seven subjects) than when plate 1 was the
ephemeral plate (two of seven subjects), possibly indicating a preference for that plate (Fisher’s
exact test: P = 0.02).

Reversal learning phase
Two of the nine subjects that solved the initial learning task solved the reversal task
within 80 trials (range 40–80 trials, mean ±SD = 60 ± 28.28 trials). Six of the seven subjects that
did not reverse their preference showed a side bias (binomial/sign test: all Ps < 0.01), and the
seventh one did so from trial 50 to trial 100 (binomial/sign test: P < 0.01).

Moorean vs. Philippine fish (between-subjects)
We compared the fishes’ performance on the initial and reversal phases of the plate task
to the performance of the Philippine fish population. There was no significant difference in the
initial learning phase between Moorean fish (nine of 14 subjects succeeded in the task) and
Philippine fish (all six subjects succeeded; Fisher’s exact test: P = 0.26). However, more
Philippine fish succeeded in the reversal phase (six of six subjects) than Moorean fish (two of
nine subjects; Fisher’s exact test: P < 0.01).

Fish vs. monkeys (between-subjects)
We compared the Moorean fishes’ performance on the initial and reversal phases of the
plate task to the performance of the capuchin monkeys in the previous study (Salwiczek et al.,
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2012). More fish succeeded on the initial phase (nine of 14 subjects) than did monkeys (all eight
subjects failed in the task; Fisher’s exact test: P < 0.01), while more monkeys succeeded on the
reversal phase (seven of eight subjects) than fish (two of nine subjects; Fisher’s exact test: P =
0.02).

Discussion
As with previous work in cleaner fish, Moorean fish learned the plate task more rapidly
than capuchin monkeys in Salwiczek et al. (2012). This allowed us to continue with our central
comparison, between the Moorean cleaner fish tested in the current study, which were able to
solve the initial learning task, and capuchin monkeys, which were not. Unless otherwise
specified below, all comparisons between monkeys and fish were with the Moorean fish in the
current study.
Interestingly, however, although the two populations did not differ in performance on the
initial learning task, the Moorean fish were less likely to solve the reversal task than were the
Philippine fish. Although our task cannot determine why this difference exists, there are several
possible (nonmutually exclusive) reasons. First, recent evidence from Australia suggests that
client species’ density and diversity as well as cleaners’ density may have important effects on
cleaner performance in cognitive tasks (Wismer, Pinto, Vail, et al., 2014; also see Salwiczek et
al., 2012). While we do not have measures for these two parameters, they do appear to differ on
basic measures of client diversity and density; reports indicate that there are at least twice as
many species of reef fish in the Philippines as in French Polynesia (FishBase:
http://www.fishbase.org), making the Philippines the richest concentration of marine life on the
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planet (Carpenter & Springer, 2005). It is possible that these (or other smaller-scale) parameters
influence the two populations differently.
Second, the aquaria used in the current experiments were shorter than those used in the
previous work with Philippine fish, which reduced the distance to make a choice. In primates,
differences in the size of the enclosure (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007), the orientation of the
experimenter to the stimuli (Mulcahy & Call, 2009), and seemingly minor changes in procedure
(e.g., providing one tool rather than two; Girndt, Meier, & Call, 2008) influence responses in
cognitive tasks, and it is possible that the same was true here. Supporting this, all of the Moorean
fish that failed to reverse their preferences showed robust side biases, something not seen in
previous work (R. Bshary, personal observation).
Finally, despite our use of the same colors as in our previous work (Salwiczek et al.,
2012) and our efforts to make both plates equally attractive, the Moorean fish showed a
preference for one of the plates (the one with red stripes) in the initial task. This was somehow
surprising, because none of the adult fish showed such biases in our previous study, although one
juvenile did so (Salwiczek et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the apparent color preference makes it
somewhat more difficult to interpret our fish data, and it may have influenced the fishes’ ability
to solve the reversal task. We find it very interesting that one population should show a much
stronger color preference than the other, and we hope to explore this topic further in the future.
Because of the inconsistency between the two populations on the reversal task, we do not
compare these two populations of fish further on the reversal phase, although we note that these
population differences are a very fruitful avenue for future research.
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2.4

Study 2: Color Task
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the plate task described in Study 1, except that in this

case, the plates had the same color, pattern and shape, and the foods on the plates differed in
color.

Capuchin monkeys
The two plates were green and rectangular, and rewards were 750 mg banana-flavored
precision pellets (Bio-Serv) that were colored pink or black with spray food coloring (Figure 2).
Of the nine subjects, six (in one social group) were tested first in this study and subsequently on
Study 3, while the other three (in a separate social group) were tested first in Study 3 and
subsequently on this study.

Cleaner fish
The two plates were white and rectangular (presented vertically, as opposed to
horizontally as in Study 1) and the foods were colored yellow-orange and purple-pink with liquid
food coloring (Figure 2; these colors were chosen because both were favored by cleaners in pilot
testing). Only nine of the 14 fish were tested in this task (two of these nine subjects were
previously tested in Study 3; all subjects were previously tested in Study 1). For the initial
learning phase, four subjects were tested using yellow-orange as the ephemeral choice, while
five subjects started with purple-pink as the ephemeral choice. One of these five subjects (D12)
chose purple-pink in 10/10 trials in each of the first four sessions and so was dropped from the
study, leaving a sample size of eight fish. Because of time constraints on how long the
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experimenter could stay at the field site, one subject (D1) received three sessions on one day, and
another subject (D5) received three sessions on two different days.

Results
Individual data for all subjects are in Table 2.

Initial learning phase
All nine monkeys reached the preference criterion within 100 trials; seven individuals
solved the task and preferred the ephemeral stimulus (range 20–100 trials, mean ±SD = 50 ±
27.08 trials), while two developed a preference for the permanent stimulus in 20 trials.
Seven of the eight fish tested reached the preference criterion within 100 trials; six
individuals solved the task and preferred the ephemeral stimulus (range 50–100 trials, mean ±SD
= 63.33 ± 19.66 trials), while one developed a preference for the permanent stimulus in 20 trials.

Reversal learning phase
Six of the seven monkeys that solved the initial learning task also solved the reversal task
within 100 trials (range 40–100 trials, mean ±SD = 70 ± 21.91 trials). The two subjects who
preferred the permanent stimulus in the initial task reached criterion for the ephemeral stimulus
in 60 trials.
None of the fish that solved the initial task (N = 6) solved the reversal task, although this
population of fish was also unlikely to reverse in the original plate task (see Study 1). The one
subject that preferred the permanent stimulus in the initial task reached criterion for the
ephemeral stimulus in 20 trials.
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Plate vs. color tasks (within-subjects)
For the analysis, we only included subjects that completed both the plate and color tasks
(seven monkeys and eight fish). Significantly more monkeys succeeded in the initial learning
phase of the color task (five of seven subjects) than in the original plate task (none of seven
subjects; Fisher’s exact test: P = 0.02; Figure 3).
The fish did not show any difference in performance between the color task (six of eight
subjects succeeded) and the plate task (five of these eight subjects succeeded in the plate task;
Fisher’s exact test: P = 1.00; Figure 3).

Monkeys vs. fish (between-subjects)
There was no significant difference in the initial learning phase between monkeys (seven
of nine subjects succeeded) and Moorean fish (six of eight subjects succeeded; Fisher’s exact
test: P = 1.00). Considering only the subjects that solved the initial task, there was no difference
in speed of learning between species (Mann–Whitney U exact test: U = 11.50, Nmonkeys = 7, Nfish
= 6, P = 0.20).

Discussion
More monkeys succeeded in the color task than in the plate task, which supports our
hypothesis that, for primates, food color is a more salient cue than plate design. In contrast to our
predictions, however, cleaner fish did as well on the color task as on the original plate task. This
could be an indication that the fish were able to generalize to a novel cue (or that the cue was
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more salient than predicted), but we cannot rule out the possibility that their performance was
due to a color preference.

2.5

Study 3: Cup Task
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1, except that in this case, the foods were hidden

(by cups in the case of capuchins, and placed behind the plates in the case of cleaners).

Capuchin monkeys
The food was placed under two opaque cups so that subjects could not see the food prior
the choice. We used two identical black plates to hold the two different containers, one of which
was yellow with one red dot on each side and the other of which was purple with a blue triangle
on each side (Figure 2). At the beginning of each trial, the subjects saw the experimenter hiding
each food item under the container. Subjects were then presented the choice between the two
containers. Subjects indicated their choice by touching a container, at which point, either they
lifted the cup themselves, or the experimenter lifted it for them to access the food underneath.
One social group completed this task prior to Study 2 and the other group completed this task
subsequent to Study 2.

Cleaner fish
Instead of containers, which would not work under water, the food was placed on the
reverse side of the plates (i.e. away from the direction from which the individual approached).
Subjects made a choice by swimming behind the plate to obtain the food. All the fish learned
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quickly (typically on the first trial) to swim to the reverse side of the plates. The two plates were
white and triangular and only differed in color and pattern (both sides of the plates were
colored/patterned). Plate 1 had two vertical red lines, while plate 2 had two diagonal yellow lines
(Figure 2); for the initial learning phase, four subjects were tested using plate 1 as the ephemeral
choice, while the other four started with plate 2 as the ephemeral choice. Eight of the 14 fish
subjects were tested in this task (three of which had previous experience with Study 2). Note
that, because of time constraints, one subject (D12) received three sessions on two different days,
while another subject (D8) was not tested on the reversal learning phase.

Results
Individual data for all subjects are in Table 3.

Initial learning phase
All nine monkeys solved the task within 110 trials (range 20–110 trials, mean ±SD =
54.44 ± 32.06 trials), all preferring the ephemeral plate.
Seven out of the eight fish tested reached preference criterion within 110 trials; three
individuals preferred the ephemeral stimulus (range 40–60 trials, mean ±SD = 53.33 ± 11.55
trials), while four individuals preferred the permanent stimulus (range 30–110 trials, mean ±SD
= 62.50 ± 35.94 trials).

Reversal learning phase
Seven of the nine monkeys that succeeded in the initial learning phase reversed their
preference within 100 trials (range 30–100 trials, mean ±SD = 74.29 ± 26.37 trials).
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None of the fish that solved the initial task (N = 3) solved the reversal task. Among the
three subjects that preferred the permanent stimulus in the initial task and were tested in the
reversal task (one was not, due to time constraints, see above), two reached criterion for the
ephemeral stimulus in 10 and 60 trials, while the remaining did not reach criterion within 100
trials.

Plate vs. cup tasks (within-subjects)
For the analysis, we only included subjects that completed both the plate and cup tasks
(seven monkeys and eight fish). More monkeys succeeded in the initial learning phase of the cup
task (seven of seven subjects) than in the original plate task (none of seven subjects; Fisher’s
exact test: P < 0.01; Figure 3).
The fish did not differ in performance between the cup task (three of eight subjects
succeeded) and the plate task (five of these eight subjects succeeded in the plate task; Fisher’s
exact test: P = 0.62; Figure 3).

Color vs. cup tasks (within-subjects)
For the analysis, we only included subjects that completed both the cup and color tasks
(nine monkeys and four fish). Monkeys did not show any difference in the initial learning phase
between the color task (seven of nine subjects succeeded) and the cup task (nine of nine subjects
succeeded; Fisher’s exact test: P = 0.47).
The fish did not show any difference in the initial learning phase between the color task
(two of four subjects succeeded) and the cup task (one of four subjects succeeded; Fisher’s exact
test: P = 1.00).

43

Monkeys vs. fish
Significantly more monkeys succeeded in the initial learning phase of the cup task (nine
of nine subjects) than did fish (three of eight subjects; Fisher’s exact test: P < 0.01; Figure 3).
Considering only the subjects that solved the initial task, there was no difference in speed of
learning between species (Mann–Whitney U exact test: U = 11, Nmonkeys = 9, Nfish = 3, P = 0.71).

Discussion
As in the color task, monkeys improved their performance in the hidden-food task when
compared to the original plate task, suggesting that the presence of food in the original task may
have caused primates to act impulsively. The use of a method that obscured the food may have
helped the monkeys to inhibit any possible prepotent response due to the presence of food
rewards (see Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Boysen et al. 1999, 2001; Murray et al. 2005;
Pepperberg & Hartsfield, 2014; Prétôt et al., 2016a).
Although fish did not show any difference in performance between the cup task and the
two other tasks, their overall performance in the cup task was poorer than that of the monkeys. If
anything, this is somewhat surprising given that ectoparasites consumed by cleaners are so small
that they are only visible from relatively close range, indicating that cleaners are accustomed to
not seeing food on their initial approach. One possibility is that the cleaners found the procedure
more difficult; unlike the other tasks, this task required them to swim behind the plate to find
food (although note that all subjects swam behind the plates to obtain food on their first session
of exposure to it). Alternately, cleaners’ low performance might be due to a preference for one of
the plates or some carryover effects resulting from the same colors (the two that they most
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preferred) being used on multiple tests. Based on our analyses, we propose that carryover effects,
if they existed, might have been small, because most subjects took a minimum of 40 trials to
develop a preference for one of the plates, which indicates that their choice was not influenced
by their previous exposure in the plate task. Nevertheless, subjects apparently had a preference
for the red-striped plate (seven of eight individuals preferred that plate; binomial/sign test: P =
0.07), which may have hindered their overall performance in the task, independently of any
carryover effects.

2.6

General Discussion
In the present paper, we tested two hypotheses about factors that may have caused

primates to perform less well than cleaner wrasse on a previous dichotomous choice task based
on the cleaners’ ecology (Salwiczek et al., 2012). In particular, we altered two factors that we
predicted might have made the original task more difficult for primates than for fish. First, we
changed the cue from being the plate surrounding the food to being the food itself, which we
predicted would be more relevant to the monkeys. The primates’ performance improved,
whereas the cleaners’ performance was unchanged (see details in Discussion of Study 2).
Second, we hid the food (the cue was again the color/pattern of the plate), because visible foods
are known to inhibit decision making in primates. Again, the primates’ performance improved,
but the cleaners’ performance was unchanged (see details in Discussion of Study 3). Taken
together, these results indicate that, not surprisingly, many factors play into determining what
species may learn with more or less ease, and that, as predicted, the cues themselves are an
important part of decision making.
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Of course, while our results demonstrate the importance of these two factors in the
primates’ decision making, they do not rule out the (very likely) possibility that other factors
influence different species’ performance in such tasks. For example, previous work showed that
parrots did as well as fish on the “fish” version of the task (Pepperberg & Hartsfield, 2014). The
authors of that study proposed that this might be because fish and parrots are constrained to
making a single choice at a time (e.g., with a mouth or bill), forcing them to prioritize, whereas
monkeys are typically able to obtain two things at once (e.g., with both hands). As a result, the
monkeys may have found the limitations of the experimental task difficult. In fact, in another
study, we found that two different species of monkeys did better on a computerized version of
the task, in which they chose an option with a joystick-controlled cursor, possibly because they
were limited to a single choice (by necessity rather than by experimenter constraint; Prétôt et al.,
2016a). Continued work will help to identify all of the constraints on decision making, as well as
interactions among them.
Turning now to the fish, we got two unexpected results. First, contrary to our hypothesis,
neither of the cue-related changes led to decreased performance for the cleaner fish on the initial
learning trials. Second, the Moorean fish were substantially worse at the reversal task than were
the original Philippine fish. These are somewhat difficult to reconcile as they suggest two
seemingly contradictory possibilities (on the one hand, that the fish were able to generalize
across stimuli in a way that the primates were not, and on the other that the Moorean population
was substantially less cognitively flexible than the Philippine fish). We discuss each of these in
turn.
Considering the first outcome, cleaner fish performed similarly on the color and cup tasks
as on the original plate task in Study 1, and did as well as the monkeys on Study 2, although the
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monkeys outperformed the fish on the cup task in Study 3. This is quite different than what we
observed for the monkeys, which performed better on some versions of the task than others.
There are a couple of possible explanations for this. First, our results could be partly due to an
artefact of the fishes’ apparent preference for some plates over others (which is potentially
interesting in and of itself given that such a color preference has not been reported previously for
any other population). Second, the fish may have generalized from their experience in natural
contexts, using cues derived from their own ecology, priming them to succeed in all versions of
the task. This would be an impressive feat, in particular, given the primates’ difficulty in learning
the task originally (even with what we predicted to be more ecologically relevant cues, the
monkeys still did not learn the color task in fewer trials than the fish used in this study or than
the fish from the original study by Salwiczek et al., 2012). This possibility deserves further
consideration because as of late, there is evidence for generalized rule learning in cleaners
(Wismer, Grutter, & Bshary, 2016), and much evidence has emerged supporting greater
cognitive ability in fish than was previously recognized (Agrillo et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2011;
Bshary et al., 2014; Ferrari et al., 2005; Grosenick et al., 2007; Kendall et al., 2009; Piffer et al.,
2013; Vail et al., 2013, 2014; for reviews, see: Brown, 2015; Bshary et al., 2002, 2014). These
results might thus indicate that fish have some form of general intelligence that goes beyond the
ability to readily solve problems only if presented within a precise ecological context.
Considering the second finding, we were very surprised by the Moorean fishes’ inability
to solve the reversal task, particularly in comparison with the performance of the original
Philippine fish. Because we wished to (1) give the fish comparable experience to the primates
and (2) compare the fish to themselves in a within-subjects design, as we did with the primates,
we initially tested the fish on the original version of the task (Study 1). This secondarily allowed
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us to compare two different populations of cleaners. We found that, while their outcomes were at
least not significantly different for the initial learning trials (64% of the Moorean fish learned the
task compared with 100% of the Philippine fish), the Moorean fish were significantly worse at
the reversal task than the original Philippine population. This may indicate differences in
cognitive flexibility between these two populations, possibly due to differences in their
interspecific social environment (such differences due to microecology have been described for
cleaners caught from different microhabitats around Lizard Island, Great Barrier Reef; Wismer et
al., 2014), experimental differences (such as the aforementioned differences in the length of the
aquaria in the two new studies), or the unexpected plate preferences we found in our fish
population. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the original Philippine population anymore,
nor do we know exactly where they came from (they were obtained from a pet store), so it is
difficult to test the first possibility directly. However, both the ecological and procedural
possibilities can be tested by exploring population-level differences in cognition and behavior in
both fish and other species. Although this was not the primary focus of our study, we find it a
very intriguing avenue of research and are excited by the possibility of fully integrating ecology
into studies of cognition.
Overall, we find that changing the cues given to subjects can dramatically influence their
ability to learn a task. This has important ramifications for comparative work, where scientists
(including us!) work very hard to equalize every possible aspect of the task across a species or
population. However, these results indicate that this may backfire, with subjects not living up to
their potential because they are struggling with the cue of the task rather than the task itself.
While there are undoubtedly many ways to approach this issue, we have done so by first running
studies that are, to the degree possible, identical, and then iterating the design for the lesser-
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performing species to try to unpack what exactly caused the difficulty. This allows us to
triangulate in on the fairest comparison. We are excited to see an increasing volume of research
that integrates ecology, cognition and behavior to better understand the evolution of decision
making across species.
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2.7

Tables

Table 1 Two-Choice Moorean Fish Plate Task
Number of trials needed for each subject to solve the plate task for the initial learning phase and
the reversal phase in Study 1

Stimulus options (plate 1 vs. plate 2) are shown in Figure 2. Subjects that did not reach
preference criterion in the initial learning phase were not further tested on the reversal phase.
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Table 2 Two-Choice Monkey-Fish Cup Task
Number of trials needed for each subject to reach preference criterion for the initial learning
phase and the reversal phase in Study 2

Stimulus options (color 1 vs. color 2) are shown in Figure 2. Subjects that did not reach
preference criterion in the initial learning phase were not further tested on the reversal phase.
1

Subjects previously tested in Study 3.

2

New subjects (not tested in Salwiczek et al., 2012)

3

Subject was tested without the opaque face shield.
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Table 3 Two-Choice Monkey-Fish Cup Task
Number of trials needed for each subject to reach preference criterion for the initial learning
phase and the reversal phase in Study 3

Stimulus options (cup 1 vs. cup 2) are shown in Figure 2. Subjects that did not reach preference
criterion in the initial learning phase were not further tested on the reversal phase.
1

Subjects previously tested in Study 2.

2

New subjects (not tested in Salwiczek et al., 2012).

3

Subject was tested without the face shield.

4

Subject was not tested on reversal test due to time constraints.
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2.8

Figures

Figure 1 Monkey-Fish Experimental Set-Up
Subjects used a door system (fish: sliding door; monkeys: “Velcro” doors) before they could
access the plates and food (the dimensions of the aquarium and enclosure are given in
centimeters).
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Figure 2 Monkey-Fish Sets of Stimuli
Pairs of stimuli (named 1 and 2) used in the plate, color and cup tasks.
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Figure 3 Monkey-Fish Initial Learning Phase
The number of trials required for Moorea fish and capuchin monkeys to develop a preference for
the ephemeral stimulus in the plate task (capuchins data based on Salwiczek et al., 2012; note
that one subject previously tested in the plate task was no longer available for the current study),
and either stimulus in the color and cup tasks. Each dot represents one individual; black dots
indicate a preference for the ephemeral stimulus, while white dots indicate a preference for the
permanent stimulus. For monkeys, the grey dots designate new subjects not previously tested in
the plate task. Fourteen fish were tested in the plate task, eight were tested only in the color or
cup task, and four were tested in both the color and cup tasks. As in our previous work (Prétôt et
al., 2016a), while criterion was set at 10 sessions, if subjects were in the process of meeting
criterion on the 10th session (e.g., preferred one stimulus on at least 7 out of 10 trials), they were
allowed to continue until they either met criterion or failed to do so. The label “failed”
corresponds to subjects who did not reach preference criterion.
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3

STUDY 2: VARIATION IN PERFORMANCE OF ORANGUTANS, GORILLAS
AND DRILLS IN TWO VERSIONS OF A CHOICE TASK DERIVED FROM THE
CLEANER FISH ECOLOGY

3.1

Introduction
Species’ performance in cognitive tasks is influenced by a number of key factors. One

recent hypothesis is that differences in cognitive performance are often due to differences in
understanding species-specific cues needed to solve a task (Lotem & Halpern, 2012; for a
review, see Rowe & Healy, 2014). For example, we recently showed that monkeys performed
better in a dichotomous choice task derived from the cleaner fish ecology when the cues to solve
the task were more ecologically relevant to primates (Prétôt et al., 2016b). In the task, if the
subjects first chose one of the options (ephemeral), they received both food items, but if they
chose the other (permanent) option first, the ephemeral option was no longer available. Here, we
replicated the study with three additional primate species (Pongo spp., Gorilla gorilla gorilla and
Mandrillus leucophaeus), to see if our results generalized across the primate taxon. The task was
based on the cleaning interaction between the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and its
“client” fish species, from which the wrasse eats ectoparasites as its primary diet.
In the wild, cleaner fish remove parasites and other material from client reef fish, which
visit them at their so-called cleaning stations. Clients have been categorized as either residents,
which live in small territories and interact most frequently with the same cleaner fish (and are
therefore a permanent food source for the cleaner), or as choosy clients, which have larger home
ranges that cover several cleaning stations and can choose the cleaners with whom to interact
(and are therefore an ephemeral food source for the cleaner). Cleaners typically compete among
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each other over access to choosy clients, while they each have exclusive access to their resident
clients; consequently, choosy clients are expected to use their choice options by visiting stations
where the service is better. Field observations found that choosy clients have priority for
cleaning access over the residents (Bshary, 2001). This priority of access is likely because
visitors will leave if they are not cleaned rapidly, and they are less likely to return to the same
cleaner if it has been ignored in the past or received a bad service access (Bshary & Schäffer,
2002).
To test this in the lab, Bshary and Grutter (2002) replaced client fish with plates; one
plate mimicked the choosy client, while the other mimicked the resident client. Importantly, the
two plates contained a same reward and only differed in size. In the task, if the subject picked the
food from the choosy plate first, it could then take the food from the resident plate too (the same
way as a client fish would prioritize cleaning access to a choosy client over a resident client). In
contrast, if the resident plate was selected first, the choosy plate was withdrawn (the same way as
a choosy client would leave and switch of cleaning partner if it is not inspected first). In this
case, the subject obtained only the food from the resident plate. Therefore, the optimal foraging
strategy was to take the food from the choosy plate first before the food from the guaranteed,
resident plate. Within just a few trials, cleaner fish inspected the choosy plate first, supporting
previous field observations of this behavior.
In a subsequent study, Salwiczek et al. (2012) tested new cleaner fish subjects, capuchin
monkeys, chimpanzees, and orangutans, on the plate task. The goal of this study was to compare
the performance of fish and two primate species, capuchins and chimpanzees, who converged on
their tendency to cooperate with one another (e.g., capuchins: Brosnan, 2010; chimpanzees:
Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Suchak et al., 2014) and their propensity to eat both mobile and
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immobile food sources, which may roughly correlate with the stable resident and mobile choosy
clients (e.g., plant materials vs. hunting for insects and smaller vertebrates; see Fragaszy et al.,
2004; Goodall, 1986). In addition, their performance was contrasted with orangutans, which
primarily eat fruits (Galdikas, 1988) and less frequently insects or other mobile animal protein
sources (Rijksen, 1978). We hypothesized that if brain size is the key feature in determining
whether species can solve this task, one would expect that primates, who have relatively large
brain, outperform fish. However, if ecology is more important, then one would predict that fish
outperform primates, or a subset of primate species, in this task derived from cleaner fish
ecology. Supporting the latter prediction, the fish performed better than all primates in the task.
However, to draw the general conclusion that it is the ecological relevance of a task that
primarily influences species’ abilities to solve it, we still needed to demonstrate that primates
outperformed fish in a similar task derived from their ecology.
To address these points, we tested capuchins and new fish subjects in versions of the
plate task designed to be more relevant to primates (Prétôt et al., 2016b). In the original design
based on cleaners, the plates differed but the food outcomes were identical, just as cleaners
always consume the same foods, but acquire these foods from different clients. This may have
given the cleaners an advantage simply because they were already predisposed to focus on the
way the food was presented (i.e., the plate, which was indeed the relevant stimulus) rather than
the food itself, which was uninformative as the foods were identical. In a first study, we changed
the color of the food item rather than the design/color of the plates. Food color is potentially a
more ecologically relevant cue to primates than fish. In a second study, the foods were hidden,
under cups for the monkeys and behind plates for the fish, as primates’ performance in choice
tasks is generally influenced by the presence of visible rewards (e.g., Boysen & Berntson, 1995;
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Boysen et al., 1996; 1999; 2001; Diamond, 1981; Murray et al., 2005).
Monkeys improved their performance in both tasks as compared to the original plate task,
indicating that these more salient cues did support the primates’ ability to solve the task.
However, they do not rule out the (very likely) possibility that other factors influence species’
performance in these tasks. Indeed, recent studies have found that parrots, whose ecology and
cognition are presumably more like those of primates than fish, performed at levels equal to the
fish in the plate task (Pepperberg & Hartsfield, 2014), while two other species, pigeons and rats,
perform as poorly as the primates (Zentall et al., 2016, 2017).
The goal of the current study was to see if the results of the color and cup tasks were
capuchin-specific, or if they generalized across the primate taxon. To do so, we tested three
additional primate species on these tasks: orangutans, who failed to solve the plate task in a prior
study (Salwiczek et al., 2012), and two new species, gorillas and drill monkeys. All three species
have relatively comparable foraging habits, as they all consume mostly plant matter
(predominantly fruits, but also leaves, seeds and bark). All differ, however, from chimpanzees
and capuchins in that they eat ephemeral prey such as insects or other mobile animal protein
sources less frequently (orangutans: Galdikas, 1988; Knott, 1998; Rijksen, 1978; gorillas: Doran
& McNeilage, 2001; Doran et al., 2002; Tutin, 1996; drills: Astaras et al., 2008; GonzalezKirchner & de la Maza, 1996), and do not cooperate to the same extent in the wild. As a result,
we could see whether the results of our prior studies (Salwiczek et al., 2012; Prétôt et al., 2016b)
were 1) due to some aspect of capuchins’ and chimpanzees’ specific ecologies (i.e., frequency of
encounter with ephemeral prey), 2) specific to having a large brain-to-body ratio (true of the ape
species and capuchins; e.g., Deaner et al., 2007), 3) related specifically to higher levels of
cooperation in the wild (as in chimpanzees and capuchins), or 4) widespread across the primate
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taxon.
Our primary goal was to compare all three species’ responses across all three tasks (the
original plate task and the two new studies conducted here). However, to do this, we also needed
to test gorillas and drills on the original task (Salwiczek et al., 2012), in order to give them
equivalent experience. Therefore, gorilla and drill subjects were first tested on the plate task
(Study 1) before being tested in either the color task (Study 2) or the cup task (Study 3). Because
some orangutan subjects had previous experience with the task from Salwiczek et al. (2012), we
did not replicate the plate task with them. We predicted that gorillas and drills, like capuchins
and orangutans tested previously, would fail in the plate task. However, we expected all three
species, like capuchins, to solve the color and cup tasks, because the cues to solve the tasks were
designed to be relevant to primates.

3.2

Methods
3.2.1

Subjects and Housing

We tested six orangutans, nine western lowland gorillas, and six drill monkeys, housed in
social groups at Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA (for group compositions, see Table 4). All
subjects were tested while off exhibit. Orangutan tests subjects were one Sumatran male
(Dumadi), four Sumatran females (Madu, Biji and Blaze, who was tested with her 2-year-old
infant male), one Bornean male (Satu) and one hybrid male (Chantek). Three of them (Satu,
Madu and Chantek) have had previous experience with Salwiczek et al. (2012)’s original plate
study. All tests subjects were also tested in a computerized-touchscreen task during the period of
our study, and some had participated in other cognitive tests prior this one (e.g., Brosnan,
Flemming, Talbot, et al., 2011; Diamond, Stoinski, Mickelberg, et al., 2016; Flemming, Jones,

60

Mayo, et al., 2012; Talbot, Mayo, Stoinski, & Brosnan, 2015). One female, Madu, was reared in
a computer-enriched environment at the Georgia State University Language Research Center,
where she participated in various cognitive tests (e.g., see Beran, 2002; Washburn, Gulledge,
James, & Rumbaugh, 2007). In addition, one male, Chantek, had previous experience using sign
language to communicate with humans (see Miles, 1990).
Gorilla tests subjects were six bachelor males (Jasiri, Kidogo, Kekla, Stadi, Charlie and
Mbeli), two geriatric females (Choomba and Shamba) and one geriatric male (Ozzie). Although
some subjects have been the focus of a large number of behavioral studies, their experience with
cognitive tests prior ours was relatively limited (e.g., Anderson, Stoinski, Bloomsmith, et al.,
2005; Drayton, Brosnan, Carrigan, & Stoinski, 2013; Stoinski, Wrate, Ure, & Whiten, 2001).
Drill tests subjects were one male (Bobby) and five females (Inge, Drew, Lucy, Achi and
Amaka). Although they interact daily with their human keepers in the context of feeding and
training, they have never received any cognitive test prior to ours.
All subjects had indoor/outdoor access and extensive material enrichment (climbing
structures, ropes and swings, barrels, and other toys), and were tested off-exhibit. All subjects
were fed their usual diet consisting of primate chow, fruits and vegetables prior or after testing.
In addition, feeding enrichment was provided on a daily basis as part of the husbandry routine.
At no time were the subjects ever food or water deprived. Studies involved a single subject at a
time. All subjects participated voluntarily, being called in from their social groups and tested in
one of the indoor dens of their living area. If possible subjects were separated from other
individuals to limit distractions (however, unweaned infants always accompanied their mothers).
All procedures used in this research were approved by the Scientific Review Committee of Zoo
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Atlanta and met the ethical standards of the United States. Zoo Atlanta is fully accredited by the
Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA).

3.2.2

General Procedure

The experimental design was based on the studies of Bshary and Grutter (2002),
Salwiczek et al. (2012), and Prétôt et al. (2016b). Subjects had to choose between two stimuli,
each assigned to one of two specific roles, permanent or ephemeral. Choosing the permanent
stimulus always resulted in an immediate reward and this stimulus was available throughout the
trial. The ephemeral stimulus offered the same immediate reward, but only if it was the first one
the subjects chose. If subjects chose the permanent stimulus first, the ephemeral stimulus was
withdrawn out of reach of the subject (for a total of only one reward). Thus, the optimal outcome
was to pick the ephemeral plate first for a first reward, which allowed the subject to also obtain
the permanent stimulus for an additional reward (for a total of two rewards). The side on which
each stimulus was presented for each trial was randomly determined, but counterbalanced within
a session so that they were on each side an equal number of times, but with no more than three
trials in a row on the same side. Each subject received 10 sessions of 10 trials each (unless
otherwise noted; see Learning Criterion section below). Subjects that reached preference
criterion in the initial learning test were then tested on a reversal test. The procedure was
identical to the initial test, but the role of each stimulus was reversed (i.e., the ephemeral
stimulus became the permanent one, and vice-versa).
The presentation of the stimuli and the choices slightly differed between the ape and the
monkey studies. In compliance with the safety procedures, orangutans and gorillas were
presented the two stimuli out of reach (the distance varied between 40 and 60cm), and they
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indicated their choice by gesturing to it with their hand (for similar procedures, see Brosnan et
al., 2011; Flemming et al., 2012). They always received the choice that they indicated. Although
this is different than in previous work, as the subjects were unable to grab the reward themselves,
this was essential due to practical demands of the zoo environment and a procedure with which
all of the apes were familiar. Occasionally they gestured at both stimuli (e.g., by stretching out
both hands or moving one hand from one stimulus to the other), in which case the experimenter
withdrew both stimuli and restarted the trial. As with other such studies, immediately after a
choice, the selected option was moved forward and delivered to the subjects through an opening
located below the front mesh.
Unlike orangutans and gorillas, drill monkeys made their decisions using a procedure
more similar to the one of capuchin monkeys in prior studies (see Prétôt et al., 2016b; Salwiczek
et al., 2012). However, as subjects were tested directly on their front enclosure, the two stimuli
were presented such that they were both visible, but far enough away from the mesh that they
could not be reached simultaneously. Despite the distance between the two stimuli, however,
some subjects became very quick at selecting the foods, often trying to obtain both stimuli. As
with the apes, if a subject attempted to select both stimuli simultaneously, the stimuli were
quickly removed and the trial restarted.
For all species, the foods were presented on two plates that were located at equal distance
from the subject and that the experimenter could move independently. The trial started once the
subjects faced the two food options. If the subject chose the permanent stimulus first, the
ephemeral stimulus was quickly withdrawn out of reach of the subject. Subjects were tested up to
four sessions a week, but never in more than one session per day. The inter-trial interval (ITI)
was 30 seconds, chosen because, in previous testing, it was the ITI at which the orangutans did
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the best (Salwiczek et al., 2012). We used 750 mg banana flavored pellets for orangutans, 1g
Piña Colada flavored pellets for gorillas (unless otherwise noted), and raw shelled peanuts for
drills. These foods could be dyed different colors, as needed for Experiment 2.

Learning Criterion and Statistics
We used the same learning criterion as in earlier work (Prétôt et al., 2016a & 2016b).
This criterion was based on a two-tailed binomial/sign test, such that subjects were considered to
have solved the test when they met the preference criterion for choosing the payoff-maximizing
ephemeral option. Subjects met the preference criterion when they chose the stimulus (1) 10/10
trials on one session (but only if the subject selected each of the two stimuli in at least one trial of
a previous session in the initial learning test, in order to ensure that they had experience with
both outcomes), (2) 9/10 or 8/10 trial on two consecutive sessions or (3) 7/10 trials on three
consecutive sessions. Although we planned to limit subjects to 10 sessions, if a subject chose
either option 9/10, 8/10 or 7/10 in the last session (i.e., Session 10), it was given another session
(or two, in the case of sessions with 7/10, followed by a second session with 7 or more out of 10)
of 10 trials to maximize its chances of reaching criterion. They failed if they either developed a
preference for the permanent option (using the same criterion as for the ephemeral preference) or
did not develop any preference within 100 trials. Subjects who developed a preference for either
option were then tested on a reversal test so that all subjects had similar experience prior to
subsequent studies.
To compare subjects’ performance between tasks, we used a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test
that allowed us to compare the number of individuals who met criterion for preferring the
ephemeral option to those who did not; this way, we could include data from all subjects, even

64

those who developed a preference for the permanent option. To compare subjects’ performance
across species, we used a two-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test and a Scheffe’s test (as a post-hoc test;
see Salwiczek et al., 2012). Subjects that failed were assigned 110 trials for the purposes of
analysis, which was one session greater than the minimum number of trials at which testing
ceased (see Prétôt et al., 2016a). For this comparison, we used the data from subjects who either
preferred the ephemeral option or did not develop any preference, but did not use the data from
the subjects who significantly preferred the permanent stimulus (although we reported them),
because they were difficult to interpret (see Prétôt et al., 2016b). Indeed, if subjects initially
preferred the ephemeral stimulus and then reversed to prefer the newly ephemeral (formerly
permanent) option, this would indicate that they were consistent in their preference. Similarly,
reversing to maintain a preference for the newly permanent (formerly ephemeral) option would
indicate a consistent preference for the permanent stimulus. However, maintaining a preference
for the newly ephemeral (formerly permanent) option would be uninformative, because we
would not know whether subjects preferred that particular stimulus (e.g., based on design or
color), or whether they recognized the utility of choosing the ephemeral option because it
became the food-maximizing option after the two options switched role. We used a withinsubjects design for the comparisons between tasks, and a between-subjects design to compare
performance between species.

3.3

Study 1: Plate Task in Gorillas and Drills
Procedure
As in Prétôt et al. (2016b), we replicated the original plate task to give gorillas and drills

the same experience as three of the orangutans, and compare how subjects did on the subsequent
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studies. In the task, the nine gorillas and the six drills had a choice between two food items
placed on two plates that were similar in size and shape, but differed in color and pattern (for a
better comparison, the design of the plates were kept similar across species; see Figure 4 for
details of plates in all studies to date). Plate 1 had two yellow triangles and one green circle,
while Plate 2 had two blue rectangles (one of them striped). The gorilla plates were
approximately 60 x 12 x 2cm, whereas the drill plates were approximately 34 x 10 x 0.5cm (i.e.,
scaled for body size). The plates were equipped with a handle at the bottom to make the
manipulations easier. Five of the nine gorillas and three of the six drills were tested with Plate 1
as the ephemeral choice, while the other four gorillas and three drills were tested with Plate 2 as
the ephemeral choice. Note that one male gorilla (Stadi) was tested using purple grapes rather
than pellets, because he would not work for pellets.

Results
Individual data for all subjects are in Table 5.

Initial learning phase
None of the gorilla and drill subjects tested on the initial learning phase solved the task
(Ngorillas = 9, Ndrills = 6). Given that no subject met criterion, no subject was tested on the reversal
test and the study ended.

Cross-species comparison (between-subjects)
We compared the performance of gorillas and drills in the plate task with the
performance of the capuchin monkeys and the orangutans in Salwiczek et al. (2012). There was
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no significant difference in learning speed performance between the species (Kruskal-Wallis
exact test: df = 3, H = 0, P = 1.00; see Figure 5).

Discussion
Consistent with our prior study (Salwiczek et al., 2012), all the primates in the current
study failed to solve the plate task. One possible explanation for their struggle is that they had
difficulty recognizing which cue was the important one for the task (i.e., that they should be
distinguishing based on plate color/pattern). Unlike cleaner fish, which choose food based on
which client fish species they are feeding on, primates grab their foods directly, so the substrate
on which the food is presented may not be relevant to them. To test this hypothesis, in the
subsequent studies, we retested subjects in two versions of the original plate task with cues that
we hypothesized were more relevant to primates than fish.

3.4

Study 2: Color Task
Procedure
The basic procedure was identical to the plate task described in Study 1, except that the

plates were similar in color and pattern, but the foods differed in color. We tested six orangutans,
and the same gorilla and drill subjects as in Study 1. We used the same plates as in Study 1 (but
eliminated colors and patterns) for both gorillas and drills. Orangutans were tested using the
same plates as the gorillas. Rewards were colored pink (Color 1) or black (Color 2) with spray
food coloring (Figure 4). Note that two gorillas were tested with different combinations of foods
and colors. One female (Shamba) who was originally presented with pink pellets as ephemeral
foods and black pellets as permanent foods, would not eat any of the black pellets in Session 1.
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Consequently, we tested her with a new combination of colors, blue and red, in Session 2. In
addition, one male (Stadi) was tested using a combination of green and black grapes. Although
we strived to provide all tests subjects with foods that were equally attractive, we could not know
whether this subject perceived any difference in flavor between the two grapes; however, we
assumed that if he showed any, we would have seen it early in the test, which was not the case
(see Table 6). Five of the nine gorillas, and three of the orangutans and drills were tested first in
this study and subsequently on Study 3 (cup task), while the other four gorillas and three
orangutans and drills were tested first on Study 3 and subsequently on this study.

Results
Individual data for all subjects are in Table 6.

Initial learning phase
Four of the six orangutans tested on the initial learning phase solved the task within 60
trials (range 20-60 trials, mean ± SD = 37.50 ± 17.08 trials). Three of the nine gorillas reached
preference criterion within 120 trials; two individuals solved the task and preferred the
ephemeral stimulus in 40 and 120 trials, while one developed a preference for the permanent
stimulus in 110 trials. None of the drills tested on the initial learning phase solved the task (Ndrills
= 6).

Reversal learning phase
Three of the four orangutans that solved the initial learning task also solved the reversal
task within 90 trials (range 50-90 trials, mean ± SD = 70.33 ± 20.01 trials), while the remaining
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individual did not reach criterion. The two gorillas that reached preference criterion for the
ephemeral stimulus in the initial learning task did not solve the reversal task, while the gorilla
that preferred the permanent stimulus never developed any preference for either stimulus in the
reversal task.

Plate vs. color tasks (within-subjects)
For the analysis, we only included subjects that completed both the plate and the color
tasks (three of the six orangutans, the nine gorillas and six drills). Note that orangutans’ small
sample size did not allow for a statistically significant analysis. The three primate species did not
show any difference in performance between the color task (two of three orangutans and two of
nine gorillas succeeded, while all six drills failed in the task) and the plate task (all subjects of all
species failed in the task; Fisher’s exact test, orangutans: P = 0.40; gorillas: P = 0.47; drills: P =
1.00; Figure 5).

Cross-species comparison (between-subjects)
We compared the performance of orangutans, gorillas and drills in the color task with the
performance of capuchin monkeys in Prétôt et al. (2016b). There was a significant difference in
learning speed between the species (Kruskal-Wallis exact test: df = 3, H = 14.59, P < 0.001;
Figure 5). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the capuchins performed better than the drills and
the gorillas (Scheffe’s test: all Ps ≤ 0.01), but not the orangutans (P = 0.90). Orangutans also
outperformed the drills (P = 0.04) and showed a tendency to perform better than the gorillas (P =
0.08), while the drills were not distinguishable from the gorillas’ behavior (P = 0.97).
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Discussion
Our results supported partially our hypothesis. As predicted, orangutans improved their
performance in the task as compared to the plate version (although our sample size was too small
for statistical significance), supporting our prior results with capuchin monkeys. Together, these
species performance indicates that changing the task cues from the color of the plate to the color
of the food helps them to solve the task, possibly because it is a more salient cue. Gorillas and
drills, however, did not do better in the task, suggesting that this modification to the task does not
work universally among primates, or that there another factor is influencing the responses of the
gorillas and drills. We discuss why the task might still be challenging for some primates in the
General Discussion section.

3.5

Study 3: Cup Task
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1, except that the two foods were hidden under two

different opaque cups (used in Prétôt et al., 2016b; see Figure 4) so that subjects could see the
experimenter bait the cup, but could not see the food during the choice. One cup was yellow with
one red dot on each side (Cup 1) and the other was purple with a blue triangle on each side (Cup
2). The two plates that carried the cups were the same as in Study 2 (unmarked and identical). At
the beginning of each trial, the subjects saw the experimenter hiding a same food item under
each cup. They were then presented the choice between the two cups. Once gorillas and
orangutan subjects made a choice (by gesturing at the cup they wanted), the experimenter lifted
the cup for them, before pushing the plate forward to give subjects access to the food underneath
the front mesh. If the ephemeral cup was selected first, the experimenter removed the ephemeral

70

cup first, gave the subject access to the food, and only then did the same for the permanent cup.
Again, drills were presented the cups so that they could make a choice either by lifting up the
cup themselves and take the food through the mesh, or by touching the cup (which varied across
subjects), in which case the experimenter lifted the cup for them and let them take the food.

Results
Individual data for all subjects are in Table 7.

Initial learning phase
One of the six orangutans tested on the initial learning phase solved the task within 30
trials, and one of the nine gorillas reached preference criterion for the permanent stimulus with
20 trials. As in Study 2, none of the drills tested on the initial learning phase solved the task
(Ndrills = 6).

Reversal learning phase
The orangutan who solved the initial task solved the reversal task within 111 trials, while
the gorilla who reached preference criterion for the permanent stimulus never developed any
preference for either stimulus in the reversal task.

Plate vs. cup tasks (within-subjects)
As in Study 2, we only included subjects that completed both the plate and the cup tasks
(three of the six orangutans, the nine gorillas and six drills). Again, the three primate species did
not show any difference in performance between the cup task (all three orangutans, nine gorillas
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and six drills failed in the task) and the plate task (all subjects of all species failed in the task;
Fisher’s exact test: all Ps = 1.00; Figure 5).

Color vs. cup tasks (within-subjects)
For the analysis, we included subjects that completed both the cup and the color tasks
(the nine gorillas and the six orangutans and drills). Subjects from the three primate species did
not show any difference in the initial learning phase between the color task (four of six
orangutans and two of nine gorillas succeeded, while all six drills failed in the task) and the cup
task (one of six orangutans succeeded, while all nine gorillas and six drills failed in the task;
Fisher’s exact test, orangutans: P = 0.24; gorillas: P = 0.47; drills: P = 1.00; Figure 5).

Cross-species comparison (between-subjects)
We compared the performance of orangutans, gorillas and drills in the cup task with the
performance of the capuchin monkeys in Prétôt et al. (2016b). There was a significant difference
in learning speed between the species in (Kruskal-Wallis exact test: df = 3, H = 18.54, P < 0.001;
Figure 5). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the capuchins outperformed all three species
(Scheffe’s test: all Ps ≤ 0.02), which were not distinguishable from one another (all Ps ≥ 0.77).

Discussion
Interestingly, none of the primate species improved their performance in the cup task, in
which the foods were hidden, as compared to the plate task, in which the foods were visible. We
had predicted that they would do better due to the presumably lessened prepotent response
associated with visible rewards (since the food was hidden). The overall poor performance of
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orangutans in the cup task was particularly surprising, given their well-known inhibitory skills
(e.g., see Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008; Parrish, Perdue, Stromberg, et al., 2014; Shumaker,
Palkovitch, Beck, et al., 2002; Vlamings, Hare, & Call, 2010). Although we do not know why
orangutans performed so poorly in the task, our results nonetheless support the hypothesis that
changing the task cues influences performance differently across primates.

3.6

General Discussion
In a prior study, we found that capuchin monkeys performed better in a dichotomous

choice task after the cues were changed from being primarily motivated by the cleaner fish
ecology towards cues that we predicted were more relevant to primates’ behavior (Prétôt et al.,
2016b). Here, we tested whether these results generalized across the primate taxon by testing
three additional species in the tasks. As predicted, gorillas and drills failed in the plate task,
which was consistent with our prior findings on both capuchin monkeys and orangutans. Besides
this, however, the choices of the orangutans, gorillas and drills largely deviated from the
capuchins’ results, despite the fact that we expected all three species, like capuchins, to do better
because these tasks were designed specifically to make use of cues that might be familiar to
primates (the color task) or minimize cues that might be distracting (the cup task). As predicted,
orangutans did perform overall better in the color task than in the original plate ask, which was
also how the capuchins had behaved. However, unlike the capuchins, they did not improve
relative to the plate task in the cup task, in which the food was hidden. Moreover, the gorillas
and drills performed poorly on all tasks.
Although we can only speculate on why these primates in general did so poorly
(excepting the orangutans in the color task), we see at least two possible explanations. First, it is
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possible that the cues were (inadvertently) more salient to capuchins than to the other species,
which would have meant that the capuchins were better than the other primates at finding the
cues associated with success in the tasks. We cannot rule this out; however, we also cannot think
of any a priori reason why it should be the case. All four species are diurnal primates with good
color vision, and all eat fruits (which has been hypothesized as one driver of primates’ reliance
color vision; e.g., see Osorio & Vorobyev, 1996; Osorio, Smith, Vorobyev, & Buchanan-Smith,
2004; Regan, Julliot, Simmen, et al., 2001). Indeed, color is presumably even more important in
the drills and great apes than in the capuchins, in which females have concealed ovulation and
males lack conspicuous sexual coloration (e.g., see Carnegie, Fedigan, & Ziegler, 2005; Carosi,
Heistermann, & Visalberghi, 1999).
Second, and, we believe, most likely, the primates might have done poorly in the tasks
for reasons that were external to the task. In particular, none of the subjects that we tested in the
current study have a lot of experience with cognitive testing, especially relative to the capuchins.
Perhaps more tellingly, the gorillas and drills have even less experience than the orangutans, and
also did relatively worse than the orangutans. Indeed, while some of our gorilla subjects have
had participated in studies prior ours, most of these studies were behavioral, and only a few have
used experimental procedures. This was, to our knowledge, the first cognitive study ever
performed on these drill subjects. The orangutans’ increased experience with testing may explain
why they did better than the gorillas and drills on the color task.
We do not know why the orangutans performed poorly in the cup task, in which foods
were hidden, while they did relatively well on the color task, in which the foods were colored
rather than the plates. On one hand, given evidence that orangutans generally possess advanced
inhibitory skills as compared to other primates (e.g., see Amici et al., 2008; Shumaker et al.,
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2002; Vlamings et al., 2010), we had expected them to do well in both tasks. On the other hand,
performing poorly in the cup task despite high inhibitory control may have indicated that
inhibition was not the key issue that affects subjects’ responses in the task (at least in
orangutans). If it was, then the orangutans may not have needed the extra boost from hiding the
foods to solve it.
Overall, what do our results tell us about species’ performance in the task? Primarily, our
findings indicate that performance in the task vary greatly across species of the same taxon,
which indicates, not surprisingly, that these responses are driven by very specific features of
individuals species’ ecologies rather than broad generalities that apply to an entire taxon.
Unfortunately, the (very likely) influence of external factors, including subjects’ levels of
experience with testing procedures, did not allow us to determine with much certainty what was
the underlying cause of such variability (although these results may indicate that difficulty with
inhibition is not a key aspect that drives subjects’ responses, at least in orangutans). Most
importantly, these results (re-) emphasize the importance of testing multiple species in similar
tasks whenever possible (as we did here and in prior studies), which should facilitate identifying
the factors that may influence species’ performance in the tasks. Indeed, testing any one of these
species separately would have led to a very different set of conclusions than we can now reach.
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3.7

Tables

Table 4 Orangutan-Gorilla-Drill Subjects General Information
Social group, age, gender and studies conducted

1

Subjects previously tested in the plate task (Salwiczek et al., 2012).

2

Subjects only tested in Studies 2 and 3.
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Table 5 Two-Choice Gorilla-Drill Plate Task
Number of trials needed for each subject to solve the plate task for the initial learning phase and
the reversal phase in Study 1

Stimulus options (Plate 1 vs. Plate 2) are shown in Figure 4. Subjects that did not reach
preference criterion in the initial learning phase were not further tested on the reversal phase.
1

Subject was tested with grapes.

2

Subjects did not complete one session.
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Table 6 Two-Choice Orangutan-Gorilla-Drill Color Task
Number of trials needed for each subject to reach preference criterion for the initial learning
phase and the reversal phase in Study 2

Stimulus options (Color 1 vs. Color 2) are shown in Figure 4. Subjects that did not reach
preference criterion in the initial learning phase were not further tested on the reversal phase.
1

Subjects previously tested in the plate task (Salwiczek et al., 2012).

2

Subjects previously tested in Study 3.

3

Subject did not complete one or more sessions.

4

Subject was tested with grapes.

5

Subject was tested with different color food.
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Table 7 Two-Choice Orangutan-Gorilla-Drill Cup Task
Number of trials needed for each subject to reach preference criterion for the initial learning
phase and the reversal phase in Study 3

Stimulus options (Cup 1 vs. Cup 2) are shown in Figure 4. Subjects that did not reach preference
criterion in the initial learning phase were not further tested on the reversal phase.
1

Subjects previously tested in Study 2.

2

Subject did not complete one session.

3

Subjects previously tested in the plate task (Salwiczek et al., 2012).

4

Subject was tested with grapes.
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3.8

Figures

Figure 4 Orangutan-Gorilla-Drill Sets of Stimuli
Pairs of stimuli (named 1 and 2) used in the plate, color and cup tasks.
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Figure 5 Orangutan-Gorilla-Drill Initial Learning Phase
The number of trials required for capuchins, drills, gorillas and orangutans to develop a
preference for the ephemeral stimulus in the plate task (capuchins’ data based on Salwiczek et
al., 2012) and to develop a preference for either stimulus in the color and cup tasks (capuchins’
data based on Prétôt et al., 2016b). Each dot represents one individual; black dots indicate a
preference for the ephemeral stimulus, while white dots indicate a preference for the permanent
stimulus. For capuchins and orangutans, the grey dots designate new subject not previously
tested in the plate task. As in our previous work (Prétôt et al., 2016a & 2016b), criterion was set
at 10 sessions, but if subjects chose one stimulus at least 7 out of 10 times on the 10th session,
they were allowed to continue until they either met criterion or failed to do so; “failed” indicates
subjects that did not reach preference criterion.
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4

STUDY 3: COMPARING SPECIES DECISIONS IN A DICHOTOMOUS CHOICE
TASK: ADJUSTING TASK PARAMETERS IMPROVES PERFORMANCE IN
MONKEYS

Previously published as Prétôt, L., Bshary, R., & Brosnan, S. F. (2016a). Comparing species
decisions in a dichotomous choice task: Adjusting task parameters improves performance in
monkeys. Animal Cognition, 19, 819–834.

4.1

Introduction
In comparative psychology, researchers compare species and use their similarities and

differences to improve understanding of the evolution and development of their cognition and
behavior (Kamil, 1988, 1998). One challenge with this is that when differences between species
are found (e.g., one species outperforms another in a same task), it is often difficult to determine
what were the underlying factors that caused it (Bitterman, 1960, 1965). Was it a difference in
cognitive architecture? Social environment? Ecology? Was it an artifact of the species’ anatomy
or physiology? Some aspect of the procedure? Or a combination of some or all of these?
Therefore, a single comparison, whether the behavior is shown to be similar or different, is
almost never sufficient for a full understanding of that behavior.
Recently, Salwiczek et al. (2012) conducted a cross-taxon study designed to compare the
performance of cleaner fish with several nonhuman primate species (capuchin monkeys,
chimpanzees and orangutans) on a seemingly simple two-choice discrimination task derived
from the cleaner’s natural habitat (Bshary & Grutter, 2002). The goal of this study was to
compare two distantly related taxa that have both evolved complex social and foraging behaviors
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(especially those related to cooperation between individuals) to see if the primates could solve it
as well as the fish despite the lack of ecological relevance. If this had been the case, it would
have indicated that the primates were able to use their relatively more developed cognitive ability
to overcome their lack of experience. However, it was not; the adult fish outperformed all of the
primate species (and juvenile cleaner fish). This was surprising, and indicated that the task might
not be as easy as it seemed. For example, the primates might have failed at the task because of
the general tendency animals show to prefer the first of two rewards that they encounter (e.g.,
Davison & Baum, 2000; Timberlake, Gawley, & Lucas, 1987; also see Salwiczek et al., 2012).
In light of this literature, it is also surprising that the cleaner fish performed as well as they did
on the task. Unfortunately, the study design did not allow us to further explore which factors
made the task difficult for the primates. Thus, the goal of the current study was to test two
potential explanations, first, that the primates would do better in a computerized task that
minimized extraneous cues and the presence of the experimenter, and second, that they would do
better in a task designed to more closely mimic their ecology.
The paradigm we used was based on a mutualistic interaction between the cleaner fish
Labroides dimidiatus and its “client” species. Cleaner fish remove parasites and other material
from client reef fish, which visit them at “cleaning stations”. Clients have been categorized as
either residents, which have small territories or home ranges that allow them to access only one
cleaning station, or as choosy clients, which have larger home ranges that cover several cleaning
stations. Cleaners typically compete against one another over access to choosy clients, providing
faster and better service, while they each have exclusive access to their resident clients. Choosy
clients are expected to use their choice options by visiting stations where the service is better.
Field observations have found that choosy clients have priority of cleaning access over the
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residents (Bshary, 2001). They also typically switch to another cleaner if ignored, but are more
likely to return to the same cleaning station if they are inspected (Bshary & Schäffer, 2002),
indicating that the clients’ choosiness is the cause of priority of access.
Bshary and Grutter (2002) simulated this interaction in the lab, replacing client fish with
plates. In the experiment, one plate simulated the choosy client, while the other represented the
resident. Fish could feed on the choosy plate only if they started to feed on it before they foraged
on the resident plate, otherwise the choosy plate was withdrawn while the fish was eating from
the resident plate, just as choosy clients leave if they are not inspected rapidly. The resident
plate, however, always stayed in the testing area until the fish had stopped feeding on it, just as
resident clients often queue for service while the cleaner fish is inspecting another client.
Crucially, both plates offered the same amount and type of food, and hence were equally
attractive as food patches. Within just a few trials, cleaner fish as a group showed a significant
tendency to visit the choosy plate first, supporting previous field observations that client choice
drives cleaners’ decisions to give visitors priority of access.
In their study, Salwiczek et al. (2012) tested two species of nonhuman primates, capuchin
monkeys and chimpanzees, that converge with cleaner fish on both their tendency to cooperate
with one another (e.g., capuchins: Brosnan, 2010; chimpanzees: Boesch & Boesch, 1989) and
their propensity to eat both immobile and mobile food sources, which may roughly correlate with
the stable resident and mobile choosy clients (e.g., plant materials vs. hunting for insects and
smaller vertebrates; Fragaszy et al., 2004; Goodall, 1986). Additionally, they tested orangutans,
which eat fruit (Galdikas, 1988) and, less frequently, insects or other mobile animal protein
sources (Rijksen, 1978), but who do not cooperate to the same degree in natural situations (but
do in captivity: see Chalmeau et al., 1997; Dufour et al., 2009). All of these primates have in
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common, though, that they do not cooperate with their food patches, and that food patches of the
same type do not behave differently according to what they look like (e.g., their color). This is in
stark contrast to cleaners, which cooperate with clients that differ in color, such that color can be
used as a recognition cue and associated with the species’ strategic options.
In Salwiczek et al. (2012), fish outperformed all three primate species, but notably, the
majority of monkeys (but not apes) who learned the task subsequently performed well on a
reversal test (i.e., when the role of each plate was suddenly reversed). This demonstrated that,
once acquired, the primates were able to flexibly use the rules needed in the task. Although these
findings imply that at least part of the difference in decision-making could be due to the
difference in the ecological relevance of the task to the different species, we could not rule out
other factors that might play a role. One way to address this is to test successive adaptations of
the task that have been modified to change a variable of interest. In the current paper, we used
this approach to test two potential explanations in the species of primates that performed best on
the previous task, capuchin monkeys, on two adapted versions of the task to see if they would
learn the task more rapidly with these alternate procedures. In addition, we compared their
performance to that of rhesus macaques, another nonhuman primate species that cooperates and
is very successful at cognitive tasks but had not had previous experience with the task, to see the
degree to which our results generalized across primates.
First, we hypothesized that the primates’ lack of success could be due to extraneous cues
that were part of the procedure itself that may have more heavily influenced primates than fish
(e.g., the presence of the experimenter). Specifically, in Study 1, we used a computerized
paradigm that replaced plates with virtual icons on a computer screen. Computerized testing is
familiar to our primate subjects of both species, and has the benefit that it minimizes extraneous
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cues that may influence the primates’ performance, such as side biases (Anderson, Degiorgio,
Lamarque, & Fagot, 1996; Masataka, 1990; de Waal, Leimgruber, & Greenberg, 2008;
Westergaard & Suomi, 1997) and the presence of visible foods (see Boysen & Berntson, 1995;
Boysen et al., 1996, 1999, 2001; Murray et al., 2005). While we could not determine which, if
any, of these cues influenced their behavior, if any of these cues were the key challenge to
solving the task, we predicted that 1) capuchin monkeys would reach learning criterion more
quickly in this version than they did in the plate task, and 2) rhesus macaques would perform
similarly to the capuchins (because they did not participate in the previous study, there was no
previous performance to compare them to).
Second, we hypothesized that adapting the procedure to be more ecologically relevant to
the primates would improve their performance. As discussed above, cleaners’ ephemeral food
patches only leave if the cleaner does not choose them, whereas monkeys’ ephemeral food
patches do not wish to be consumed and may try to escape prior to being chosen. Therefore, in
our second study, the ephemeral stimulus moved from the beginning of the trial, as if “escaping”.
We predicted that this change would allow primates to reach criterion more rapidly.
Additionally, to rule out that any change was simply due to the increased attention to a moving
icon, for a second version of the task, both stimuli were moving (vibrating) from the beginning
of the task. Note that the primates could have been influenced by one or both of the factors in
these studies, or those that we did not test, but this is a first step at beginning to understand the
factors driving the monkeys’ performance.
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4.2

Methods
4.2.1

Subjects and Housing

All experiments were approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee (IACUC; capuchins: A13022; macaques: A13021) and met the standards of
the United States. Georgia State University is fully approved by the Association for Assessment
and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC).

Capuchins
We tested 11 captive born brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella; 6 males,
average age: 12 years, range: 5-22 years, and 5 females, average age: 11 years, range: 4-16
years) from two stable social groups at the Language Research Center of Georgia State
University, USA. We initially tested 10 of these subjects and added one who became old enough
to participate in testing prior to Study 2. Subjects were separated from their social groups only
for behavioral and cognitive testing. Subjects were fed a diet according to their species-specific
needs, consisting of primate chow and fresh fruits and vegetables. They also received enrichment
foods several times per day. Animals were never food or water deprived. Running water was
available ad libitum, including during testing.
The monkeys lived in two large indoor/outdoor enclosures. Each enclosure contained
ample three-dimensional climbing space as well as trapezes, perches and enrichment items. The
enclosure for each social group was divided into an indoor area (approximately one-half of their
total space) and an outdoor area. The subjects had previously been trained to enter test boxes
attached to their indoor area, which allowed us to separate individuals from their group for
testing. Subjects could choose not to participate at any time by walking away from the
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experimenter. The monkeys were tested 3-5 days per week. No subject was ever involved in
more than one session of this study on any given day (see detail in General Procedure, below).

Macaques
We tested eight captive born adult male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta; average age:
18 years, range: 9-29 years) at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University, USA.
They had continuous access to water and worked for fruit-flavored primate pellets. They also
received a daily diet of fruits and vegetables to supplement the food they received from testing,
and were never food or water deprived.

4.2.2

Apparatus

Subjects were tested using the Language Research Center’s Computerized Test System
comprising a personal computer, digital joystick, color monitor, and pellet dispenser (Evans,
Beran, Chan, et al., 2008; Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, et al., 1990; Washburn &
Rumbaugh, 1992). Monkeys manipulated the joystick to produce isomorphic movements of a
computer-graphic cursor on the screen. Contacting appropriate computer-generated stimuli with
the cursor provided them a 45-mg (capuchins) or 94-mg (macaques) banana-flavored chow pellet
(Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ) using a pellet dispenser that interfaced to the computer through a
digital I/O board (PDISO8A; Keithley Instruments, Cleveland, OH). All monkeys had previously
participated in multiple cognitive and behavioral experiments involving this computerized test
system (e.g., Beran, 2007, 2008; Beran & Parrish, 2012; Beran, Evans, Klein, & Einstein, 2012;
Beran, Harris, Evans, et al., 2008a; Brosnan, Wilson, & Beran, 2012; Evans & Beran, 2012).
Monkeys were tested on the computerized apparatus while in their testing enclosures.
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4.2.3

General Procedure

The experimental design was based on the studies of Bshary & Grutter (2002) and
Salwiczek et al. (2012). Two icons, one representing an ephemeral choice and one a permanent
choice (see Table 8), were presented on a computer screen and subjects had to choose between
them. If the permanent stimulus was chosen first, the subject could not make another choice, but
if the subject chose the ephemeral stimulus first, they could then choose the permanent one as
well, resulting in one reward for each choice. The optimal outcome was always to select the
ephemeral stimulus first, which ultimately gave the subject two rewards. The location of each
stimulus was randomly determined, but in conditions in which only two locations were used
(e.g., left/right), the stimulus position was counterbalanced within a session so that they were
presented on each side an equal number of times, with the constraint that there were no more
than three trials in a row on the same side (as in Salwiczek et al., 2012; see details in the
procedures, below). Each trial ended once the monkeys made a choice between the options. Each
subject received 10 sessions of 10 trials each, unless otherwise noted. The inter-trial time interval
varied depending on the task (see detail in the procedures, below).
Subsequent to the initial learning test, subjects completed a reversal test (Rumbaugh,
1971, 1997; Salwiczek et al., 2012). The methodology was identical to that in the initial test, but
the role of each stimulus was reversed (i.e., the stimulus that was ephemeral in the initial
learning test became permanent, and vice-versa). These tests are frequently used to demonstrate
flexibility in cognitive processing. If subjects initially preferred the ephemeral stimulus and then
reversed to prefer the newly ephemeral (formerly permanent) stimulus, this indicated that they
were consistent in their preference. The outcomes are more difficult to interpret if subjects
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initially preferred the permanent stimulus. Reversing to maintain a preference for the newly
permanent (formerly ephemeral) stimulus indicated a consistent preference for the permanent
stimulus, however, maintaining a preference for the newly ephemeral (formerly permanent)
stimulus was uninformative because we cannot disentangle two possible explanations: did they
prefer that physical stimulus, or did they recognize the utility of choosing the ephemeral stimulus
first when they chose the now-ephemeral stimulus to do so after the stimuli switched? We report
data on reversal tasks in all cases, but do not attempt to interpret them in this latter situation. For
each study, stimuli were counterbalanced such that each was the ephemeral stimulus for
approximately half of the subjects.

Learning Criterion and Statistics
In Study 1, we initially used the same criterion as was used in Salwiczek et al. (2012).
This criterion was based on a two-tailed signs test, such that significance was reached when a
subject developed a preference for the ephemeral source in 10/10 or 9/10 trials on one session, in
≥8/10 on two successive sessions, or in ≥7/10 trials on three consecutive sessions; however,
unlike primates in the previous study, some monkeys developed a preference for the permanent
over the ephemeral stimulus, so for Study 2, developing a preference for either stimulus met
criterion. Two additional changes to Study 2 were that 1) we still used the 10/10 criterion on one
unique session, but only if the subject selected each of the two stimuli in at least one trial of a
previous session to ensure that they had experience with both outcomes (note that this did not
apply to the reversal phase, because a subject had experienced both options in the initial phase),
and 2) we required two sessions of 9/10 because it came to our attention that, while a single 9/10
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session is used frequently as a criterion in cognitive and behavioral testing, Monte Carlo
simulations show that this criterion is not sufficiently strict (see Grant, 1946).
We used a two-tailed exact Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to analyze differences in subjects’
performance between the two learning phases and across the studies. We also used a two-tailed
exact Mann-Whitney U test to compare performance between species. Subjects that failed were
assigned 110 trials for the purposes of analysis, which was the minimum number of trials at
which testing ceased. Sometimes subjects did receive more than this because if on their final
session the subjects were close to meeting criterion (i.e., at least 7 choices for one option), they
were given another set (or two, in the case of sessions with 7/10 correct) of 10 trials to give them
the opportunity to do so. For all of our cross-study and cross-species comparisons, we used the
data from subjects who either preferred the ephemeral icon or did not develop any preference,
but did not use the data from the subjects who significantly preferred the permanent stimulus,
because our goal was to determine what changes allowed the monkeys to meet the same
performance criteria as the fish.
Due to our small sample sizes, we also provided a measure of the effect size (Pearson’s
correlation coefficient, r; see Rosenthal, 1991). Cohen (1988)’s classification of effect size
magnitude was used, whereby r ≤ 0.09 mean that there is “no effect” of the treatment, r = 0.100.29 is considered a “small effect”, r = 0.30-0.49 is a “moderate effect”, and r ≥ 0.50 is a “large
effect”.
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4.3

Study 1
4.3.1

Procedure

Study 1 was carried out between July and December 2012 with the same 8 capuchin
subjects tested in the original plate study (Salwiczek et al., 2012) and two additional subjects
who had no experience with the original paradigm, and between August and November 2012
with macaques. At the beginning of each trial, two stimuli that differed in shape and color
appeared simultaneously on the computer screen (the orientation of the stimuli differed across
the versions of the task; see Table 8). The monkeys used a cursor (a red dot on the screen) to
select one of the stimuli.

Study 1A
Subjects were tested on four versions of the task that varied on inter-trial time interval
(ITI) and stimulus location until they met criterion (see Table 8 for a summary of procedures in
the order in which the subjects experienced them). Once they met criterion, they were not tested
on subsequent versions. Additionally, once they met criterion, they were given a reversal test
using the same version of the task on which they had just passed criterion. We used a green
pentagon and a purple cross stimuli in all the versions (see Table 8). Note that the ITI was the
interval between stimulus presentations, thus the subject could have taken more time to actually
make a choice. Rhesus monkeys sometimes failed to re-engage in the task after an ITI (this is
why trial counts were not always multiples of 10), thus we added a tone concurrent with the
presentation of a new stimulus to attract their attention in an attempt to ameliorate this problem.
Capuchin monkeys typically completed their sessions and did not have a tone in any condition.
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Version 1 had an ITI of five minutes and a left-right presentation of the stimuli (e.g., one
stimulus was on each side of the screen); if they failed to meet criterion, subjects were tested in
subsequent versions that were altered in ways that we hypothesized would improve performance.
Version 2 had an ITI of only 1 minute, because in the previous study a decreased ITI increased
performance on the task (see Salwiczek et al., 2012). For this version, we used a maximum of 50
trials because the three capuchin subjects tested on that version developed a side bias, which did
not occur in other conditions. To avoid the subjects developing side biases, Version 3 was the
same as Version 2, except that the stimuli were randomized across four positions that were either
lined up on a left-right or up-down axis. Version 4 replicated Version 3, except with a shorter ITI
of 30 seconds.
The reversal test was identical, except that the role of each stimulus was reversed. As
with the regular test, subjects who did not meet criterion on the reversal test were subsequently
moved to the next condition set available until they either met criterion or completed all possible
conditions. An issue with how counterbalancing was calculated in the computer program meant
that for the first two sessions of the capuchins’ Version 1, the same stimulus was presented six
times on one side (rather than five). To be thorough, the two subjects who passed criterion in the
first two sessions were given an additional session with correct counterbalancing. Also, due to a
technical problem with the food dispenser dispensing incorrectly, one capuchin (Lily) was
excluded from the analysis because we could not know what she was basing her decisions on.
One capuchin (Logan) and one macaque (Chewie) inadvertently received two reversal sessions
of Version 1 on one day.

Study 1B
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Each capuchin subject who passed both the initial and reversal learning phases of Study
1A was subsequently tested in a generalization task in which both ephemeral and permanent
stimuli were replaced with new ones to see how quickly the subjects were able to apply the same
rules to a new situation (Harlow, 1949; Schrier, 1984; Barros, Galvão, & Mcilvane, 2002). For
this task, subjects were tested in the same version of Study 1A on which they had met criterion,
with the exception that we did not use Version 1, with the ITI of 300 seconds, to maintain
subjects’ motivation to participate. Similarly to Study 1A, subjects who did not succeed in the
first version on which they were tested progressed to the next version in the order indicated in
Table 8. To be consistent with Study 1A, we used a maximum of 50 trials in Version 2 of Study
1B. We used a blue circle-top rectangular and a brown L-shape stimuli in all versions (see Table
8). Note that one subject (Nkima) always chose the permanent icon after 60 trials on the reversal
phase of Version 3, at which point we decided to terminate the study. Rhesus monkeys were not
run on Study 1B.

4.3.2

Results

Individual data for all subjects are in Tables 9 (capuchins) and 10 (macaques). Subjects’
performance across the conditions is shown in Figures 6 (initial phase) and 7 (reversal phase).

Capuchin Study 1A
Initial Learning Phase. Six out of the nine subjects tested in the initial learning phase of
Version 1 reached criterion within 100 trials (or 10 sessions; range: 20-100 trials, X = 45 trials,
SD ± 32.71). The three subjects who did not meet criterion in Version 1 also did not meet
criterion in Version 2, but all did so in Version 3 (range: 30-96 trials, X = 62 trials, SD ± 33.05).
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Reversal Learning Phase. Two of the six subjects who had passed the initial learning
phase of Version 1 reached criterion on the reversal phase within 110 trials (range: 60-110 trials,
X = 85 trials, SD ± 35.36). The other four subjects met criterion in Version 2 (range: 10-40 trials,
X = 25 trials, SD ± 12.91). One of the three subjects who reached criterion on the initial learning
phase of Version 3 reached criterion on the Version 3 of the reversal phase (110 trials). Of the
other two subjects, one met criterion in Version 4 (30 trials) and one never reached criterion.
Initial vs. Reversal Learning Phases. Subjects who met criterion in Version 1, and
therefore were the quickest in the initial learning phase, performed better on the initial learning
phase than on the reversal phase (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -2.20, N = 6, P = 0.03,
r = -0.64). This was different than in the original plate task, where capuchins met criterion faster
on the reversal phase than the initial phase (see Salwiczek et al., 2012). Considering all subjects
who passed in all versions, however, subjects showed no significant difference in speed of
learning between the two phases (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 11, Z = -0.98, N = 8, P =
0.33, r = -0.25).
Computer vs. Plate Tasks (within-subjects). We compared the performance of the eight
capuchin subjects who participated in the initial learning phase of the original plate task
(Salwiczek et al., 2012) with their own data on the computerized task (note that there is an order
confound as all plate testing was completed prior to computerized testing, although three years
separated the two experiments). Subjects performed only marginally better on the computerized
learning than the previous plate task, although the effect size is at the high end of medium,
indicating that this may be a real effect (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -1.84, N = 7, P =
0.13, r = -0.49; Figure 6). Interestingly, the monkeys’ performance on the reversal phase of the
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computerized task was marginally worse than the reversal phase of the previous plate task
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 2.50, Z = -1.70, N = 7, P = 0.13, r = -0.45; Figure 7).

Macaque Study 1A
Initial Learning Phase. Four out of the eight subjects tested in the initial learning phase
of Version 1 reached criterion, preferring the ephemeral icon, within 50 trials (range: 10-50
trials, X = 36.5, SD ± 18.05), while the other half reached criterion with a preference for the
permanent icon, within 40 trials (range: 20-40 trials, X = 27.25, SD ± 9.50). Taken as a group,
macaques did not show any significant preference for either icon (binomial/sign test: P = 1.00).
Reversal Learning Phase. The four subjects who chose the ephemeral icon on the
learning phase of Version 1 reached criterion on the reversal phase within 88 trials (range: 40-88
trials, X = 65.75, SD ± 20.21). The four subjects who initially chose the permanent icon reached
a significant preference for their previously preferred icon, which now signaled the ephemeral
reward, within 90 trials (range: 10-90 trials, X = 37.5, SD ± 35.94). In those cases, however, we
cannot say whether the subjects learned that the ephemeral option ultimately provided additional
rewards or that they simply preferred that particular icon.
Initial vs. Reversal Learning Phases. Too few subjects initially preferred the ephemeral
task for statistical significance; however, we note that all four performed better on the initial
phase than on the reversal phase (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -1.83, P = 0.13, r = 0.65).
Ephemeral vs. Permanent Choice. There was no significant difference in learning speed
between subjects who preferred the ephemeral icon and those who preferred the permanent one
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(Mann-Whitney U test: U = 4, Z = -1.16, Nephemeral = 4, Npermanent = 4, P = 0.29, r = -0.41; see
Table 10).

Capuchins vs. Fish
Monkeys’ performance in Study 1A did not significantly differ from fishes’ performance
in the plate task (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 24.50, Z = -0.30, Ncapuchins = 9, Nfish = 6, P = 0.81, r
= -0.08).

Capuchins vs. Macaques
Unlike the capuchins, the macaques were equally likely to prefer the ephemeral or the
permanent icon. When only comparing the subjects who initially chose the ephemeral icon,
however, the two species did not significantly differ in performance in the learning phase (MannWhitney U test: U = 12, Z = -0.93, Ncapuchins = 9, Nmacaques = 4, P = 0.39; r = -0.26), but the
macaques reached criterion in the reversal phase faster than did capuchins (Mann-Whitney U
test: U = 3, Z = -2.22, Ncapuchins = 8, Nmacaques = 4, P = 0.02, r = -0.64).

Capuchin Study 1B
Initial Learning Phase. We tested the subjects who passed both the initial and the
reversal learning phases in any version of Study 1A on a generalization task designed to
determine if they would extrapolate to a novel situation. Five out of six subjects who met
criterion on Version 1 of Study 1A met criterion within 30 trials in Version 2 of Study 1B (we
did not use Version 1, so subjects started on Version 2; range: 10-30 trials, X = 22 trials, SD ±
10.95). The only subject who did not reach criterion in Version 2 did so in Version 3 (30 trials).
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The two subjects who did not reach criterion on the learning phase until Versions 3 and 4 met
criterion on this generalization task in 30 trials (subject who met criterion on Version 3) and 80
trials (subject who met criterion on Version 4), respectively.
Reversal Learning Phase. The five subjects tested in Version 2 met criterion within 100
trials on the reversal phase (range: 30-100 trials, X = 53.20 trials, SD ± 28.66). Among the two
subjects who started in Version 3, one reached criterion in 100 trials, while the other did not
meet criterion within 60 trials (this subject always chose the permanent icon, at which point we
terminated the study). Finally, the subject who started Version 4 reached criterion in 80 trials.
Study 1A vs. Study 1B (within-subjects). As a group, subjects performed only marginally
better on the initial learning phase of Study 1B than Study 1A (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W =
4.50, Z = -1.61, N = 8, P = 0.13, r = -0.40).

4.3.3

Study 1 Discussion

Overall, capuchins were somewhat more likely to meet criterion on the computerized task
than on the original plate task. Moreover, their learning speed on the computerized task did not
differ from the fishes’ performance on the plate task. Finally, seven of eight monkeys met
criterion on their first version of the generalization task, indicating that once they understood the
procedure, they could generalize to novel stimuli. Thus, based on this evidence, it seems that the
capuchin monkeys were better able to learn the same task when it was presented on a computer
as compared to the manual procedure. This was presumably due to the fact that there were fewer
extraneous cues that may have influenced the subjects’ performance, either by distracting them
from the important cues or by providing additional (but unnecessary) information that needed to
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be considered. While we cannot identify which cue(s) was relevant, our adapted task changed
primates’ perception of the task so that they were now able to learn it at equal speed to the fish.
These results are very important as they again emphasize the importance of how a task is
presented in the subjects’ ability to learn it. On the one hand, these results negate those from
Salwiczek et al. (2012), as the monkeys were able to learn the task, but on the other hand, they
emphasize that the monkeys could not learn using the same task parameters as the fish, but
required alternate ones. This complicates comparative research as it requires studies to test both
the different species on identical parameters (for a direct comparison, as we did in Salwiczek et
al. (2012)) and also to test species using parameters that are adapted to that species’ preferences
and abilities (as we did here) to rule out the possibility that the difference is not in the task itself,
but in how the task is presented. Of course, variations that allow a species to learn to the best of
their ability could also derive from differences in cognitive architecture, ecology, or how they
interact with the task, and in most cases will likely differ on more than one dimension. Thus, it is
important to test several of these possibilities in an attempt to pin down which feature(s) led to
the species difference, which is what we do in the current paper.
One potential confound with our result is that this was many of the monkeys’ second time
to do this basic procedure. However, we consider it unlikely that their performance was strongly
influenced by their previous experience for several reasons. First, approximately three years had
elapsed between the subjects participating in the plate task and the first computer task (Study
1A), during which time they had participated in many other cognitive and behavioral tasks
unrelated to this one. Moreover, two of the subjects in the computer task did not participate in
the previous plate task, but performed at the same level as the more experienced monkeys,
showing that experience was not necessary for this level of performance. The reversal learning
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results also provide evidence that subjects’ success was not entirely based on previous
experience; if experience was substantially influencing their performance, we would expect
subjects to show increased speed of reversal learning across multiple presentations of the same
problem (rhesus: Harlow, 1949; Harlow & Warren, 1952; capuchins: Gossette & Inman, 1966),
which they did not.
In an attempt to address this confound, we also tested rhesus monkeys, who had not
previously been tested. All macaques reached preference criterion, however while the capuchins
were more likely to prefer the payoff maximizing choice, the macaques were equally likely to
prefer to maximize payoffs or to avoid what likely appeared to be an unreliable stimulus (e.g.,
the ephemeral was often not available for them to choose). This was a surprising finding, given
these rhesus macaques’ higher performance in cognitive tasks as compared to capuchin monkeys
(e.g., Beran & Smith 2011; Beran, Perdue, & Smith, 2014; Beran, Smith, Coutinho, et al., 2009).
It is difficult to know exactly what subjects based their decision on, but we discuss this further in
the General Discussion, including data from both Studies 1 and 2.

4.4

Study 2
Study 2, which was completed subsequent to Study 1, was designed to be more

ecologically relevant for primates. We predicted that this would increase the speed at which the
monkeys met criterion above and beyond their performance on the computerized task. This study
consisted of two experiments, A and B. In both tests, the ephemeral stimulus was moving from
the beginning of the trial, which more closely mimics primates’ natural ephemeral food sources
(e.g., insects; see Introduction for more discussion of this). Study 2A had a single change from
Study 1: from the beginning of the trial, the ephemeral icon moved towards the edge of the
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screen (where it escaped) while the permanent icon remained stationary. In Study 2B, we added
another change; in this case, both icons vibrated on the spot before the ephemeral icon (still
vibrating) moved away, while the permanent icon kept vibrating in the same location. This was
done to control for the increased visual salience of a moving icon (e.g., attention effects).
We predicted subjects would do better in Study 2 as compared to Study 1. If performance
increased only in Study 2A, this would indicate that it was due to an attention/salience effect,
whereas if it increased in both Study 2A and 2B, this would more likely indicate that the change
was due to the structure of the task, implicating ecological salience.

4.4.1

Procedure

Study 2A was carried out between September and October 2014 with capuchins, and
between February and March 2015 with macaques, while Study 2B was carried out between
November and December 2015 with both monkey species. We tested eight of the nine capuchins
used in Study 1, plus an additional subject with no previous experience with any version of the
paradigm, and seven of the eight macaques used in Study 1. In order to compare the performance
of monkeys in both Study 1 and Study 2, subjects were again tested in Version 1 of Study 1,
using novel stimuli, except that when the subject touched the start button to begin the trial, both
stimuli appeared and the ephemeral stimulus began moving from its initial position towards a
lower corner of the screen. In Study 2B, both icons vibrated on the spot for 200 milliseconds
before the ephemeral icon (still vibrating) began moving. The subjects had to track and touch the
ephemeral stimulus first, before it moved off the screen and could not be “caught” (the cursor
moved only slightly faster than the ephemeral stimulus). We used a yellow heart and a purplepink ring stimuli for Study 2A, and a blue waive and an orange moon for Study 2B (see Table 8).
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Note that two macaques (Obi and Luke) received two reversal sessions on one day (respectively
in Study 2A and Study 2B). Also, one macaque (Luke) received an additional session because
the data of the second session were lost.

4.4.2

Results

Individual data for all subjects tested on Study 2A and Study 2B are in Table 11.
Subjects’ performance across the conditions is shown in Figures 6 and 7.

Capuchin Study 2A
Initial Learning Phase. All subjects met criterion in fewer than 50 trials; however, while
eight out of the ten subjects met criterion with a preference for selecting the ephemeral icon first
(range: 20-50 trials, X = 37.50 trials, SD ± 11.65), two preferred the permanent icon (20 trials).
Taken as a group, capuchins did not show any significant preference for either icon
(binomial/sign test: P = 0.11).
Reversal Learning Phase. Five out of the eight subjects who preferred the ephemeral icon
in the initial phase reversed their preference in fewer than 60 trials (range: 30-60 trials, X = 44
trials, SD ± 13.42), while the other three subjects did not meet criterion within 100 trials. The
two subjects who initially preferred the permanent icon reversed their preference in 20 and 50
trials, although it is again difficult to interpret these data.
Initial vs. Reversal Learning Phase. As in Study 1, there was a trend for capuchins to
learn the initial learning phase in fewer trials than the reversal phase (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test: W = 2, Z = -2.05, N = 8, P = 0.06, r = -0.51).
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Within-subjects comparison with previous studies. There was no significant difference
between Study 1A and Study 2A in monkeys’ learning performance in either the initial
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 2, Z = -1.48, N = 6, P = 0.19, r = -0.43) or the reversal phase
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -1.34, N = 6, P = 0.50; r = -0.39; Figures 6 & 7). Unlike
in Study 1A, however, subjects were faster to learn the initial phase of Study 2A than in the
previous plate task (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -2.23, N = 6, P = 0.03, r = -0.64).

Capuchin Study 2B
Initial Learning Phase. Four out of the ten subjects met criterion in fewer than 50 trials,
with a preference for selecting the ephemeral icon first (range: 20-50 trials, X = 27.50 trials, SD
± 15). Five subjects never met criterion within 100 trials, and the last one never did so within 110
trials. Despite the fact that all monkeys who developed a preference did so for the ephemeral
icon, taken as a group, capuchins did not show a significant preference for either icon
(binomial/sign test: P = 0.75).
Reversal Learning Phase. Three out of the four subjects who preferred the ephemeral
icon in the initial phase reversed their preference within 80 trials (range: 40-80 trials, X = 60
trials, SD ± 20), while the last subject did not meet criterion within 100 trials.
Initial vs. Reversal Learning Phase. Too few subjects initially preferred the ephemeral
task for statistical significance; however, we note that all four subjects performed better on the
initial phase than on the reversal phase (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -1.84, P = 0.13, r
= -0.65).
Within-subjects comparison with previous studies. Although nonsignificant, subjects
showed a trend towards being faster on the initial phase of Study 2A than Study 2B (Wilcoxon
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signed-ranks test: W = 3, Z = -1.87, N = 8, P = 0.08, r = -0.47; Figures 6 & 7). Like in Study 2A,
subjects did not differ in performance between Study 2B and Study 1A (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test: W = 7, Z = -0.74, N = 8, P = 0.59, r = -0.19); however, unlike in Study 2A, they did not
differ in performance between Study 2B and the previous plate task (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test:
W = 1, Z = -0.45, N = 7, P = 1.00, r = -0.12).

Macaque Study 2A
Initial Learning Phase. All seven subjects met criterion within 107 trials, with a
preference for selecting the ephemeral icon first (range: 14-107 trials, X = 35.57 trials, SD ±
32.59). Unlike in Study 1A, macaques showed a preference for the ephemeral icon over the
permanent one (binomial/sign test: P = 0.02).
Reversal Learning Phase. All but one subject reversed their preference in fewer than 76
trials (range: 10-76 trials, X = 40.67 trials, SD ± 24.36). The last subject did not reach criterion
within 109 trials.
Initial vs. Reversal Learning Phase. Subjects’ learning speed did not differ between the
initial and reversal phases (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 7.50, Z = -1.10, N = 7, P = 0.31; r =
-0.29).
Study 1A vs. Study 2A (within-subjects). Although all seven subjects performed better in
Study 2A than in Study 1A, there were too few subjects who initially preferred the ephemeral
icon in both studies for statistical significance; we note, however, that all three subjects who had
an initial preference for the permanent icon in Study 1A preferred the ephemeral icon in Study
2A, and three of the four subjects who developed a preference for the ephemeral icon in both
tasks learned the initial task more rapidly in Study 2A than in Study 1A (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
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test: W = 2, Z = -1.10, N = 4, P = 0.38; r = -0.39; Figures 6 & 7). Three of these four subjects
also learned the reversal phase of Study 2A more rapidly than in Study 1A (Wilcoxon signedranks test: W = 4, Z = -0.37, N = 4, P = 0.88; r = -0.13).

Macaque Study 2B
Initial Learning Phase. Six of the seven subjects met criterion within 80 trials; however,
while four out of the six subjects met criterion with a preference for selecting the ephemeral icon
first (range: 20-80 trials, X = 40.50 trials, SD ± 26.85), two preferred the permanent icon (20 and
30 trials). The last subject never reached criterion within 111 trials. Unlike in Study 2A, subjects
did not show any significant preference for either icon (binomial/sign test: P = 1.00).
Reversal Learning Phase. None of the four subjects who preferred the ephemeral icon in
the initial phase reversed their preference within 100 trials. The two subjects who initially
preferred the permanent icon reached a significant preference for their previously preferred icon,
which now signaled the ephemeral reward, in 20 and 60 trials (although again we cannot
interpret this result).
Initial vs. Reversal Learning Phase. Too few subjects initially preferred the ephemeral
task for statistical significance; however, we note that all four subjects learned the initial task
more rapidly than the reversal (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -1.83, P = 0.13; r = 0.65).
Within-subjects comparison with previous studies. Too few subjects initially preferred the
ephemeral icon in the studies for statistical significance; however, we note that three of the four
subjects who learned the initial task in both studies learned it more rapidly in Study 2A than in
Study 2B, while the last one performed equally in both studies (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W =
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0, Z = -1.60, P = 0.25; r = -0.57; Figures 6 & 7). Three of the four subjects who performed the
reversal task in both studies learned it more rapidly in Study 2A than in Study 2B, while the last
one failed to learn it in Study 2B (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 1, Z = -1.46, P = 0.25; r = 0.52). Two of the three subjects who learned the initial task in both studies learned it more
rapidly in Study 1A than in Study 2B, while the last one showed the opposite (Wilcoxon signedranks test: W = 1, Z = -1.07, P = 0.50; r = -0.44). The three subjects learned the reversal task
more rapidly in Study 1A than in Study 2B (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: W = 0, Z = -1.60, P =
0.25; r = -0.65).

Capuchins vs. Fish
As in Study 1A, there was no significant difference in learning performance between fish
in the plate task and capuchins in either Study 2A (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 13.50, Z = -1.43,
Ncapuchins = 8, Nfish = 6, P = 0.18, r = -0.38) or Study 2B (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 20.50, Z = 1.07, Ncapuchins = 10, Nfish = 6, P = 0.28, r = -0.27).

Capuchins vs. Macaques
As in Study 1A, there was no significant difference in performance between monkey
species in either Study 2A (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 15, Z = -1.53, Ncapuchins = 8, Nmacaques = 7,
P = 0.16; r = -0.40) or Study 2B (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 21.50, Z = -0.44, Ncapuchins = 10,
Nmacaques = 5, P = 0.69; r = -0.11). Also, although the two species did not differ on the reversal
phase in Study 2A (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 20.50, Z = -0.88, Ncapuchins = 8, Nmacaques = 7, P =
0.40, r = -0.23), capuchins showed a trend towards being faster than macaques in Study 2B
(Mann-Whitney U test: U = 1.50, Z = -2.00, Ncapuchins = 4, Nmacaques = 4, P = 0.11; r = -0.71).
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4.4.3

Study 2 Discussion

Overall more capuchin monkeys found the payoff maximizing solution in Study 2A than
in Study 1A and, unlike in Study 1A, their performance in Study 2A was better than in the
original plate task. Similarly to Study 1A, the capuchin subject with no previous experience did
as well as her conspecifics who were more familiar with the paradigm, indicating that their
performance in Study 2A was not necessarily due to more experience with the task. Like
capuchins, more macaques solved the task in Study 2A than in Study 1A. This finding was even
more striking as all subjects, including those who preferred the permanent icon in Study 1A,
developed a preference for the ephemeral option. One reason for the success in Study 2A may
have been the fact that the moving icon was more prone to catching the monkeys’ attention than
in any of the other studies. The monkeys’ performance was no different in Study 2B, when both
icons were vibrating, than in Study 1A (and not much different from the original plate task).
Finally, both macaque and capuchin monkeys took longer overall to meet criterion on the
reversal phase than the initial phase in both studies. Our finding was consistent with previous
research showing that capuchins may have difficulty with reversal tests (e.g., Beran, Klein,
Evans, et al., 2008b; Brosnan & de Waal 2004), and contrasts with the capuchins’ results in the
original plate task (Salwiczek et al., 2012) in which subjects more rapidly learned the reversal
phase than the initial phase.

4.5

General Discussion
In the current paper, our goal was to replicate a previous study in which monkeys and

apes failed to learn a two-choice discrimination task as rapidly as cleaner fish, in order to tease
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apart some potential explanations for the fishes’ superior performance. In particular, we tested
two possible explanations for their failure: first, that the unintentional extraneous cues present in
a manual (as opposed to computerized) testing environment may have made the task more
challenging for the primates, and second, that adding a movement component that more closely
replicated natural stimuli from the monkeys’ ecology would improve their performance. As we
discussed in detail in each Study’s Discussion section, both of these modifications allowed the
monkeys to pass the task that they had previously failed. We do not repeat the discussions of
why these modifications succeeded here, but instead consider the overall implications.
One interesting finding in the current study, not seen previously, was that several
monkeys developed a preference for choosing the permanent icon. There are several possible
explanations for this. For instance, they may have preferred the option that never disappeared, or
found the disappearing one frustrating or confusing. Alternately, it may be that this was related
to some sort of superstitious behavior (Blanchard, Wilke, & Hayden, 2014). It is also worth
noting that while both species showed this suboptimal preference, it was particularly notable in
the macaques. In particular, while the computerized methodology of Study 1 increased capuchin
monkeys’ preference for the ephemeral icon over the original plate task, half of the rhesus
macaques developed a preference for the permanent icon, indicating that the task might be
perceived differently between the two species. Understanding this difference may shed light on
why the permanent icon ever came to be preferred.
Before we can be certain that the changes in procedure were responsible for the improved
performance, there are other possible explanations that must be ruled out. For instance, one
possibility is that this is an experience effect, resulting from the fact that these animals were
tested on these paradigms sequentially. However, we think this is unlikely for two main reasons.
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First, the better performance of the capuchin monkeys on the computerized tasks was also found
for novice monkeys who had no previous experience with the task. While this does not rule out
an experience effect among the experienced individuals, it does show that novices could do
much better on this task than (other) novice monkeys did on the previous test. Also in support of
this, half of our macaque subjects performed at a level comparable to the capuchins in both
studies, again despite having no previous experience with the paradigm. Second, the monkeys
did not improve their performance in the reversal tests, indicating that even among the
experienced individuals, there was not a great influence of previous experience on their results.
A second potential challenge to our results is that we did not also test fish. In particular, it
may be important to see if their performance decreased, which would be expected given that the
task was designed to be ecologically relevant for monkeys, not fish. Then, again, depending on
the degree to which fish can generalize, they might have maintained a high level of performance.
Of course, the current version, which uses a computerized procedure, would be very challenging
to test using identical procedures with the fish (although see Saverino & Gerlai, 2008; Siebeck,
Litherland, & Wallis, 2009; Siebeck, Parker, Sprenger, et al., 2010), but an adapted paradigm
could be used. Additional monkey-fish comparisons are a line of research that we are pursuing
using a different procedure that is more amenable to underwater testing.
Our results highlight a tension present in any comparative work, particularly when testing
species that differ substantially in body plan, ecology or cognitive ability; when designing the
task, the researchers must not only develop procedures that meet the needs of each species, but
also make a choice between keeping the task parameters identical and keeping the goals of the
task identical. In fact, we originally chose this task for our comparison explicitly because both
primates and fish are capable of two-choice tasks with minimal modifications required (i.e.,
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primates choose with their hands whereas fish choose with their mouths). Our current results
show that even in identical tasks (e.g., the earlier plate task), details in how subjects experience it
may make the task substantially different between species.
Therefore, we recommend that direct comparisons take a two-step approach. First,
researchers should directly compare the subjects on a task in which parameters are identical, as
we did in Salwiczek et al. (2012), to establish a baseline for comparing further results. Second,
researchers should then, when possible, compare the subjects based on whether they meet certain
criteria that respect the spirit of the decision being tested, but also address species-specific
strengths by using different procedures that may or may not be identical, as we tried to do here.
Neither approach is ideal in isolation, but combining the two across a long-running research
program allows for a very strong comparative test.
We note that this is becoming more common among comparative psychologists. For
instance, Pepperberg and Hartsfield (2014) replicated Salwiczek et al. (2012)’s study with
parrots, and found that they performed at levels comparable to the cleaner fish (and therefore
better than the primates) in the plate task. They argued that this task may be more natural for
species that are physically limited to grabbing only one food item at a time (e.g., using a mouth
or beak) because these animals are accustomed to sequential acquisition of food, as in this task,
rather than simultaneous acquisition, as is possible with two hands. This artificial limitation may
have been frustrating to the bimanual monkeys. In this context, it is interesting that in the current
task, our monkeys were using a joystick to control a single cursor and were able to learn more
rapidly. We believe that this supports Pepperberg and Hartsfield’s hypothesis, because the
sequential task was easier for the (bimanual) monkeys to learn when they were limited to
sequential acquisition by the testing modality (to which they were already accustomed) rather
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than artificially being forced to choose one option at a time when they could easily have grabbed
both if not limited by the experimenter. This may indicate that it is not only the behavior and
presentation of the stimuli that is important, but also the format of the test, and provides a
possible explanation for other results, such as the finding that primates more easily pass the traptube task when they have a single tool that they must decide where to use than when they are
presented with two tubes, each baited with its own tool (Girndt et al., 2008; Mulcahy & Call,
2006). Continued work on questions like these across species that vary on many dimensions will
help to clarify how ecology, cues and cognitive abilities influence decision-making across
variety of contexts.
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4.6

Tables

Table 8 Computer Tasks
The table describes the version, intertrial-time interval (ITI), spatial location of the stimuli, and
the stimuli used for each study and version.
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Table 9 Capuchin Computer Study 1
Number of trials for each subject in each version of Study 1A (initial learning) and Study 1B
(generalization). For each version, the left column indicates the number of trials for the initial
learning phase, while the right column indicates the number of trials for the reversal phase. Note
that we did not use Version 1 in Study 1B.
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Table 10 Macaque Computer Study 1A
The left column indicates the number of trials for the initial learning phase, the middle column
indicates the number of trials for the reversal phase, and the right column indicates the number of
trials for the second reversal phase.
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Table 11 Capuchin-Macaque Computer Study 2
For each version of the study (A and B), the left column indicates the number of trials for the
initial learning phase, while the right column indicates the number of trials for the reversal phase.
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4.7

Figures

Figure 6 Capuchin-Macaque Initial Learning Phase
The number of trials required for individuals to select either the ephemeral or the permanent
stimulus on the original manual plate task (data from Salwiczek et al., 2012), computer Study 1A
and Study 2, as compared to the fish. The black dots designate subjects that developed a
preference for the ephemeral stimulus, whereas the white dots designate those who preferred the
permanent stimulus. The grey dots designate new capuchin subjects who were not tested in the
original plate task (Salwiczek et al., 2012): the dark grey dots are for those who developed an
initial preference for the ephemeral icon, whereas the light grey dot is for the subject who
developed an initial preference for the permanent icon. Note that one capuchin subject was
dropped from Study 1A, and one capuchin and one macaque subjects were not tested subsequent
to Study 1A.
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Figure 7 Capuchin-Macaque Reversal Learning Phase
The number of trials required for individuals to reverse their preference on the original manual
plate task (data from Salwiczek et al., 2012), computer Study 1A and Study 2, as compared to
the fish. We only included data from those subjects who preferred the ephemeral stimulus on the
initial learning phase (see Figure 6). The black dots designate subjects who were tested in all
possible conditions (capuchins: manual + computer tasks; macaques: computer tasks), whereas
the grey dots designate new capuchin monkeys who were not tested in the original plate task
(Salwiczek et al., 2012).
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5

STUDY 4: MONKEYS SHOW BACKWARDS INDUCTION IN A MANUAL MAZE
TASK

Currently in review as Prétôt, L., & Brosnan, S. F. Monkeys show backwards induction in a
manual maze task. Journal of Comparative Psychology.

5.1

Introduction
The ease with which species can solve apparently similar problems can be due to a

variety of features, but one that has gained attention lately is the degree to which different
species are selected to focus on cues that are relevant to them (Lotem & Halpern, 2012; Prétôt et
al., 2016a & 2016b). How species perceive relevant cues may influence their ability to solve a
task, irrespective of their cognitive abilities. For example, previous research found that cleaner
fish outperformed monkeys and apes in a task derived from fish ecology, suggesting that the
ecological relevance of the task was likely to determine species’ performance (Salwiczek et al.,
2012). To draw the general conclusion that ecology primarily influences species’ ability to solve
a task, however, we must in concert consider alternative hypotheses to explain these findings. In
the current study, we followed up on previous work that compared fish and primates to explore
one possible cognition limitation in the primates, their ability at backwards induction.
This earlier work was based on a task that simulated the cleaner fish’s natural ecology
(Salwiczek et al., 2012). In the wild, cleaner fish remove parasites and other material from client
reef fish (this is the cleaners’ sole source of food), which actively visit cleaners at their so-called
cleaning stations. There are two categories of clients, visitors and residents; visitors live in large
territories that cover many cleaning stations and can choose the cleaners with whom to interact,
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and are therefore an ephemeral food source for the cleaners. In contrast, residents live in smaller
territories and interact most frequently with the same cleaner, making them a permanent food
source. Field observations found that visitors have priority of cleaning access over the residents
(Bshary, 2001). This priority of access is likely because visitors will leave if they are not cleaned
rapidly, and they are less likely to return to the same cleaner if it has been ignored in the past or
has received bad service (i.e., been bitten; see Bshary & Schäffer, 2002).
Following the latter observation, researchers designed a lab experiment that simulated
this interaction (Bshary & Grutter, 2002) with two different plates of food (each containing the
same food, and thus were equally attractive). In the task, if the cleaner picked the food from the
permanent plate first, the ephemeral plate was immediately removed, just as visitor clients would
leave if not inspected rapidly. The permanent plate, however, always stayed until the fish had
stopped feeding on it, just as resident clients often queue for service if the cleaner inspects
another client. Within just a few trials, cleaner fish inspected the ephemeral plate first,
supporting previous field observations of this behavior.
In a subsequent study, Salwiczek, Prétôt et al. (2012), tested cleaner fish and three
nonhuman primate species in the same plate task. The goal of this study was to compare the
performance of two animal taxa, cleaner fish and primates, which evolved complex social and
foraging behaviors but differ substantially in brain size. If brain size (as a proxy for cognitive
ability) is the key feature in determining whether they can solve this task (see Deaner et al.,
2006, 2007; Reader et al., 2011; but see Healy & Rowe, 2013), one would expect that primates
would outperform fish in the task. However, if natural ecology is more important, then one
would predict that fish would outperform primates in this task, which derived from cleaner fish
ecology. Although chimpanzees and capuchins hunt for meat and catch mobile insects and small
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vertebrates, and in doing so, encounter ephemeral food sources (Boesch, 1994; Fragaszy et al.,
2004; Rose, 1997), they generally encounter ephemeral food sources unpredictably and
opportunistically, and thus the ecological constraints are quite different from those of the fish, for
whom the interaction with ephemeral sources is predictable. Supporting the latter prediction, fish
outperformed all of the primate species. However, to draw the general conclusion that it is the
ecological relevance of a task that primarily influences species’ abilities to solve it, we needed to
both demonstrate that primates outperformed fish in a similar task derived from primate ecology,
and also rule out possible cognitive explanations for the primates’ poor performance.
To address the first point, in follow-up studies, fish and monkeys were tested on a series
of tasks designed to be more relevant to primates (Prétôt et al., 2016b; also see Prétôt et al.,
2016a). In the original design based on cleaners, the plates differed but the food outcomes were
identical, just as cleaners always consume the same foods, but acquire these foods from different
clients during social interactions. This may have given the cleaners an advantage simply because
they were already predisposed to focus on the way the food was presented (i.e., the plate, which
was indeed the relevant stimulus) rather than the food itself, which was uninformative as the
foods were identical. To determine the degree to which this cue influenced the primates’ ability
to learn the task, we tested fish and monkeys using two variations designed to be more salient to
monkeys (Prétôt et al., 2016b).
In the first study, the plates were identical but the food items differed (only in color),
which is a cue more ecologically relevant to the monkeys. In the wild, cleaner fish consume
small invertebrates on the surface of the client reef fish (Côté, 2000; Randall, 1958), which only
become visible at short range (i.e., that need to be searched for and found). Parasite abundance
varies between species, partly as a correlate of client body size (Grutter, 1995); therefore,
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cleaners should prefer certain clients over others because of their quality as a food patch (Grutter
et al., 2005). In other words, cleaners should focus on the way the food is presented, rather than
on the food itself. This was reflected in the original plate task adaptation, where the plate color
and pattern were the relevant stimuli, rather than the foods, which were identical and
uninformative (Salwiczek et al., 2012). For the primates, however, what is important is the food
itself, not the food patch. Although foods may be associated with specific surroundings (e.g., a
species of tree may provide hidden fruits), the general details of the source do not change (e.g.,
the fruits will not suddenly be found in a different species of tree) and the patch may not be
informative about the quality of food (e.g., the position of the leaves will not tell whether the
fruits are ripe; the fruits themselves must be inspected). Therefore, as food color is potentially a
more ecologically relevant cue to primates than fish, we changed the color of the food item
rather than the design/color of the plates.
In the second study, the food was hidden (under cups in monkeys and behind plates in
fish), which should help with the general tendency of primates (and other species) to be
distracted by seeing food immediately available during choice tasks (see Prétôt et al., 2016a).
Monkeys improved their performance in both tasks as compared to the original plate task,
indicating that these more salient cues did support the primates’ ability to solve the task.
Contrary to our predictions, however, the fish kept performing at the same level in all tasks,
which may indicate that they were able to generalize to novel cues (see other evidence for fishes’
impressive cognitive ability: e.g., Agrillo et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2011; Bshary et al., 2014;
Ferrari et al., 2005; Grosenick et al., 2007; Kendal et al., 2009; Miletto Petrazzini et al., 2016;
Piffer et al., 2013; Vail et al., 2013, 2014; Wismer et al., 2016; for reviews, see: Brown, 2015;
Bshary et al., 2002, 2014).
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Despite the monkeys’ success, these results suggest that other factors are affecting
species’ response in the task. For example, Pepperberg and Hartsfield (2014) found that parrots
performed equally to the fish in the original plate task. They argued that both species may have
excelled in the task because they are naturally constrained to making a single choice at a time
(with the mouth or bill), whereas primates typically use both hands to reach multiple foods or
objects simultaneously, but were forced by the procedure to make only one choice. Indeed,
capuchins did better on a computerized version in which they used a joystick to make their
choice, potentially because they are accustomed to being able to make only a single choice at a
time in this modality (Prétôt et al., 2016a). In studies using an analogue of the procedure,
however, two other species that are naturally constrained to single choices, pigeons and rats,
failed in learning the task (Zentall et al., 2016, 2017), emphasizing the importance of considering
alternative explanations to species’ difference in performance in the task.
Salwiczek et al. (2012) proposed that part of the reason the primates performed so poorly
in the task might have been a failure to use a higher cognitive mechanism, like backwards
induction, to solve this task in lieu to the evolved predispositions seen in the fish. Backwards
induction (first introduced by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) is a problem-solving strategy,
which consists of analyzing a problem from back to front in order to determine what sequence of
optimal actions is required to solve it. Evidence of this capacity in animals was first
demonstrated in a chimpanzee, Julia, using a tool-use procedure (Döhl, 1968). In this study, Julia
learned to open 10 boxes in the appropriate sequence, using specific tools that she could find
inside each box, to retrieve a food at the end. In our plate task, although the two foods were
presented simultaneously, they were always offered (or removed) sequentially. Therefore, after
subjects experienced and learned the outcome associated with each option, they could have used
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backwards induction to determine what option they would have to choose next in order to obtain
the additional reward from the subsequent (permanent) option.
Although backwards induction is a term that has been used mostly in human game
theory, it is unclear how it differs from the planning capacity explored in the animal literature.
Beran et al. (2015) broadly define planning as “requiring the organization of behavior in the
present to obtain a future goal” (where the time frame is not specific), and emphasize that
“although the cognitive processes involved in different types of planning might not necessarily be
identical, they are likely related, and all have some degree of future-orientation.” According to
this, our definition of backwards induction falls into one of these categories.
In Beran et al. (2015), four primate species (human children, chimpanzees, rhesus and
capuchin monkeys) were tested in a computerized maze task. Subjects had to move a cursor
through mazes presented on a computer screen, and avoid obstacles to reach a target located at
the bottom of the screen. One important caveat is needed; although such procedure requires
subjects to integrate somehow future consequences into their immediate decision to succeed in
the task, it does not allow us to determine whether subjects solved the mazes by looking ahead,
that is they started with the cursor location (at the top) and figured out which way might lead the
cursor to the target (at the bottom), or by looking backwards, that is they first located the
endpoint of the problem (the target) and only then found their way to the start point (the cursor).
Because there is no evidence that these two strategies truly differ, nor do we know how
significant the difference (if any) between the two is, we use the term “backwards induction”
throughout this paper, because we believe this is specifically the strategy that could help
primates to learn the plate task.
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Although there is evidence that apes (and other animals) show, under our definition,
some degree of backwards induction in various contexts and modalities (e.g., joystick-based
computerized maze tasks: Beran et al., 2015; Fragaszy et al., 2003, 2009; touchscreen-based
computerized maze task: Iversen & Matsuzawa, 2001; manual “paddle-box” task: Tecwyn et al.,
2013; manual finger-maze task: Völter & Call, 2014a; for a tool-use version, see Völter & Call,
2014b), few studies have investigated this ability in monkeys, and most of these exceptions have
used computerized procedures (e.g., Beran & Parrish, 2012; Beran et al., 2015; Fragaszy et al.,
2003, 2009; Pan et al., 2011). In Beran et al. (2015), for example, although all species succeeded
in the maze task, the chimpanzees were overall more proficient than the monkeys in solving it
(see also Fragaszy et al., 2003, 2009), and monkeys particularly struggled when required to move
away from the target.
One particularly clever design, by Tecwyn et al. (2013), tested backwards induction using
a “paddle-box” apparatus, which consists of a clear box with three levels of paddles that subjects
had to rotate to drop a food reward into one of four openings located at the bottom of the box
(and retrieve it from there). Tecwyn and colleagues tested orangutans and bonobos and found
that most subjects succeeded in the task when the paddles were set up in a flat orientation
(although they failed when the paddles were initially positioned in diagonal orientations). Such a
procedure presented two main advantages as compared to the tool-use and computer-based tests
of planning. First, unlike tool-use tasks, the paddle-box task is quite intuitive for primates, as it
does not involve any complex tool-use skill, nor does it depend on species-specific behaviors or
competencies (although capuchin monkeys are usually good at tool-use tasks, in general primates
have difficulty solving them; see Tomasello & Call, 1997). Second, unlike computerized mazes,
it is a very natural food acquisition context, in which individuals have to go through multiple
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steps to acquire the food. This may be particularly relevant for extractive foragers, like capuchin
monkeys, making this a good task to further explore monkeys’ ability to use backwards
induction.
In the current study, capuchin monkey (Cebus [Sapajus] apella) subjects were tested for
backwards induction in a “paddle-box” task based on the design by Tecwyn et al. (2013). There
were three levels of paddles and, accordingly, three degrees of difficulty to retrieve the food. If
the monkeys show backwards induction, they should anticipate which way to turn the paddles to
release the reward. If they fail to follow the correct path, the food would be lost. Based on
capuchins’ performance in previous studies (i.e., Beran et al., 2015), we predicted that monkeys
would solve our manual maze task in all three degrees of difficulty. We also predicted that they
would understand the task, leading to them passing the final generalization phase of testing.
These results would provide evidence that capuchin monkeys show backwards induction in a
food acquisition context, and that they can show this ability in different contexts and modalities
(i.e., in previous work and in the current project), ultimately supporting the hypothesis that
capuchins have at least this cognitive skill that could help to solve the two-choice task of
Salwiczek et al. (2012).

5.2

Methods
5.2.1

Subjects and Housing

We tested 10 captive-born brown capuchin monkeys (5 males, average age: 14 years,
range 9–19 years; 5 females, average age: 15 years, range 8–20 years) from two long-term,
stable, mixed-sex social groups housed at the Language Research Center of Georgia State
University, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. One subject was discontinued in the study because she

125

often chose not to participate, resulting in a total sample size of nine individuals. Subjects were
always housed with their social groups except when they separated voluntarily for behavioral
and cognitive testing. They were fed a diet according to their species-specific needs that included
primate chow and fresh fruits and vegetables. They also received enrichment foods several times
per day. Animals were never deprived of food or water for testing purposes. Running water was
available ad libitum, including during testing. All of the capuchin monkey experiments were
approved by the Georgia State University IACUC (A16031) and met the ethical standards of the
United States and the American Society of Primatologists. Georgia State University is fully
accredited by AAALAC.
The monkeys lived in two large indoor/outdoor enclosures. Each enclosure contained
ample three-dimensional climbing space as well as trapezes, perches and enrichment items. The
enclosure for each social group was divided into an indoor area and a larger outdoor area
(approximately one-half to two-thirds of their total space). The subjects had previously been
trained to voluntarily enter testing boxes attached to their indoor area, which allowed us to
separate individuals from their group for testing. They could choose not to participate at any time
by walking away from the experimenter, and there were no consequences for the monkeys if they
decided not to participate. No subject was ever involved in more than one session of this test on
any given day.

5.2.2

General Procedure

Subjects were tested using a paddle-box apparatus (based on Tecwyn et al., 2013; Figure
8), which consisted of a clear acrylic box (approximately 60 x 45 cm) containing paddles that
subjects rotated using handles to drop one food reward into a funnel connected to one of four
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openings (A-D; Figure 8). Rewards were 1g banana-flavor precision pellets (Bio-Serv,
Flemington, NJ, U.S.A.). Subjects could only obtain the food from the opening connected to the
funnel, which was made large enough for the pellet to go through but too small for monkeys’
hands to reach through. The whole system was mounted vertically on a computer cart. Subjects
were tested individually in a large testing cage (70 x 70 x 60 cm) and would activate the handles
through five large horizontal slits (55 x 5 cm) cut in a clear polycarbonate front to the testing
cage.
The paddle-box apparatus had three degrees of difficulty depending on the level of the
paddle at which the pellet was initially placed. The first level consisted of three paddles that
could be rotated to the left or the right towards the funnel, into which the pellet dropped directly.
The second level consisted of two paddles that, once turned, dropped the food into a single
paddle of the first level; only then could the subject rotate that paddle (on level 1) to drop the
food into the funnel (if the food was in the appropriate paddle) to retrieve it. Finally, the third
level consisted of three paddles that, once turned, dropped the food into one paddle on the second
level, which the subject had to rotate to drop the food into the first level, from which it could be
retrieved via the funnel. Note that at any point subjects could send the food in the wrong
direction, which was irreversible. In the case of levels 2 and 3, failing to properly plan ahead
meant that the food could fail to end up in the paddle(s) on level 1 that allowed it to be retrieved.
It is this aspect that required backwards induction (especially on the novel generalization trials,
which they could not solve based on prior experience).
Prior to a trial, the experimenter placed the reward on a predetermined paddle (see
schedule below). A trial began once the subject was presented the apparatus and rotated the
paddle containing the food item, at which point the experimenter stepped back (in order to
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minimize experimenter cueing). Each trial ended once the food was retrieved through the funnel
(correct trials), was lost by dropping on the bottom of the cart or the room floor (incorrect trials),
or was still located on any paddle after 60 seconds (this occurred only in a few trials at the
beginning of the study, likely due to subjects’ lack of experience with the apparatus). Each trial
was video-recorded and checked for accuracy after each session.
To evaluate subjects’ degree of skill in the task, the locations of both food and funnel
were assigned according to the probability of retrieving the reward, starting with the locations
that gave the highest probability, and moving sequentially to those that gave the lowest
probability. Only once the subject solved the task with the food located on the lowest level (i.e.,
paddles 1 to 3) was it tested with the food placed on higher levels (i.e., paddles 4 to 5 and, if they
met criterion on the second level, paddles 6 to 8). The locations of both the paddle and the funnel
were chosen so that they gave subjects 50%, 25%, and 12.5% of probability to retrieve the food
(see Table 12). This excluded 14 combinations; 10 combinations that had 0% of success (1-C, 1D, 2-A, 2-D, 3-A, 3-B, 4-D, 5-A, 6-D, 8-A), the two combinations that had 37.5% of success
because there was only one starting paddle location for which this probability held (see selection
criteria, below), and two combinations that were too ambiguous because they lead to
unpredictable outcomes (6-A, 8-D; see “?”, Table 12). For example, with an 8-D combination, if
the subject rotated the paddle clockwise, we could not predict (nor could the monkeys) whether
the food would drop directly into the funnel, or skip paddle 5 and fall onto paddle 3 and be
retrieved, or roll too far on the right and be lost by dropping on the floor of the cart.
Subjects were tested in up to five phases, starting with phase 1, which had the lowest
degree of difficulty (50% chance of receiving the reward) and the lowest level of paddles (one
level), and working up to increased difficulty (up to 12.5% in phase 5; Table 13). Within each
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phase, only the paddles that were from a same level and that had a same probability of releasing
the food were used. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups so that all subjects
within the same group received the same trials, but the different groups received different trials.
For each group, we selected trials following three criteria that maximized subjects’ exposure to
different trials while saving new ones for the generalization test (see below). First, there were
only two different trials in each phase; for example, phase 1 had six possible combinations (1A,
1B, 2B, 2C, 3C and 3D; Table 13), so each group received two different trials three times for a
total of six trials; phase 2, however, had only two possible combinations (4B and 5C), so subjects
received each combination three times for the same total number of trials. Second, the two trials
required subjects to rotate the paddles evenly to the left and the right; for example, for one
monkey group, phase 1 had three 1A trials, which required a rotation to the left side and three 2C
trials, which required a rotation to the right side. Third, the two trials always involved different
paddles holding the food (which excluded the trials that gave 37.5% of probability to succeed);
for example, phase 1 had three trials with the food located on paddle 1 and three trials with the
food located on paddle 2.
Subjects received one six-trial session per day and were tested in up to 15 sessions in
each phase (unless otherwise specified). Subjects who succeeded in the task were then given a
generalization test, consisting of three six-trial sessions of a combination of familiar and
unfamiliar trials (i.e., novel trials that they would not have experienced in any previous phase).
There were eight unfamiliar trials and 10 familiar trials per subject (for a total of 18 trials). The
first and second sessions had three pairs of trials from all three degrees of difficulty (and all three
levels of paddles), each pair made of one familiar and one unfamiliar trial. Because there were
not enough new trials remaining after the second session for three unfamiliar trials, the final
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session was made of only two unfamiliar trials from the first level of paddles, and two pairs of
familiar trials from the two other levels (levels 2 and 3).
As in Tecwyn et al. (2013), the reward occasionally ended up in an unexpected location
(e.g., on a different paddle, stuck on a paddle, or accidentally lost by jumping out of the
apparatus). This mostly occurred when a subject rotated the paddle too quickly or slowly, or
when a paddle did not function properly (because it was too tight or loose). When this happened,
the experimenter withdrew the apparatus as quickly as possible before the trial ended and
restarted the trial (although in a few occasions, the subject was fast enough to grab the food
before the experimenter could take the apparatus away). This accounted for fewer than 2% of the
total trials of the study.

Learning Trials
Four of the nine subjects tested in phase 1 reached the learning criterion within 10
sessions (see section below). The other five subjects that did not solve the task showed a robust
side bias in sessions 6-10 (binomial/sign test: all Ps < 0.001). In an attempt to eliminate the side
bias, subjects received five learning sessions of six forced trials each, directly following session
10. In those trials, a T-shape pipe that functioned as a blocker was inserted between paddles,
requiring the subject to rotate the paddle towards the less-preferred side to retrieve the food.
Because each learning trial was designed to always lead to a correct outcome, subjects always
retrieved the food reward. Following the learning phase, subjects were tested again in 10 sessions
of phase 1 (without the learning trials). No subsequent learning trials were used.

Criterion and Statistics
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The learning criterion for all tests was based on a two-tailed exact binomial test. In
phases 1-5, for those locations that gave 50% of probability of success, subjects needed to get at
least 5/6 correct trials on two consecutive sessions to reach criterion of significance. For the
locations that gave 25% and 12.5% of chance to succeed, subjects needed respectively at least
4/6 and 3/6 correct trials on two consecutive sessions to reach criterion. Note that subjects
always completed the six trials, whether or not they reached criterion before the six trials ended,
to ensure all subjects had the same exposure to the task. Although our criterion was to limit
subjects to 15 sessions, if a subject did 5/6 correct trials in the last session (i.e., session 15), it
was given another set of six trials to maximize its chances of reaching criterion. This happened
to one subject (Wren) in phase 1 (Table 14).
Because there were too few unfamiliar trials at the individual level for statistical
significance, we reported the percentage of correct unfamiliar trials (i.e., out of eight trials) for
each subject in the generalization test. At the group level, we used the total number of unfamiliar
trials for each of the three degrees of difficulty; that is, 28 trials that had 50% of probability to
succeed, and 14 that had 25% and 12.5% of probability to succeed. For those trials that had 50%
of probability to succeed, subjects as a group reached criterion if they got at least 20/28 correct
trials. For the locations that gave 25% and 12.5% of chance to succeed, all subjects together
needed respectively at least 8/14 and 5/14 correct trials to succeed. As with the individual
analyses, our criteria are based on two-tailed probabilities.

5.3

Results
Phases 1-5
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Four of the nine subjects used for the analysis reached criterion of phase 1 within 60 trials
(range 18–60 trials, mean ±SD = 34.50 ± 18.57 trials; Table 14 & Figure 9), while three of the
other five did so after they received the learning trials (range 72–78 trials, mean ±SD = 74 ± 3.46
trials; note that the range includes the initial 60 trials and the trials subsequent to the learning
trials, but not the 30 learning trials, which were forced choice). The last two subjects never
reached criterion in phase 1, after 150 and 156 trials respectively (again not counting the 30
learning trials).
All seven subjects who passed phase 1 reached criterion in all subsequent phases in 72 or
fewer trials on each phase (there were no additional learning trials in any phase; phase 2: range
12–72 trials, mean ±SD = 36 ± 22.72 trials; phase 3: range 18–72 trials, mean ±SD = 30.86 ±
19.42 trials; phase 4: range 24–66 trials, mean ±SD = 40.29 ± 13.73 trials; phase 5: range 12–60
trials, mean ±SD = 24 ± 17.32 trials).

Generalization Test
At the individual level, one subject was correct on 8/8 unfamiliar trials (100%; Table 15),
two subjects were correct on 7/8 trials (87.5%), two were correct on 6/8 trials (75%), one was
correct on 5/8 trials (62.5%), and one was correct on 4/8 trials (50%).
Taken as a group, monkeys reached learning criterion in all three degrees of difficulty of
the test; they were correct on 25/28 trials in the lower degree of difficulty (50%), 12/14 in the
intermediate degree (25%), and 8/14 in the higher degree (12.5%).

132

5.4

Discussion
Although previous studies have shown evidence of backwards induction in monkeys,

most have used computerized procedures. Therefore, an obvious next step was to test animals in
different contexts and modalities to probe the limits of their understanding. In the present study,
we tested whether capuchin monkeys show backwards induction in a manual procedure. Subjects
were tested in an adapted version of the “paddle-box” task, using an apparatus originally
designed for apes (Tecwyn et al., 2013). The system, which allowed for various degrees of
difficulty, consisted of paddles that subjects had to rotate in the correct pattern to drop a food
reward through a funnel, and thereby gain access to it. This procedure was particularly
appropriate for capuchins, who are very manipulative extractive foragers, therefore manipulating
substrates to get at an otherwise unobtainable food should be ecologically relevant for them.
In our study, all seven subjects who passed phase 1 (the easiest phase, with a single level
of paddles and no backwards induction) ultimately passed phase 5 (the most difficult phase, with
three levels of paddles, and therefore three decisions to make). Thus, at bare minimum, subjects
could learn to make the required series of choices to obtain the food. Subjects showed different
levels of performance in the generalization test, but overall, despite the small sample size, they
showed evidence of using their backward induction skills to solve novel trials. These results
demonstrate that monkeys possess, at least to some degree, the capacity for backwards induction
in a manual task, which adds to the corpus of studies showing that this trait is shared quite
widely across the primate taxon.
What do these findings tell us about the poor performance of monkeys relative to cleaner
fish in the previous choice-task study? Salwiczek et al. (2012) suggested that one way to solve
the problem was to learn the outcome of each option and evaluate subsequently which one to
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select first to maximize rewards. That means subjects should learn first to choose the ephemeral
option over the permanent one because it leads to as twice as many rewards. Our findings
support the view that capuchin monkeys have the capacity to show backwards induction.
Therefore, the next question is why did they fail to use it? We see (at least) three possible
reasons for this failure.
First, even if the monkeys show backwards induction, they might have failed to use this
skill because the intermediate reward from the permanent plate may have interfered with
learning mechanisms, in that it lowered the incentive value of the reward from the subsequent,
ephemeral plate. That is, because the reward from the suboptimal, permanent option was
received prior to the one from the optimal ephemeral option, blocking or overshadowing
mechanisms may have lowered the incentive value of the ephemeral option. This intermediate
reward contrasts with studies on backwards induction, including the current study, in which
subjects typically receive the reward only if they succeed in completing the entire task.
Second, they might have failed to use backwards induction because of the lack of
motivation to solve the task. Schubiger, Kissling, and Burkart (2016) recently found that two
other species of monkeys performed better in a memory task after the task was made more
cognitively challenging to them, that is, when the number of options presented increased and
therefore the probability to obtain the reward concomitantly decreased (from 50% in a twochoice task to 11% in a nine-choice task). In Salwiczek et al. (2012), the primates’ chance of
receiving the better reward (two pieces of food) was high, and moreover, they had a 100%
chance to obtain at least one reward on every trial. Therefore, the primates’ lack of motivation to
pay attention and make careful decisions in the task (rather than their inability to solve it) might
explain their poor performance.
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Finally, and most importantly for our cross-taxon comparative research program, the
monkeys may have failed to use backwards induction in the previous two-choice task because
they did not recognize the relevant cue associated with it in the task. That is, even if a species
possesses a particular cognitive skill, the ability might never show in a context that is irrelevant
(e.g., see Salwiczek et al., 2012; Prétôt et al., 2016a & 2016b, for the importance of considering
a species natural ecology). Although we could not test any of these hypotheses using the current
procedure, we think that it is important to take such factors into account when investigating
species’ variation in performance in a task. This may be particularly important when looking at
species with lesser cognitive abilities; although we assumed that monkeys should be able to learn
a task that a fish can learn, which led us to explore further, if the reverse had happened it is likely
that the conclusion would have been that the fish simply lacked the cognitive skill of the
primates, and no further exploration would have been done to figure out what factor was limiting
the fish.
Taken together, our findings emphasize the importance of testing species in what we
(researchers) perceive to be the same question in multiple contexts and modalities to ensure that
we have a good understanding of the real limits of their abilities. This way, we can present
species with tasks that are “fair”, which means that take full account of the species-specific needs
and avoid a biased interpretation of species skills. Again, this may be particularly important
when testing species that are assumed to have less cognitive ability. In conclusion, although it is
still unclear why the monkeys failed to use backwards induction in the previous task (Salwiczek
et al., 2012), the current findings demonstrate that they show the skill under at least some
contexts and emphasizes that subjects may not always use all of their cognitive abilities in every
situation.
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5.5

Tables

Table 12 Paddle-Box Task: Probability to Retrieve Food
Probability in percent to retrieve the food for each paddle given the funnel location if subjects’
choices were purely random. Only the combinations with 50%, 25% and 12.5% of probability to
retrieve the food, were used in the current study.
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Table 13 Paddle-Box Task: Summary of the Trials
Summary of the trials in each phase (1-5) and in the generalization test (G), including the
subject’s group (each group received a different set of trials), the probability to retrieve the food
(in percent), the level at which the paddle holding the food was located, and the combinations of
paddle and funnel location (see Figure 8).
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Table 14 Paddle-Box Task: Trials to Reach Criterion
Number of trials needed to reach criterion in each phase. Note that a minimum of 12 trials was
required to meet criterion in all phases.

1

Subjects received five learning sessions of six forced trials before being tested again in phase 1.

This number includes the original 60 trials and those subsequent to the learning trials, but not the
learning trials.
2

Subject did 5/6 correct trials in the last session, thus was given an additional set of six trials.

138

Table 15 Paddle-Box Task: Correct Unfamiliar Trials
Number of correct unfamiliar trials in each session of the generalization test. Note that there
were three unfamiliar trials in session 1-2, and two in session 3.

*Because of an issue with the apparatus, the subject was given one unfamiliar trial again at the
end of the session.

139

5.6

Figures

Figure 8 Paddle-Box Apparatus
Each paddle (1-8) was controlled by a handle that subjects rotated to drop the food into a funnel
connected to one of four openings (A-D; based on Tecwyn et al., 2013). Here, the food could
only be retrieved through opening B.
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Figure 9 Paddle-Box Task: Phase Results
Number of trials required for subjects to complete each phase. Each dot represents one
individual. Note that a minimum of 12 trials was required to meet criterion in all phases.
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6

6.1

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Results
The overarching goal of my research is to understand the underlying causes of the

diversity of behaviors across species. For my dissertation project, I focused primarily on the
relative role of ecology in shaping species’ decision-making, a perspective that is often neglected
in studies of cognition. To do so, I compared the performance of several nonhuman primate
species with cleaner fish in tasks derived from the cleaner fish ecology.
In a prior study, my colleagues and I compared the performance of capuchin monkeys,
orangutans and chimpanzees, with the bluestreak cleaner wrasse on a dichotomous choice task
derived from the natural cooperative interaction between the cleaner fish and its client fish
species (Salwiczek et al., 2012). We found that fish were better than primates at solving the task,
indicating that ecology prepares species to be sensitive to particular cues when solving
ecological problems. Species tested using cues not derived from their natural ecology typically
required longer to solve the task, probably because they first had to determine which of the
available cues were the most relevant to its solution. Consistent with this idea, when for my
dissertation I re-designed the original fish task using cues that I hypothesized were more relevant
to primates than fish, capuchin monkeys improved their performance (Study 1; see Prétôt et al.,
2016b). These results indicated that, not surprisingly, many factors play into determining what
species may learn with more or less ease, but that cues are an important part of decision-making.
Interestingly, the fish continued to perform at the same level in all tasks, which differed
from the monkeys, who performed better on some versions of the task than others. One
explanation for these results is that cleaner fish were able to generalize to novel cues (although I
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could not rule out the possibility that they developed an apparent preference for some plates over
others). This would add to the corpus of evidence showing that fish, as a group, possess greater
cognitive ability than was previously recognized (e.g., see Wismer et al., 2016).
In a follow-up study, however, I found that the choices of three other primate species
(orangutans, gorillas and drills) in these subsequent tasks largely deviated from the capuchins’
results, with all three species performing poorly (Study 2; Prétôt et al., in prep). Although one
possibility is that the cues involved in the tasks may have been unintentionally capuchin-specific,
which may have explained species’ variation, it was more likely that the tasks were challenging
for the other species because my subjects lacked of experience with cognitive testing, especially
relative to the capuchins. This latter possibility is supported by the orangutans’ performance;
orangutans performed at the same level as the capuchins on one task, but not the other.
Orangutans also had substantially more testing experience than the gorillas or drills, albeit quite
a bit less than the capuchins, supporting the possibility that these results were heavily influenced
by the subjects’ levels of experience.
In a third study, I tested monkeys in computerized adaptations of the plate task, which
better control for unintentional extraneous cues associated with manual testing, like the presence
of an experimenter and, again, visible foods during the subjects’ choice (Study 3; Prétôt, Bshary,
& Brosnan, 2016a). Monkeys’ overall performance in these tasks matched the performance of
the fish in the original study, which provided evidence that with appropriate changes in the
procedure, the monkeys could eventually learn the task.
In a final study, I investigated one possible cognitive limitation to the primates in the
task, the failure to use backwards induction to solve it (Study 4; Prétôt et al., in review). I tested
capuchin monkeys using the manual “paddle-box” task, originally designed for testing planning
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skills in apes. Most subjects solved all levels of difficulty in the task, and monkeys succeeded as
a group in a generalization test. Although it is still unclear why, if they possess backwards
induction, the monkeys failed to use it in the original plate task, these findings demonstrate that
species may not always use all of their cognitive abilities in every situation.

6.2

Major Take-Home Messages
6.2.1

Importance of Cues

The primate results from Study 1 and Study 2 provide empirical evidence that species are
sensitive to cues when solving problems, as predicted by Lotem and Halpern (2012), and that
they respond differently to different cues in the task. Capuchin monkeys were originally
presented the problem using cues derived from the cleaner fish ecology, which they were
apparently unable to use (Salwiczek et al., 2012). In Study 1, the monkeys were presented the
same problem but with cues that, I hypothesized, were more relevant to them than to the fish.
Under this condition, monkeys improved their performance, which provided evidence for the cue
hypothesis.
In Study 2, I found that orangutans, gorillas and drills, like capuchins, failed in learning
the task with the fish cues; however, their choices largely deviated from the capuchins’ results in
the other tasks, with all three species performing overall poorly. One possibility is that the cues I
chose were more relevant for capuchins, for whom they were initially designed. Alternatively,
their poor performance may have been due to their level of experience (a hypothesis supported
by the performance of orangutans).
Although I can only speculate on this, the results of Study 4 might provide additional
support for the cue hypothesis. I demonstrated that capuchin monkeys can show backwards
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induction, a capacity they failed to use to solve the original plate task, in a very natural food
acquisition context. It is possible that subjects failed to use backwards induction in the plate task
because they did not recognize that it was relevant for solving the task. Maybe they use specific
cognitive abilities in specific tasks, and so without the cues for those tasks, they do not trigger
the right cognitive ability. That is, even if a species might possess the cognitive skill necessary to
solve a problem, they may still fail to use it, because either they do not recognize it, or the
context is so new that they have yet to associate it with a given cognitive ability. Alternatively,
they may not have understood the task the way I expected them to, and so they may not have
triggered the appropriate cognitive ability (backwards induction) because they did not realize
what they were actually solving.

6.2.2

Importance of Experience

My results from the three zoo species revealed that experience with testing might also
have heavily influenced species’ performance in the task. One very likely explanation is that the
species performed overall poorly in the tasks because none had a lot of experience with cognitive
testing (especially relative to the capuchins). In particular, orangutans, which had less experience
with testing than capuchins, but more than gorillas and drills, performed worse than capuchins
but better than the two other species (in at least one of the two versions of the task). These results
emphasize the importance for researchers to accurately report and keep track of subjects’ testing
history and take this into account when interpreting their data. This is also a way for future
investigators to more easily identify whether experience can explain variation in subjects’
performance across studies and conditions.
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In fact, the effect of experience on performance is a common issue in cognitive
psychology, which is why it is important to know what role it plays in the general context of
species’ learning and performance. For example, in another study conducted at Zoo Atlanta,
Anderson et al. (2005) tested gorillas’ numerical competence and compared their performance to
those of chimpanzees and orangutans previously tested on similar tasks (e.g., see Beran, 2001;
Call, 2000; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hegel, 1987). The gorillas performed relatively
poorly in the learning task, and worse than chimpanzees and orangutans. However, they
performed at levels comparable to the other species after they received a specific training
procedure. The authors suggested that the gorillas’ poor performance was likely due to their
more limited experience with cognitive testing. Although subjects have had participated in some
cognitive tasks prior to this study, their level of experience never reached the one of chimpanzees
and orangutans, who also had prior experience with other numerical competence experiments.
Note that this phenomenon is widespread across primates (and presumably other taxa as well).
For example, Baenninger and Newcomb (1989)’s meta-analysis on human spatial cognition
revealed that the performance of adults in spatial ability tests could be improved with training
procedures. In a more recent study, humans and monkeys learned to choose the more optimal
strategy as a result of increased experience with a probability-based task (Klein, Evans, Schultz,
& Beran, 2013).

6.2.3

Importance of Designing Careful Procedures

Despite my best efforts, there were some practical concerns that may have limited my
results. In particular, I could not rule out the (very likely) possibility that species’ performance in
the task was heavily influenced by external factors, in particular the choice of testing subjects
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(and environment), which is an issue present in many comparative studies and thus an important
one to be addressed. In my research, fish and primates differed substantially in raising/living
conditions and experience with cognitive testing. At the taxon level, cleaner fish subjects were
all wild-caught, thus never had any experience with testing prior my work, and must actively and
constantly search for food in the wild, which is a matter of survival for them. In contrast, most of
the primates were born in captivity, and many have participated in various studies in the past.
Importantly, the primate subjects receive food sufficiently multiple times per day, for which they
do not have to compete at the same levels as the fish (in particular, food is not a limited
resource). It is thus possible that differences in environmental pressure and/or testing experience
may have influenced taxa differently in the tasks.
At the species level, it is important to note that the capuchin monkey subjects live in a
different setting than the other primates tested. All four primates (capuchins, gorillas, orangutans
and drills) live in large social groups with species-typical demographics. In addition, all four
species enclosures consist predominantly of natural outdoor space, and all subjects have
extensive enrichment (for climbing, swinging, hiding, etc.). Finally, no individuals for any
species are ever deprived of food, water, treats, outdoor access, or access to social group peers,
except for veterinary procedures, and certainly never to motivate testing. All subjects at both
facilities received food multiple times per day regardless of testing. However, the capuchins live
in a research setting, and participate daily in cognitive and behavioral tasks (no invasive work is
or has even been done with the capuchins). As a result, they have more experience than the
orangutans, which are tested several times per week, and fundamentally more than the other
species, who are tested more rarely or not at all. Supporting this, prior studies have shown that
rearing/housing conditions influenced primates’ performance in a cognitive task. For example,
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Vlamings et al. (2010) found that, unlike orangutans, chimpanzees and bonobos housed in
sanctuaries outperformed their counterparts housed in zoos in an inhibitory task. Although I do
not know why the two populations behaved differently, such results emphasize the importance of
considering such factors when conducting comparative research (Boesch, 2007).
Additionally, the capuchins are tested in individual test boxes that they have been trained
to enter when they are willing to test (again, there are no negative repercussions of any sort for
failing to enter the boxes). Although they can still hear and see the other members of their social
group, this minimal separation likely minimizes distraction (e.g., from the group), which
presumably facilitates learning. In contrast, orangutans, gorillas and drills were all tested at the
zoo, where they were tested directly in their home enclosure. Both they and their social group
members were free to enter and leave the testing area at any time, which might have been a
distraction and made the task more difficult for them to learn.
Another important note is on the importance of considering differences in natural
environments (population-level) as well as captive ones. For example, I found difference in
performance in the tasks between Moorean and Philippine cleaner fish, with the former
performing overall lower than the latter (at least on the reversal tests). These results may indicate
differences in cognitive flexibility between the two populations, possibly due to differences in
their interspecific social environment (see Wismer et al., 2014); in particular, the Philippines
have as twice as many species of reef fish than French Polynesia (which includes Moorea; see
Carpenter & Springer, 2005). Therefore, Philippine fish have increased exposure to different
species and therefore may have more complex interactions with client fish than Moorean fish.
There is also evidence that captive and wild animals often behave differently in different
contexts. In particular, captive individuals have been shown to outperform their wild
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counterparts in various cognitive tasks, possibly because they are less neophobic and more
exploratory (e.g., Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2012; Damerius, Forss, Kosonen, et
al., 2017; Laidre, 2008; Reader & Laland, 2003; Visalberghi, Janson, & Agostini, 2003). Finally,
it may not just be the difference between captive and wild animals that impacts performance. For
example, Damerius et al. (2017) found that captive orangutan subjects that had experienced
different rearing and housing conditions during ontogeny performed differently in cognitive
tasks. In particular, those that had increased exposure to humans typically performed better as
compared to those that did not.

6.2.4

Unexpectedly Good Performance of Fish

Although I had no prediction for the effect of the cup task on fish performance in Study
1, I expected primates to outperform fish at least in the color task, because I hypothesized that
the fact that the cue was the color of the food rather than some aspect of the plate would be more
ecologically relevant for primates than fish. However, this was not the case; fish performed
surprisingly well in all tasks. One possible explanation for these results is that the fish might
have developed the decision rule to preferentially approach the ephemeral option under natural
conditions and then applied the same rule to all experiments (i.e., they generalized across
contexts), even if they didn’t necessarily recognize the task as the same one (see Wismer et al.,
2016). Monkeys, however, rarely face a natural situation that calls for the discrimination between
ephemeral and permanent sources of food and so may have struggled when the cue was the plate
color compared to the other conditions. Supporting this hypothesis, prior studies have found that
adult cleaner fish outperformed juvenile fish in the plate task, presumably because adults have
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more encounters with clients in the wild and have experienced the interaction for longer than the
juveniles (Salwiczek et al., 2012).
Finally, I could not rule the possibility that Moorean fish developed an apparent
preference for one plate over the other in the tasks. This was somehow surprising, because none
of the Philippine adult fish showed such biases in the previous study (Salwiczek et al., 2012).
However, I find it very interesting that one population should show a much stronger color
preference than the other, and I hope to explore this topic further in the future (see Importance of
Designing Careful Procedures section above).
Taken together, the fish results raise new important questions about the influence of
experience and the use of presumably general cognitive capacities in the task. Although both are
very likely involved, additional studies are necessary to further distinguish the relative impact of
each of these factors separately. For example, Salwiczek et al. (2012) suggested that a logical
follow-up study to investigate the role of experience in the task could consist in replicating this
study with adult subjects that were kept in captivity without simultaneous exposure to both
visitor and resident clients.

6.3

Implications
6.3.1

Scientific Contribution

Taken together, the findings of my dissertation project represent an important
contribution to the fields of psychology and evolutionary biology, in two key ways. First, they
emphasize the importance of understanding a species’ ecology to better understand its cognition.
Second, they represent a nice example of the template promoted by Kamil (1998) for conducting
comparative research. Below, I expand on these two issues.
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First, my findings show that ecology influences cognition. They emphasize the
importance of a species’ natural ecology for understanding its psychology, a perspective that is
often neglected in studies of cognition. Indeed, many studies on cognition and decision-making
assume that the critical factor – or only – of success in any problem-solving tasks resides in the
range of the species’ cognitive skills or cognitive flexibility (e.g., for an approach using the serial
reversal task, see Bitterman, 1965, 1975). Based on my results, I argue that some aspects of a
species’ ecology, which include species-relevant cues and experience, also directly influence
species’ decision-making. Importantly, one must keep in mind that both ecology and cognition
work together rather than in competition, and that neither should be treated as if it is the only
explanation for a species’ variance in a task.
In fact, both aspects answer completely different questions of decision-making, with the
former focusing more on ultimate questions, and the latter about its proximate explanations
(Mayr, 1961; also see Laland, Sterelny, Olding-Smee, et al., 2012). Ultimate explanations focus
on the historical reasons of a behavior, whereas proximate explanations focus on the immediate
causes and/or mechanisms underlying a behavior. For example, to understand the phenomenon
of migration in birds, one must understand why birds migrate (ultimate) and how they migrate
(proximate). Birds migrate south because their food supply becomes scarce during the cold
season (ultimate), and it is the changing length of the days near winter that stimulates hormonal
and behavioral changes that result in migration (proximate). Tinbergen (1963) proposed a
refinement of Mayr (1961)’s dichotomous view, breaking down the two-question classification
into a four-question classification, which included two proximate causes of behavior – the
mechanism (causation) and ontogeny (development) – and two ultimate ones – function
(adaptation) and phylogeny (evolution). Importantly, Tinbergen viewed all four levels of analysis
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as equally important, nonmutually exclusive, and complementary. In other words, to fully
understand a behavior, one must answer not just one, but all four questions.
The view that I promote in this dissertation is in accordance with Kamil (1998)’ synthetic
approach to the study of animal behavior, which integrates both cognitive and ecological
research programs by including all four levels of Tinbergen (1963)’s analysis. The use of an
integrative multilevel approach eliminates the false dichotomies between cognitive and
ecological approaches. Again, both approaches must be viewed as nonmutually exclusive, and
complementary.
The second major contribution of my dissertation project is that it represents a nice
example of the template promoted by Kamil and colleagues for researchers interested in
developing comparative research programs that investigate specific questions on decisionmaking (e.g., see Balda & Kamil, 1989; Kamil et al., 1994; Olson et al., 1995). My findings, and
the difficulties I encountered, emphasize the importance of designing careful procedures when
conducting cross-species comparisons; in particular, care must be taken when testing species that
differ substantially in various aspects of behavior, such as body plan, ecology, and cognitive
abilities. To address this issue, I encourage researchers to use a two-step analysis, as I did here,
to compare species in a task, first by testing them in the same basic procedure (i.e. in which all
parameters are kept identical), which allows to establish a baseline for comparing further results
(see Salwiczek et al., 2012), and only then by altering the procedure in ways that address
species’ specific strengths in the task (as in Prétôt et al., 2016a & 2016b). Neither approach is
ideal in isolation, but combining the two across a long-running research program allows for a
very strong comparative test.
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For my dissertation, I used a cross-taxon comparative approach to investigate the impact
of ecology on decision-making. I had the privilege to test several primate species, including
capuchin and rhesus monkeys at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University,
orangutans, gorillas and drill monkeys at Zoo Atlanta, and cleaner fish in Moorea, French
Polynesia, in collaboration with Prof. Redouan Bshary from the University of Neuchâtel,
Switzerland. These collaborations across disciplinary, institutional and laboratory boundaries, in
which my colleagues and I participate enthusiastically, represent one powerful way (among
others) to provide full answers and solutions to different problems relevant to psychology. Most
importantly, I encourage researchers to 1) consider alternate hypotheses when exploring
questions of psychology, 2) address relevant ecological constraints that others might be willing
to test, and 3) integrate their research findings into the broader scheme of the existing literature.

6.3.2

Interface Between Ecology and Cognition

The findings of my dissertation indicate that species’ natural ecologies likely influence
individuals’ capacities to solve problems; different species responded differently when presented
the same task, presumably because they rely on different specific cues to solve it. In my studies,
cleaner fish outperformed all primate species in the version of the task based on the fish ecology,
whereas capuchin monkeys, and orangutans to some extent, performed equally to the fish in a
version of the task designed to be more ecologically relevant to primates (Studies 1 and 2).
In addition, individuals differed substantially in the tasks, both in terms of learning speed
and choice pattern (i.e., preference for either the ephemeral or permanent option). These results
indicate that the change of cues impacted individuals differently; that is, the new cues helped
some individuals more than others to solve the task. Although I do not know precisely what
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caused such variation, it is likely that individual life history (among other factors) played a major
role in the way subjects made decisions. To begin to address the issue on variation in
performance, I first define cognition and decision-making, and then discuss the possible
mechanisms involved in the acquisition of the task.
Cognition is broadly defined as the action or faculty of thinking (i.e., processing
information mentally), which encompasses various concepts of psychology, such as knowledge,
consciousness, insight, reasoning, and decision-making (see Benjafield, Smilek, & Kingston,
2010). Decision-making, which is the major focus of my dissertation, is the cognitive process in
which individuals choose (whether consciously or not) between two or more options available to
them. Choosing often depends on numerous factors, but one that is likely to impact subjects’
performance is the environmental aspect, in particular the information from meaningful objects
and events present in the real world (which is also the major focus of the ecological approach;
see Gibson, 1950, 1966). It is important that individuals rely on a schema, which represents what
is likely to be found in the environment (Neisser, 1976); then, the frequency at which individuals
encounter expected and unexpected information helps them become more and more sophisticated
with how they deal with the world.
Because animals are constantly exposed to a greater amount and variety of sensory data
than they can absorb, they must focus on information that is ecologically relevant, while ignoring
that which is irrelevant, as predicted by Lotem and Halpern (2012)’s model. This salience can be
either innate or acquired through experience. For example, when an animal recognizes food in a
natural context, this reinforcer becomes associated with objects or features close (in time and
space) to the food. Even if they do not act directly as reinforcers, these data include useful
information because they help an individual to locate food more efficiently. Following this logic,
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based on their previous experience, the cleaner fish in the previous study (Salwiczek et al., 2012)
might have immediately seen the design of the plates (color and shape) as the salient information
they required to make a decision, whereas the primates did not.
As mentioned earlier, the ecological approach is highly functional; that is, species are
good at solving problems that are important for their fitness. The approach is, however, neutral
with respect to the underlying mechanisms involved. Consequently, greater skill at a task may
not indicate greater intelligence per se, but rather that the species use different learning
mechanisms or focus on different aspects of the task. Therefore, one cannot assume that because
different species show similar behaviors, the learning mechanisms used must be the same, or that
learning, faster or not, implies the use of a more sophisticated mechanism (for a discussion on
the topic, see Chittka & Jensen, 2011; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith, & Lawson, 1980).
In fact, it is likely that cleaner fish solved the task using some type of associative learning (for
reviews, see Dickinson, 2012; Heyes, 2012), like operant conditioning, although this remains to
be tested in the future. In the wild, cleaner fish may have learned to prioritize visitor over
resident clients without an understanding of the future consequences of failing to do so; instead,
they may have learned a more simple rule, by which feeding first on clients that they encounter
occasionally (i.e., visitor clients) provides them with more food than those they see more often
(i.e., resident clients). Alternatively, they may have perceived the leaving of the food source as a
negative reinforcer, and therefore chose the ephemeral food source first before approaching the
permanent one (Salwiczek et al., 2012). In either case, fish may have succeeded in the task,
because they were better conditioned than primates, prior to the onset of these studies, at
identifying and discriminating relevant stimuli.
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Primates may have failed in the task for two reasons. First, experience with cognitive
tests (including dichotomous choice tasks) often requires discriminating between food quantities
or qualities, rather than between identical and immediate rewards (as in the current tasks);
consequently, subjects may have been looking for other cues or some more complex rule than
associative learning to solve the task, while completely missing the discriminative stimulus.
Second, some inhibitory phenomena, like blocking (and possibly overshadowing) may have
interfered with learning mechanisms in the task (see Kamin, 1968; Salwiczek et al., 2012).
Specifically, the food may have become a conditioned stimulus that was stronger than the plates,
and which then blocked conditioning to the plates. By altering the task in ways that were
designed to increase the salience of one or more aspects of the stimuli to the primates (e.g.,
making the food itself discriminative, or removing the food so as to eliminate those prepotent
cues), however, capuchin monkeys and orangutans overcame this effect and improved their
performance. This provided evidence as to which features of the task make it easier to attend to
by the fish and the primates.
If one assumes that simple learning rules are the key mechanism to solve the task, then
having evolved a small brain and relying on basic learning mechanisms may be sufficient to
learn problems, perhaps even to outperform more complex organisms in similar tasks. For
example, prior studies have shown that even invertebrates, like bees, outperform many vertebrate
species, including monkeys and human infants, when placed into a simple key stimulus-response
context (Chittka & Jensen, 2011; also see Pearce, 2008). Similar results have been reported in
pigeons and rats, which outperform humans in various tasks (e.g., Herbranson & Schroeder,
2010; Vermaercke, Cop, Willems, et al., 2014).

156

Although Lotem and Halpern’s (2012) model predicts that the environment favors the use
of simple learning mechanisms to solve ecological problems, it does not exclude the possibility
that more advanced mechanisms may be in play too. In fact, the model suggests that advanced
cognitive abilities may have evolved from more simple associative principles. Therefore, it is
possible that interspecies (and possibly inter-individual) variation in the task may be due to
subjects using a variety of different learning strategies, from simpler to more complex cognitive
abilities. Although it is impossible to know exactly which particular mechanism was used by
which subject in the task (see Chittka & Jensen, 2011), I see at least three cognitive processes
that may have accounted for variation in the task: attention (e.g., attention biases), perception
(e.g., object and pattern recognition), and executive functions (e.g., inhibitory control, cognitive
flexibility and working memory).
Regarding attention, species and individuals pay particular attention (whether consciously
or not) to salient stimuli that are present in their external environment. For example, humans
(Navon, 1977) and chimpanzees (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002) attend to stimulus global patterns
(i.e., shape and overall contours), whereas rhesus macaques (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002) and
capuchin monkeys (Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003; Truppa, Carducci, De Simone, et al.,
2017) attend to more local cues. Each processing presents its own advantages, but the kind of
bias each species shows reflects how they naturally perceive and treat stimuli in the real world
(see Neiworth, Gleichman, Olinick, & Lamp, 2006). To my knowledge, no existing studies have
investigated attention biases in cleaner fish; however, the results of the plate task might indicate
that, unlike capuchins, fish (and possibly chimpanzees; see Salwiczek et al., 2012) used a globalprocessing strategy to solve the task; that is, they focused on the overall design of the plates.
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Regarding perception, prior studies have shown that primates have the visual capacity to
recognize familiar and unfamiliar individuals, a capacity widely present across highly social
species (for a review, see Leopold & Rhodes, 2010; for primates, see Parr, Winslow, Hopkins, &
de Waal, 2000; Talbot, Leverett, & Brosnan, 2016; Talbot, Mayo, Stoinski, & Brosnan, 2015).
There is also experimental evidence that cleaner fish can discriminate between familiar and
unfamiliar clients in the absence of cues such as territory, behavior and location (see Tebbich,
Bshary, & Grutter, 2002). Although it is still unclear whether cleaners recognize all their clients
individually or just some of them (or what cues are key for the discrimination), given that cleaner
fish have more than 2000 cleaning interactions per day (Grutter, 1995), and that these encounters
often take place in the presence of potential clients (see Bshary & D’Souza, 2005; Pinto et al.,
2011), the results of the plate task suggest that cleaners may be even better than primates at
recognizing individuals, which in turn may have made the fish better than the primates at
recognizing individual plates.
Regarding executive function, prior studies have shown that orangutans outperform some
other primate species, including gorillas and capuchins, in various problems that require the
capacity to inhibit certain prepotent responses associated with the visibility of rewards (e.g., see
Amici et al., 2008; Parrish et al., 2014; Shumaker et al., 2002; Vlamings et al., 2010). To support
this, I found that orangutans also outperformed gorillas (but not capuchins) in the color task,
where the food was visible, possibly because of their superior inhibitory skills. In a more recent
study, Zentall and colleagues proposed that the mechanism responsible for acquisition of the fish
task is likely self-control. According to this hypothesis, fish outperformed primates in the task
because they were less impulsive (Zentall et al., 2016). Unlike primate subjects, for whom the
risk of making an incorrect trial may not have direct repercussion on their fitness, cleaner fish
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must be relatively cautious when interacting with their client fish, because cheating, such as
eating the client fish’s mucus rather than parasites, might have serious consequences (e.g.,
terminate the interaction, risk to be eaten or chased by the client, etc.).
To test for this inhibition hypothesis, rats were subjected to a version of the task where
the food reward was released after 20 seconds following the first choice, which the authors
hypothesized, would improve performance (Zentall et al., 2017). Under these conditions,
subjects eventually learned to solve the task. The authors suggested that delays to reinforcement
facilitate the acquisition of the task by minimizing the impulsive response associated with the
immediacy of the first reward. Whereas the results of the capuchin monkeys in the plate task, the
computerized-based tasks, and the cup task may support the impulsivity hypothesis (in that they
improved their performance when the food became not immediately available to them), the
performance of capuchins and orangutans in the color task (where the food is immediately
available) seem to argue against it. These results indicate that impulsivity may be influencing
performance, but cannot alone explain all species’ variation in the task, and that other cognitive
mechanisms are likely explaining success in the task.
What mechanisms species used to solve the task, and the inter-individual variation in
performance found in the tasks, remain elusive. If my subjects (within the same species or
between populations) had both the same evolutionary history and same experience with the
experimental procedure, why did they still show variation in performance in the task? Why did
some subjects learn the task quickly, whereas others never did so? Why did some subjects
behave rather counter-intuitively by choosing the suboptimal permanent option? When
comparing the performance of species in a similar task, it is hard to determine the exact strategy
by which subjects solve it. That is, even if they perform similarly, some individuals might use
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relatively simple heuristics, whereas others might use a more abstract reasoning (see Chittka &
Jensen, 2011). One way to address this issue, however, is to test multiple individuals (and
species) on multiple tasks and measures; then, if they show similarities in performance in various
contexts, it would provide converging evidence for similarities in processing as well (see Kamil,
1998). This was the approach for my dissertation project, and whereas a single dissertation
project does not allow sufficient time to address this question in full, it is my hope that my
continued work and others’ will eventually answer this question.
In conclusion, my results indicate that ecology, coded in the genetic and neural systems,
appears to predispose animals to attend to particular types of stimuli, to respond to particular
contingencies, and even to inhibit responses under particular conditions. My research emphasizes
the importance and power of comparative research to elucidate these differences.

6.4

Future Directions
6.4.1

Refining Methods to Test the Ecological Hypothesis

In a series of studies, my colleagues and I found that monkeys did better in the task
derived from fish ecology (Salwiczek et al., 2012) when the task cues were changed to be more
relevant to primates (Prétôt et al., 2016b). Nevertheless, the primates did not outperform the fish.
There are at least two possible explanations for this. First, it may be that the task was still
difficult for the monkeys, presumably because it was fundamentally motivated by fish, rather
than monkeys, behavior. Second, it is possible that the fish performed unexpectedly well in all
tasks because they were able to generalize. Therefore, an important next step is to test fish and
monkeys in an adaptation of the fish procedure entirely derived from primates’ natural behavior.
I would choose prosociality as primate behavior of interest for this study.
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Prosociality is defined as an altruistic behavior in which conspecifics are sensitive to the
needs of others. Several studies have shown that this trait may not be unique to the human
species and that nonhuman primates also show some degree of prosocial behavior (e.g., Horner,
Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008; de Waal et al., 2008). In a
future study, I will thus adapt a paradigm typically used to test prosocial behavior in primates to
this procedure (derived from fish ecology), in order to test the degree to which primates and fish
do better in the basic task when the underlying structure is directly applicable to a natural
situation for monkeys, as opposed to fish (Prétôt et al., 2016b).
Prosocial behavior represents a promising model to test my hypothesis for several
reasons. First, the intuitive nature of most tasks designed to test prosocial behavior makes it
relatively convenient to test in a variety of species. In my case, the experimental design is based
on a simple choice between two options, which is easily done by fish and primates as well as
other species. Second, the procedure used for testing prosocial behavior will be quite similar to
the one used in Salwiczek et al. (2012), a prerequisite for my comparison. Third, prosocial
behavior has been reported in primates in both experimental studies (e.g., chimpanzees: Horner
et al., 2011; Melis, Warneken, Jensen, et al., 2011; bonobos: Hare & Kwetuenda, 2010; Hare,
Melis, Hastings, et al., 2007; capuchins: Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008; de Waal et al.,
2008; marmosets and tamarins: Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, & van Schaik, 2007; Cronin, Schroeder,
& Snowdon, 2010) and in the field (chimpanzees: Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2010; Boesch,
Bolé, Eckhardt, & Boesch, 2010; capuchins: Crofoot, Rubenstein, Maiya, & Berger-Wolf, 2011;
Perry & Rose, 1994; Rose, 1997; Sargeant, Wikberg, Kawamura, & Fedigan, 2015; for reviews,
see de Waal, 2009; de Waal & Suchak, 2010). This ecological relevance for primates is an
important aspect of this particular component of my comparative program.
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6.4.2

Children’s Cooperative Decision-Making in Socially Valid Context

The findings of my dissertation project give rise to an important and untested question: Is
it possible that the species differed in performance because they perceived the task differently?
Specifically, the fish may have performed relatively well in all tasks because they perceived it as
social and cooperative (it simulates the cleaning interactions with their client fish), whereas
primates, who never experience this situation, may have perceived it as a nonsocial choice task
(Salwiczek et al., 2012). If so, a change in protocol for the primates that lets them perceive the
task as more social and cooperative should lead to faster learning.
In a recent work, I tested this hypothesis by presenting capuchin monkeys with a version
of the task in which they chose the food from between two experimenters rather than two plates
(as in the original study; Prétôt et al., in prep). I predicted that the presence of a pair of real
partners (rather than plates) would increase subjects’ overall performance in the task as
compared to the original task. Contrary to my hypothesis, however, the monkeys did not improve
their performance in the adapted task, indicating that making the task more social did not seem to
affect their behavior. To further test the possibility that the presence of a conspecific is a key
component of success in the task, I am currently replicating this study with children. My
preliminary data seem to indicate that both the context and the social component may influence
decisions in the task. Indeed, children tested at a local daycare, where I had the option to test
them over multiple days, seem to perform overall better than those tested in the on-campus lab or
at a local science museum, who were tested only once. In addition, children at the daycare
perform apparently better in the social than the nonsocial task, which demonstrates that working
with a conspecific likely improves performance in humans.
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Taken together, my research findings emphasize the importance of testing species in
ecologically and socially valid contexts in order to understand the full scope of their cognitive
abilities. In future work, I hope to employ a similar approach to investigate cooperation in
humans. Specifically, my proposed projects for my postdoctoral fellowship are united by a
strong commitment to studying children’s cooperative decision-making in a socially valid
context, one in which children engage in actual cooperation with partners to acquire and divide
collective resources. This study will be among the first to investigate how children solve
cooperative dilemmas, and will extend existing work by increasing the social validity of
established paradigms.
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